Compiled by David Chalmers
Part 1 of Online papers on consciousness
- Part 1: Philosophy of consciousness
- Part 2: Other philosophy of mind
- Part 3: Science of Consciousness
- General [47 papers]
- The concept of consciousness [34]
- The explanatory gap [54]
- Materialism and dualism [44]
- The knowledge argument [39]
- Phenomenal concepts [27]
- Materialism and modality [49]
- Metaphysics of consciousness [44]
- Panpsychism [18]
- Zombies [30]
- Qualia [37]
- Color and color experience [59]
- Other sensory experiences [37]
- Perception [61]
- Perceptual content [35]
- Nonconceptual content [35]
- Consciousness and intentionality [26]
- Representationalism [71]
- Higher-order theories [62]
- Introspection and self-knowledge[47]
- Self-consciousness [40]
- The unity of consciousness [24]
- The function of consciousness [26]
- Ned Block, Consciousness
- David Chalmers, Consciousness and cognition
- David Chalmers, The puzzle of conscious experience
- Patricia Churchland, What should we expect from a theory of consciousness?
- Daniel Dennett, Consciousness: How much is that in real money?
- Daniel Dennett, Two steps closer on consciousness
- Rocco Gennaro, Consciousness
- Susan Hurley, Precis of Consciousness in Action (with commentaries by Chemero and Cordeiro and reply, Jarvilehto, Noë and reply, plus reply to Kinsbourne and Kobes)
- Julian Jaynes, The problem of consciousness
- Uriah Kriegel, Philosophical theories of consciousness
- Paul Livingston, Experience and structure: Philosophical history and the problem of consciousness
- Eric Lormand, Consciousness
- Eric Lormand, Steps toward a science of consciousness?
- Thomas Metzinger, The problem of consciousness
- Thomas Nagel, The mind wins
- David Papineau, Could there be a science of consciousness?
- David Papineau, Theories of consciousness
- John Perry, Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness (and commentaries by Chalmers and Rosenthal)
- Jesse Prinz, A neurofunctional theory of consciousness
- David Rosenthal, Consciousness and the mind
- John Searle, The problem of consciousness
- John Searle, Consciousness and the philosophers (and Chalmers' reply)
- John Searle, Consciousness
- Charles Siewert, Precis of The Significance of Consciousness (and commentaries by Carruthers, Dretske, Gertler, Levine, Ludwig, Lurz, Lycan, Nelkin, Seager, Thomasson, Witmer, and replies)
- Robert Van Gulick, Consciousness
- Max Velmans, A natural account of phenomenal consciousness
- Michael Antony, Outline of a general methodology for consciousness research
- Michael Antony, Is "consciousness" ambiguous?
- Michael Antony, Concepts of consciousness, kinds of consciousness, meanings of 'consciousness'
- Mark Bickhard, Consciousness and reflective consciousness
- Ned Block, On a confusion about a function of consciousness (plus further reply to commentators)
- Ned Block, What is Dennett's theory a theory of?
- David Chalmers, Availability: The cognitive basis of experience? (and Ned Block's reply)
- Austen Clark, Phenomenal consciousness so-called
- Austen Clark, Vicissitudes of consciousness, varieties of correlates
- Ronnie de Sousa, Twelve varieties of subjectivity
- Daniel Dennett, Consciousness: How much is that in real money?
- Alvin Goldman, Consciousness, folk psychology, and cognitive science
- P.M.S. Hacker, Is there anything it is like to be a bat?
- Ted Honderich, Consciousness as existence
- Ted Honderich, Consciousness as existence again
- Ted Honderich, Consciousness as existence, devout physicalism, spiritualism
- Dan Hutto, Consciousness demystified: A Wittgensteinian critique of Dennett's project
- William James, Does "consciousness" exist?
- Douglas Katz, Minimally conscious states
- Uriah Kriegel, The concept of consciousness in the cognitive sciences: Phenomenal consciousness, access consciousness, and scientific practice
- Eric Lormand, Nonphenomenal consciousness
- William Lycan, The plurality of consciousness
- David Rosenthal, Phenomenal consciousness and what it's like
- David Rosenthal, Consciousness and sensation
- David Rosenthal, How many kinds of consciousness?
- David Rosenthal, The kinds of consciousness
- David Rosenthal, State consciousness and transitive consciousness
- Aaron Sloman, Notes on consciousness
- Aaron Sloman, What is it like to be a rock?
- David Woodruff Smith, Three facets of consciousness
- Nigel Thomas, Imagination, eliminativism, and the pre-history of consciousness
- Max Velmans, Defining consciousness
- Marcus Arvan, Out with qualia and in with consciousness: Why the hard problem is a myth
- Giorgio Ascoli, Is it already time to give up on a science of consciousness?
- Ansgar Beckermann, The perennial problem of the reductive explainability of consciousness
- David Bengtsson, The nature of explanation in a theory of consciousness
- Susan Blackmore, What is it like to be...?
- Ned Block, The harder problem of consciousness (and replies by Brian McLaughlin and Jakob Hohwy)
- Ned Block and Robert Stalnaker, Conceptual analysis and the explanatory gap
- David Brooks, How to solve the hard problem: A predictable inexplicability
- Peter Carruthers, Consciousness: Explaining the phenomena
- Peter Carruthers, Reductive explanation and the "explanatory gap"
- David Chalmers, Facing up to the problem of consciousness
- David Chalmers, Moving forward on the problem of consciousness
- David Chalmers and Frank Jackson, Conceptual analysis and reductive explanation
- Patricia Churchland, The hornswoggle problem (and Chalmers' reply)
- Austen Clark, How to respond to philosophers on raw feels
- Austen Clark, I am Joe's explanatory gap
- Tom Clark, Function and phenomenology: Closing the explanatory gap
- David de Leon, The limits of thought and the mind-body problem
- Daniel Dennett, Facing backwards on the problem of consciousness (and Chalmers' reply)
- Janice Dowell, Serious metaphysics and the vindication of explanatory reductions
- Brie Gertler, Explanatory reduction, conceptual analysis, and conceivability arguments about the mind
- Isabel Gois, Understanding consciousness
- Greg Hodes, What would it "be like" to solve the hard problem?: Cognition, consciousness, and qualia zombies
- Ted Honderich, Consciousness and inner tubes
- Steven Horst, Evolutionary explanation and the hard problem of consciousness (and reply by Fiona McPherson)
- Nicholas Humphrey, How to solve the mind-body problem (plus reply to commentators)
- Nicholas Humphrey, Thinking about feeling
- Marc Krellenstein, , Unsolvable problems, visual imagery, and explanatory satisfaction
- Eric Lormand, The explanatory stopgap (and appendix)
- Bruce MacLennan, The elements of consciousness and their neurodynamical correlates
- Pete Mandik, An epistemological theory of consciousness?
- Ron McClamrock, Irreducibility and subjectivity
- Colin McGinn, Consciousness, atomism, and the ancient Greeks
- Barbara Montero, The epistemic/ontic divide
- Barbara Montero, Consciousness is puzzling but not paradoxical
- Todd Moody, Consciousness and complexity
- David Papineau, Mind the gap
- Thomas Polger, H2O, 'water', and transparent reduction
- Thomas Polger, What the tortoise dreamt
- Thomas Polger & Robert Skipper, Naturalism, explanation, and identity
- Philip Robbins and Anthony Jack, The phenomenal stance
- Teed Rockwell, The hard problem is dead: Long live the hard problem
- Michael Silberstein, Reductive physicalism and the explanatory gap: A dilemma
- Michael Tye, Phenomenal consciousness: The explanatory gap as cognitive illusion
- Max Velmans, The relation of consciousness to the material world
- Ken Wilber, The hard problem
- Wayne Wright, Explanation and the hard problem
- Torin Alter, Nagel on imagination and physicalism
- Istvan Aranyosi, Type-A dualism: A novel theory of the mental-physical nexus
- Istvan Aranyosi, Physical constituents for qualia
- Karen Bennett, Why I am not a dualist
- Selmer Bringsjord, Searle on the brink
- David Chalmers, Consciousness and its place in nature
- William Hasker, How not to be a reductivist
- John Hubbard, Parsimony and the mind
- E.J. Lowe, Self, agency, and mental causation
- Peter Lloyd, Is the mind physical? Dissecting conscious brain tissue
- William Lycan, Recent naturalistic dualisms
- Marvin Minsky, Minds are simply what brains do
- Marvin Minsky, Matter, minds, and models
- Hans Moravec, Dualism through reductionism
- Gregg Rosenberg, The argument against physicalism
- Titus Rivas & Hein van Dongen, Exit epiphenomenalism: The demolition of a refuge
- A.J. Rudd, What it's like and what's really wrong with physicalism: A Wittgensteinian perspective
- John Searle, Biological naturalism
- John Searle, Why I am not a property dualist
- Wilfrid Sellars, Is consciousness physical?
- Daniel Stoljar, Two conceptions of the physical (and Jakob Hohwy's reply)
- Galen Strawson, Real materialism
- Torin Alter, The knowledge argument
- Torin Alter, Does representationalism undermine the knowledge argument?
- Torin Alter, Know-how, ability, and the ability hypothesis
- Torin Alter, A limited defense of the knowledge argument
- Istvan Aranyosi, Jackson's knowledge argument
- Michael Beaton, What RoboDennett still doesn't know
- Laurence BonJour, What is it like to be human (instead of a bat)
- Alex Byrne, Something about Mary
- Alex Byrne, Review of There's Something About Mary
- David Chalmers, Phenomenal concepts and the knowledge argument
- Daniel Dennett, What RoboMary knows
- Max Deutsch, Subjective physical facts
- Brie Gertler, A defense of the knowledge argument
- Benj Hellie, Inexpressible truths and the allure of the knowledge argument
- Benj Hellie, What the knowledge argument teaches
- Robert Howell, The knowledge argument and objectivity
- Frank Jackson, Epiphenomenal qualia
- Frank Jackson, Mind and illusion
- Jesper Kallestrup, Epistemological physicalism and the knowledge argument
- William Lycan, Perspectival representation and the knowledge argument
- Pete Mandik, Mental representation and the subjectivity of consciousness
- Yujin Nagasawa, The knowledge argument against dualism
- Thomas Nagel, What is it like to be a bat?
- Martine Nida-Rumelin, On beliefs about experience: An epistemological distinction applied to the knowledge argument against physicalism
- Martine Nida-Rumelin, The knowledge argument
- Martine Nida-Rumelin, What Mary couldn't know: Beliefs about phenomenal states
- John O'Dea, Nonconceptual content and the knowledge argument
- Michael Pelczar, Enlightening the fully informed
- Derk Pereboom, Bats, brain scientists, and the limitations of introspection
- Jesse Prinz, Mental maintenance: A response to the knowledge argument
- Diana Raffman, Even zombies can be surprised: A reply to Graham and Horgan (plus Graham and Horgan's reply)
- Paul Raymont, The know-how response to Jackson's knowledge argument
- Paul Raymont, Tye's criticism of the knowledge argument
- David Rosenthal, Reductionism and knowledge
- Robert Stalnaker, Knowing where we are, and what it is like
- Fredrik Stjernberg, Not so epiphenomenal qualia
- Daniel Stoljar and Yujin Nagasawa, Introduction to There's Something about Mary
- Nigel Thomas, Mary doesn't know science: On misconceiving a science of consciousness
- Evan Thompson, Novel colours
- Michael Tye, Knowing what it is like: The ability hypothesis and the knowledge argument
- Robert Van Gulick, Jackson's change of mind: Representationalism, a priorism, and the knowledge argument
- Torin Alter, On the conditional analysis of phenomenal concepts (plus reply to Thompson and reply to Sawyer)
- Peter Alward, Is phenomenal pain the primary intension of "pain"?
- Istvan Aranyosi, Papineau's (in)determinacy problem
- Murat Aydede & Güven Güzeldere, Cognitive architecture, concepts, and introspection: An information-theoretic solution to the problem of phenomenal consciousness
- Ned Block, Max Black's objection to mind-brain identity
- Darragh Byrne, The contents of phenomenal concepts
- Peter Carruthers, Phenomenal concepts and higher-order experiences
- Peter Carruthers and Benedicte Veillet, The phenomenal concept strategy
- David Chalmers, Phenomenal concepts and the explanatory gap
- David Chalmers, The content and epistemology of phenomenal belief
- Esa Diaz-Leon, Can phenomenal concepts explain the explanatory gap?
- Jonathan Ellis, Can an externalist about concepts be an internalist about phenomenal character
- John Hawthorne, Dancing qualia and direct reference
- Jane Heal, Minds, brains, and indexicals
- Terry Horgan & John Tienson, Deconstructing new wave materialism
- Janet Levin, What is a phenomenal concept?
- Joseph Levine, Phenomenal concepts and the materialist constraint
- Brian Loar, Phenomenal states
- Pascal Ludwig, A descriptivist theory of phenomenal concepts
- Cynthia MacDonald, Mary meets Molyneux: The explanatory gap and the individuation of phenomenal concepts
- Christopher Mole, Supervaluation for Papineau's phenomenal concepts
- John O'Dea, The indexical nature of sensory concepts
- David Papineau, Introduction to Thinking about Consciousness (and commentaries by Robert Kirk and Andrew Melnyk, and Papineau's reply) (plus review by Pär Sundström)
- David Papineau, Phenomenal and perceptual concepts
- Daniel Stoljar, Physicalism and phenomenal concepts
- Michael Tye, A theory of phenomenal concepts
- Stephen Yablo, Grokking pain
- Istvan Aranyosi, Kripke's modal argument
- Istvan Aranyosi, Chalmers' zombie argument
- Murat Aydede & Güven Güzeldere, Consciousness, conceivability arguments, and perspectivalism
- Andrew Bailey, The unsoundness of arguments from conceivability
- Katalin Balog, Conceivability arguments, or revenge of the zombies
- George Bealer, Mental properties
- George Bealer, Modal epistemology and the rationalist renaissance
- Alex Byrne, Cosmic hermeneutics
- David Chalmers, Imagination, indexicality, and intensions (review of Perry)
- David Chalmers, Materialism and the metaphysics of modality
- David Chalmers, Mind and modality
- David Chalmers, The nature of epistemic space
- David Chalmers, Does conceivability entail possibility?
- Janice Dowell, A priori entailment, conceptual analysis, and making room for type-C physicalism
- Fred Feldman, Kripke on the identity theory
- Tamar Gendler and John Hawthorne, Introduction: Conceivability and possibility
- Brie Gertler, How to draw ontological conclusions from introspective data
- Ivan Havel, Living in conceivable worlds
- Frank Jackson, The case for a priori physicalism
- Frank Jackson, From H2O to water: The relevance to a priori passage
- Mark Johnston, It necessarily ain't so
- Jesper Kallestrup, Physicalism, conceivability, and strong necessities
- Navin Kartik, In the hands of zombies
- Peter Kung, Imaginability as a guide to possibility
- Manfred Kupffer, Conceivability and the a priori
- Stephen Law, Loar's defence of physicalism
- Pascal Ludwig, Kripke's conceivability argument reconsidered
- Eric Marcus, Why zombies are inconceivable
- Wallace Matson, Logical possibility, laws of nature, and mind in the history of philosophy
- Michael McKinsey, A refutation of qualia physicalism
- Thomas Nagel, Conceiving the impossible and the mind-body problem
- Thomas Nagel, The psychophysical nexus
- Martine Nida-Rumelin, Grasping phenomenal properties
- Derk Pereboom, Consciousness and introspective inaccuracy
- Matthew Phillips, Why positive and negative conceivability can't save the conceivability-possibility link
- Karol Polcyn, Conceivability, possibility, and a posteriori necessity: On Chalmers' argument for dualism
- Karol Polcyn, Chalmers' two-dimensional argument against materialism
- Thomas Polger, Kripke and the illusion of contingent identity
- Paul Raymore, A materialist response to David Chalmers' The Conscious Mind
- Sven Rosenkrantz, Reductive materialism, apriority, and the problem of consciousness
- Warren Shrader, Assessing the case against a posteriori physicalism
- Robert Stalnaker, On considering a possible world as actual
- Daniel Stoljar, The conceivability argument and two conceptions of the physical
- Brian Weatherson, Morality in fiction and consciousness in imagination
- Stephen White, Why the property dualism argument won't go away
- Crispin Wright, The conceivability of naturalism
- Stephen Yablo, Concepts and consciousness
- Stephen Yablo, Coulda, woulda, shoulda
- Stephen Yablo, Illusions of possibility
- Stephen Yablo, Is conceivability a guide to possibility?
- Stephen Yablo, Modal rationalism and logical empiricism: Some similarities
- Stephen Yablo, Textbook Kripkeanism and the open texture of language
- Sophie Allen, A space oddity: McGinn on consciousness and space
- Michael Antony, Against functionalist theories of consciousness
- Michael Antony, Conceiving simple experiences
- Michael Antony, Vagueness and the metaphysics of consciousness
- David Barnett, On the simplicity of mental beings
- John Bolender, Factual phenomenalism: A supervenience theory
- C. D. Broad, Mind and Its Place in Nature
- Dan Bruiger, The rise and fall of reality
- David Chalmers, Consciousness and cognition
- Fergus Duniho, The mind/body problem and its solution
- Richard Gale, William James on the misery and glory of consciousness
- George Graham & Terry Horgan, Sensations and grain processes
- Robert Hanna & Evan Thompson, The mind-body-body problem
- Rom Harre, Nagel's challenge and the mind-body problem
- Dan Hutto, An ideal solution to the problem of consciousness
- Ted Honderich, Consciousness, neural functionalism, and real subjectivity
- Piet Hut & Bas van Fraassen, Elements of reality: A dialogue
- William James, A world of pure experience
- Mark Johnston, The Manifest, Chapter 1 (also Chapter 5, Chapter 7)
- Amy Kind, The irreducibility of consciousness
- Peter King, Why isn't the mind-body problem medieval?
- Peter Lloyd, Berkelian ontology as a fundamental approach to consciousness
- Peter Lloyd, Berkeley revisited: The hard problem considered easy
- Michael Lockwood, The grain problem
- Ron McClamrock, Irreducibility and subjectivity
- Neil McKinnon, Presentism and consciousness
- Colin McGinn, Consciousness and space
- Anil Mitra, Problems in the science and philosophy of mind and consciousness
- Steven Perkins, An orthodox Christian look at the mind-body problem
- Michael Silberstein, Explaining consciousness: Convergence on emergence
- Roger Sperry, A modified concept of consciousness
- Roger Sperry, The riddle of consciousness and the changing scientific worldview
- Roger Sperry, Mental phenomena as causal determinants in brain function
- Roger Sperry, A mentalist view of consciousness
- Roger Sperry, Mind-brain interaction: Mentalism, yes; dualism, no
- Roger Sperry, An objective approach to subjective experience: Further explanation of a hypothesis
- Roger Sperry, Turnabout on consciousness: A mentalist view
- Galen Strawson, Realistic materialism
- Galen Strawson, What is the relation between an experience, the subject of the experience, and the content of the experience?
- Leopold Stubenberg, Neutral monism
- Alan Thomas, An adverbial theory of consciousness
- Alan Thomas, Kant, McDowell, and the theory of consciousness
- Francois Tonneau, Consciousness outside the head
- Max Velmans, Consciousness, brain, and the physical world
- Max Velmans, Goodbye to reductionism
- Max Velmans, How experienced phenomena relate to things in themselves: Kant, Husserl, Hiche, and reflexive monism
- Max Velmans, Where experiences are: Dualist, physicalist, enactive and reflexive accounts of phenomenal consciousness
- Charles Birch, Why I became a panexperientialist
- John B. Cobb & W.H. Thorpe, Some Whiteheadian comments
- Peter Farleigh, Whitehead's even more dangerous idea
- Liane Gabora, Amplifying phenomenal information: Toward a fundamental theory of consciousness
- David Ray Griffin, Some Whiteheadian comments
- Charles Hartshorne, Physics and psychics: The place of mind in nature
- Piet Hut and Roger Shepard, Turning the "hard problem" upside down and sideways
- David Pearce, Cosmic consciousness for tough minds
- David Pearce, Naturalistic panpsychism
- Bernard Rensch and Charles Hartshorne, Arguments for panpsychistic identism
- Gregg Rosenberg, On the possibility of panexperientialism
- William Seager, Consciousness, information, and panpsychism
- William Seager, Panpsychism
- William Seager, Whitehead and the revival (?) of panpsychism
- Steven Sevush, Single-neuron theory of consciousness
- T.L.S. Sprigge, Panpsychism
- Peter Unger, The mystery of the physical and the matter of qualities
- Sewall Wright, Panpsychism and science
- Andrew Bailey, Physicalism and the preposterousness of zombies
- Andrew Bailey, Zombies support biological theories of consciousness
- Peter Bokulich, Putting zombies to rest: The role of dynamics in reduction
- Selmer Bringsjord, In defense of impenetrable zombies
- Selmer Bringsjord, The zombie attack on the computational conception of mind
- David Chalmers, Self-ascription without qualia: A case-study
- Allin Cottrell, Sniffing the camembert: On the conceivability of zombies
- Daniel Dennett, The unimagined preposterousness of zombies
- Daniel Dennett, The zombic hunch: Extinction of an intuition?
- Owen Flanagan & Tom Polger, Zombies and the function of consciousness
- Stevan Harnad, Why and how we are not zombies
- Larry Hauser, Revenge of the zombies
- Mike Kearns, Could Daniel Dennett be a zombie?
- Robert Kirk, Zombies
- Christof Koch & Francis Crick, On the zombie within
- Jaron Lanier, You can't argue with a zombie
- Dan Lloyd, Twilight of the zombies
- Michael Lynch, Zombies and the case of the phenomenal pickpocket
- Peter Marton, Zombies versus materialists: The battle for conceivability
- Chris Mathieson, Reining in Chalmers: On the logical possibility of zombies
- John McCarthy, Todd Moody's zombies
- Todd Moody, Conversations with zombies
- Tom Polger, Zombies
- William Seager, Are zombies logically possible? -- and why it matters
- Nigel Shardlow, Zombies
- Paul Skokowski, I, zombie
- Jan Sleutels, Greek zombies
- Daniel Stoljar, Actors and zombies
- Tamler Sommers, Of zombies, color scientists, and floating iron bars
- Julia Tanney, On the conceptual, psychological, and moral status of zombies, swamp-beings, and other 'behaviourally indistinguishable' creatures
- Nigel Thomas, Zombie killer
- Tillmann Vierkent, Zombie Mary and the blue banana: On the compatibility of the knowledge argument with the argument from modality
- Robert Allen, The subject is qualia
- Torin Alter, Qualia
- Andrew Bailey, Multiple realizability, qualia, and natural kinds
- Andrew Bailey, Qualia and the argument from illusion
- Jose Luis Bermudez, Categorizing qualitative states: Some problems
- Ned Block, Qualia
- Nick Bostrom, Quantity of experience: Brain duplication and degrees of consciousness
- Alex Byrne, Inverted Qualia
- David Chalmers, Absent qualia, fading qualia, dancing qualia
- Austen Clark, A physicalist theory of qualia
- Austen Clark, Quality space
- David Cole, Inverted spectrum arguments
- Tim Crane, The origins of qualia
- David de Leon, The qualities of qualia
- Daniel Dennett, Instead of qualia
- Daniel Dennett, Lovely and suspect qualities
- Daniel Dennett, Quining qualia
- John Gibbons, Qualia: They're not what they seem
- Richard Gregory, Peculiar qualia
- Richard Gregory, What do qualia do?
- Nicholas Humphrey, The privatization of sensation
- Kelly Dean Jolley and Michael Watkins, What is it like to be a phenomenologist?
- Amy Kind, Qualia realism
- Eric Lormand, Qualia! (Now showing at a theater near you)
- Michael Martin, Setting things before the mind
- David Newman, Chaos and qualia
- Martine Nida-Rumelin, Pseudonormal vision: An actual case of qualia inversion? (plus Peter Ross's commentary, Nida-Rumelin's response, and Ross's rejoinder)
- Martine Nida-Rumelin, Pseudonormal vision and color qualia
- John O'Dea, A higher-order, dispositional theory of qualia
- Eugene Park, Against Dennett's eliminativism: Preserving qualia as a coherent concept
- Michael Pelczar, On an argument against qualia inversion
- William Robinson, Qualia realism
- Teed Rockwell, Experience and sensation: Sellars and Dewey on the non-cognitive aspects of mental life
- Peter Ross, Qualia and the senses
- Mark Sharlow, Qualia and the problem of universals
- Sydney Shoemaker, Color, subjective reactions, and qualia
- Sydney Shoemaker, The phenomenal character of experience
- Robert Stalnaker, Comparing qualia across persons
- Michael Tye, Qualia
- Edmond Wright, The defence of qualia
- Clare Batty, Naïve color
- Peter Bradley and Michael Tye, Of colors, kestrels, caterpillars, and leaves
- Alex Byrne, Color and similarity
- Alex Byrne & David Hilbert, Philosophical issues about colour vision
- Alex Byrne & David Hilbert, Hardin, Tye, and color physicalism
- Alex Byrne & David Hilbert, Colors and reflectances
- Alex Byrne, Do colours look like dispositions?
- Alex Byrne & David Hilbert, Color realism and color science (plus commentaries and reply, and further reply)
- Alex Byrne & David Hilbert, Color primitivism
- Alex Byrne, Yes, Virginia, lemons are yellow
- Alex Byrne, Color and the mind-body problem
- John Campbell, A simple view of colour
- John Campbell, Manipulating colours: Pounding an almond
- Austen Clark, The particulate instantiation of homogeneous pink
- Austen Clark, A subjectivist reply to spectrum inversion
- Austen Clark, Qualia and the psychophysical explanation of color perception
- Austen Clark, Spectrum inversion and the color solid
- Austen Clark, True theories, false colors
- Jonathan Cohen, A guided tour of color
- Jonathan Cohen, Color: A functionalist proposal
- Jonathan Cohen, Color properties and color ascriptions: A relationalist manifesto
- Jonathan Cohen, On the structural properties of the colors
- Jonathan Cohen, Color constancy as counterfactual
- Jonathan Cohen, Color, variation, and the appeal to essences: Impasse and resolution
- Andy Egan, Secondary qualities and self-location
- Naomi Eilan, On the reality of color
- Jonathan Ellis, Colour irrealism and the formation of colour concepts
- Jonathan Ellis, Color, error, and explanatory power
- David Hilbert, What is color vision?
- David Hilbert & Mark Kalderon, Color and the inverted spectrum
- Susan Hurley and Alva Noë, Can hunter-gatherers hear color?
- Zoltan Jakab, Metameric surfaces: The ultimate case against color physicalism and representational theories of phenomenal consciousness
- Kent Johnson and Wayne Wright, Colors as properties of the special sciences
- Mark Kalderon, Color pluralism and the location problem
- Mohan Matthen, Our knowledge of color
- Erik Myin, Color and the duplication assumption
- Martine Nida-Rumelin, The character of color terms: A phenomenalist view
- Martine Nida-Rumelin and Achill Schnetzer, Unique hues, binary hues, and phenomenal composition
- Stephen Palmer, Color, consciousness, and the isomorphism constraint (and comments by Byrne, Dennett, Myin, O'Brien and Opie, Viger)
- Robert Pasnau, A theory of secondary qualities
- Adam Pautz, Can the physicalist about colour explain colour structure in terms of colour experience?
- Tony Pitson, The dispositional account of colour
- Thomas Polger, True colors: A problem for Tye's color realism
- William Robinson, Colors, arousal, functionalism, and individual differences
- David Rosenthal, Color, mental location, and the visual field
- David Rosenthal, The colors and shapes of visual experiences
- Peter Ross, Fixing the reference of color terms
- Achill Schnetzer, The greenness of green: Brentano on the status of phenomenal green
- Mark Sharlow, Visual cortical feedback and the ineffability of colors
- Juan Suarez and Martine Nida-Rumelin, Reddish green: A challenge for modal claims about phenomenal structure
- Pär Sundström, Colour and consciousness: Untying the metaphysical knot
- Nigel Thomas, Color realism: Toward a solution to the "hard problem"
- Brad Thompson, Inverted spectra without illusion
- Evan Thompson, Colour vision, evolution, and perceptual content
- Evan Thompson, Comparative colour vision: Quality space and visual ecology
- Michael Tye, The puzzle of true blue (plus reply by Adam Pautz)
- Wolfgang Spohn, The character of color terms: A materialist view
- Wayne Wright, A dilemma for Jackson and Pargetter's account of color
- Murat Aydede, Pain
- Murat Aydede, A critical and quasi-historical essay on theories of pain
- Murat Aydede, Is feeling pain the perception of something?
- Murat Aydede, Naturalism, introspection, and direct realism about pain
- Murat Aydede, An analysis of pleasure vis-a-vis pain
- Murat Aydede & Güven Güzeldere, Some foundational problems in the scientific study of pain
- Ned Block, Mental pictures and cognitive science
- Ronald De Sousa, Emotion
- Randall Dipert, The nature and structure of emotions
- York H. Gunther, The phenomenology and intentionality of emotion
- P.M.S. Hacker, The conceptual framework for the investigation of emotions
- Andy Hamilton, The sound of music
- Irwin Goldstein, Are emotions feelings? A further look at hedonic theories of emotions
- Irwin Goldstein, Intersubjective properties by which we specify pain, pleasure, and other kinds of mental states
- Irwin Goldstein, Pleasure and pain: Unconditional intrinsic values
- Amy Kind, Imagery and imagination
- Amy Kind, Putting the image back in imagination
- Colin Klein, Toward an accurate phenomenology of pain
- Barbara Montero, Proprioception as an aesthetic sense
- Barbara Montero, Proprioceiving someone else's movement
- Casey O'Callaghan, Echoes
- Casey O'Callaghan, The locations of sounds
- Casey O'Callaghan, Pitch
- Casey O'Callaghan, Sounds
- Casey O'Callaghan, Sounds and events
- Casey O'Callaghan, The argument from vacuums
- Thomas Polger & Kenneth Sufka, Closing the gap on pain
- William Seager, Emotional introspection
- Norman Teng, The depictive nature of visual mental imagery
- Nigel Thomas, Are theories of imagery theories of imagination?
- Nigel Thomas, Philosophy of mental imagery
- Michael Tye, Another look at representationalism about pain (with comments by Aydede, Block, Maund, Noordhof, and reply)
- Jose Luis Bermudez, Naturalized sense data
- Robert Brandom, No experience necessary: Empiricism, noninferential knowledge, and secondary qualities
- Robert Brandom, The centrality of Sellars' two-ply account of observation to the arguments of Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind
- Bill Brewer, Realism and the nature of perceptual experience
- Audre Jean Brokes, The argument from illusion reconsidered
- Philippe Chuard and Richard Corry, Looks non-transitive!
- Andrew Chrucky, The alleged fallacy of the sense-datum inference
- Austen Clark, Contemporary problems in the philosophy of perception
- Austen Clark, Philosophical issues about perception
- Austen Clark, Three varieties of visual field
- Paul Coates, Deviant causal chains and hallucinations: A problem for the anti-causalist
- Paul Coates, Perception and metaphysical skepticism
- Juan Comesana, Resisting disjunctivism
- Tim Crane, The problem of perception
- Daniel Dennett, Is perception the "leading edge" of memory?
- Daniel Dennett, Seeing is believing--or is it?
- John Dilworth, Perception, introspection, and functional consonance
- John Dilworth, Perceptual causality problems reflexively resolved
- John Dilworth, A reflexive, dispositional approach to perception
- John Dilworth, The reflexive theory of perception
- John Dilworth, Naturalized perception without information
- Fred Dretske, Perception without awareness
- William Fish, The direct/indirect distinction in contemporary philosophy of perception
- Jeffrey Galko, Ontology and perception
- Delia Graff, Phenomenal continua and the sorites
- Benj Hellie, Noise and perceptual indiscriminability
- Benj Hellie, Russell on sense-data
- Benj Hellie, Seeing into sense-data
- Ted Honderich, Seeing things
- Robert Howell & Jeremy Fantl, Sensations, swatches, and speckled hens
- Michael Huemer, Sense-data
- Susan Hurley, Active perception and perceiving action
- Pierre Jacob, Seeing, perceiving, and knowing
- Brian Keeley, Making sense of the senses: Individuating modalities in humans and other animals
- Uriah Kriegel, Trope theory and the metaphysics of appearances
- Jonathan Kvanvig, On denying a presupposition of Sellars' problem: A defense of propositionalism
- Chris Lindsay, Subjects as objects: Living in a material world
- Michael Martin, Austin's Sense and Sensibilia revisited
- Michael Martin, Beyond dispute: Sense-data, intentionality, and the mind-body problem
- Michael Martin, On being alienated
- Michael Martin, Sensible appearances
- Michael Martin, The limits of self-awareness
- Michael Martin, The transparency of experience
- Michael Martin, Uncovering Appearances, chapter one (also chapters two, three, and four)
- Ram Neta, In defense of disjunctivism
- Alva Noë, Causation and perception: The puzzle unravelled
- Alva Noë, Experience without the head
- Alva Noë, On what we see
- Alva Noë, Real presence
- John O'Dea, The senses and the structure of experience
- Christopher Peacocke, Explaining perceptual entitlement
- Christopher Peacocke, Joint attention: Its nature, reflexivity, and relation to common knowledge
- John Pollock & Iris Oved, Vision, knowledge, and the mystery link
- Susanna Siegel, The role of perception in demonstrative reference
- Susanna Siegel, Direct realism and perceptual consciousness
- Susanna Siegel, How does phenomenology constrain object-seeing?
- Susanna Siegel, Indiscriminability and the phenomenal
- Edmond Wright, Perception as epistemic
- Edmond Wright, Sensing as non-epistemic
- Kent Bach, How can experiences find their objects?
- Bill Brewer, Unilateral neglect and the objectivity of spatial representation
- John Campbell, Berkeley's puzzle
- John Campbell, Molyneux's question and cognitive impenetrability
- John Campbell, The role of physical objects in spatial thinking
- David Chalmers, Perception and the fall from Eden (and commentary by Susanna Siegel)
- Jonathan Cohen, Objects, places, and perception
- Austen Clark, Feature-placing and proto-objects
- Austen Clark, Sensing and reference
- Martin Davies, Externalism and experience
- John Dilworth, The double content of perception
- John Dilworth, The twofold orientational structure of perception
- John Dilworth, The perception of representational content
- Shaun Gallagher, The Molyneux Problem
- Benj Hellie, On the semantic properties of experiences
- Zoltan Jakab, Phenomenal projection
- Tomis Kapitan, Vision, vector, veracity
- Sean Kelly, What do we see (when we do)
- Sean Kelly, Reference and attention: A difficult connection
- Kirk Ludwig, Explaining why things look the way they do
- Kirk Ludwig, Shape properties and perception
- Fiona Macpherson, Novel colours and the content of experience
- Fiona MacPherson, Perfect pitch and the content of experience
- Michael Martin, Particular thoughts and singular thoughts
- Simon Prosser, The two-dimensional content of consciousness
- Timothy Schroeder and Ben Caplan, On the content of experience
- Susanna Siegel, Misperception
- Susanna Siegel, Particularity and presence in visual perception
- Susanna Siegel, The contents of perception
- Susanna Siegel, Which properties are represented in perception?
- Konrad Talmont-Kaminski & John Collier, Saving the distinctions: Distinctions as the epistemologically significant content of experience
- Brad Thompson, Senses for senses
- Brad Thompson, Shoemaker on phenomenal content
- Brad Thompson, The spatial content of experience
- Jose Luis Bermudez, Nonconceptual content: From perceptual experience to subpersonal computational states
- Jose Luis Bermudez & Fiona McPherson, Nonconceptual content and the nature of perceptual experience
- Bill Brewer, Sense experiential states have conceptual content
- Bill Brewer, Precis of Perception and Reason (including response to Eilan, Fumerton, Hurley, Martin) (plus response to Ayers)
- Bill Brewer, Experience and reason in perception
- Alex Byrne, Perception and conceptual content
- Alex Byrne, Spin control: Comment on McDowell's Mind and World
- Philippe Chuard, Demonstrative concepts without reidentification
- Philippe Chuard, Indiscriminable shades and demonstrative concepts
- Philippe Chuard, Perceptual reasons
- Philippe Chuard, The riches of experience
- Jerome Dokic & Elisabeth Pacherie, Shades and concepts
- Jerry Fodor, Revenge of the given
- Hannah Ginsborg, Empirical concepts and the content of experience
- Robert Hanna, Kant and nonconceptual content
- Susan Hurley, Overintellectualizing the mind (commentary on Brewer)
- Susan Hurley, Perception and action: Alternative views
- Sean Kelly, Demonstrative concepts and experience
- Sean Kelly, The non-conceptual content of perceptual experience: Situation-dependenc
e and fineness of grain - Sean Kelly, What makes perceptual content nonconceptual? (and Fred Ablondi's commentary)
- Jeremy Koons, Disenchanting the world: McDowell, Sellars, and rational constraint by perception
- Uriah Kriegel, Perceptual experience, conscious content, and nonconceptual content
- Daniel Laurier, Reasons, contents, and experiences
- Alva Noë, Thought and experience
- Elisabeth Pacherie, Conscious experience and concept-forming abilities
- Elisabeth Pacherie, Levels of perceptual content
- Christopher Peacocke, Does perception have a nonconceptual content
- Paul Pietroski, Experiencing the facts (critical notice of McDowell)
- Zenon Pylyshyn, Visual indexes and nonconceptual reference
- Jeff Speaks, Is there a problem about nonconceptual content?
- Josefa Toribio, Perceptual experience and its contents
- Michael Tye, Nonconceptual content, richness, and fineness of grain
- Wayne Wright, McDowell, demonstrative concepts, and nonconceptual content
- Andrew Brook, Jackendoff and consciousness
- Peter Carruthers, Conscious thinking: Language or elimination?
- Peter Carruthers, Conscious experience versus conscious thought
- Martin Davies, Consciousness and the varieties of aboutness
- Matthew Elton, Consciousness: Only at the personal level
- Jerry Fodor and Ernie Lepore, What is the Connection Principle?
- Eric Gillett, Searle and the "deep unconscious" (and Dan Lloyd's commentary)
- Ted Honderich, Consciousness as existence and the end of intentionality
- Terence Horgan and John Tienson, The intentionality of phenomenology and the phenomenology of intentionality
- Donovan Hulse and Cynthia Read, Searle's intentional mistake
- Pierre Jacob, Consciousness, intentionality, and function: What is the right order of explanation
- Uriah Kriegel, Moore's paradox and the structure of conscious belief
- Uriah Kriegel, The intentionality of conscious experience and mind-relative content
- Uriah Kriegel, Is intentionality dependent upon consciousness?
- Brian Loar, Phenomenal intentionality as the basis of mental content
- W.M. Meijers, Searle's impossible conception of unconscious intentionality
- David Pitt, What is it like to think that P?
- William Robinson, Phenomenal consciousness and intentionality: Vive la difference!
- David Rosenthal, On being accessible to consciousness
- Charles Siewert, Consciousness and intentionality
- Pär Sundström, Consciousness and intentionality of action
- Nigel Thomas, Coding dualism: Conscious thought without Cartesianism or computationalism
- Kenneth Williford, The intentionality of consciousness and consciousness of intentionality
- Kenneth Williford, The logic of phenomenal transparency
- Kenneth Williford, Moore, the diaphanousness of consciousness, and physicalism
- Crispin Wright, Postscript to comments on Mind and World
- Kent Bach, Engineering the mind
- Andrew Bailey, What is it like to see a bat? A critique of Dretske's representationalist theory of qualia
- Ned Block, Is experiencing just representing?
- Ned Block, Mental paint (and reply by Tyler Burge)
- Ned Block, Sexism, ageism, racism, and the nature of consciousness
- Alex Byrne, Consciousness and nonconceptual content
- Alex Byrne, DON'T PANIC: Tye's intentionalist theory of consciousness
- Alex Byrne, Intentionalism defended
- Alex Byrne, Gert on the shifted specrum
- David Chalmers, The representational character of experience
- David Cole, Dretske on naturalizing the mind
- Tim Crane, Intentionalism
- Tim Crane, The intentional structure of consciousness
- John Dilworth, Representationalism and indeterminate perceptual content
- Fred Dretske, Experience as representation
- Paula Droege, Second sense: A theory of sensory consciousness
- Andy Egan, Appearance properties
- Andy Egan & James John, A puzzle about perception
- Güven Güzeldere & Murat Aydede, On the relation between phenomenal and representational properties
- Benj Hellie, Intentionalism and unintrospected experiences
- Benj Hellie, Consciousness and representationalism
- Benj Hellie, Visual form, attention, and binocularity
- James Hopkins, Representation of the inner and the concept of mind
- Frank Jackson, Representation and experience
- Frank Jackson, Some reflections on representationalism
- Amy Kind, What's so transparent about transparency?
- Robert Kirk, Why ultra-externalism goes too far
- Brendan Lalor, Intentionality and qualia
- Dan Lloyd, Consciousness and its discontents
- Dan Lloyd, Popping the thought balloon
- Brian Loar, Transparent experience and the availability of qualia
- William Lycan, Representational theories of consciousness
- William Lycan, The representational theory of qualia
- William Lycan, The case for phenomenal externalism
- Fiona Macpherson, Colour inversion problems for representationalism
- Pete Mandik, Qualia, space, and control
- Eric Marcus, Intentionalism and the imaginability of the inverted spectrum
- Thomas Metzinger, The subjectivity of subjective experience: A representationalist analysis of the first-person perspective
- Paul Noordhof, In pain (and reply to Tye)
- John O'Dea, Representationalism and the distinction between the senses
- John O'Dea, Representationalism, supervenience, and the cross-modal problem
- Elisabeth Pacherie, Qualia and representations
- Adam Pautz, Sensory awareness is not a wide physical relation: An empirical argument against externalist intentionalism (plus Byrne and Tye's reply)
- Adam Pautz, Sensory awareness as irreducible: From internalist intentionalism to primitivism
- Paul Raymont, Some experienced qualities belong to the experience
- Dan Ryder, Explaining the "inhereness" of qualia representationally: Why we seem to have a visual field
- Dan Ryder, The autonomic nervous system and Dretske on phenomenal consciousness
- Sydney Shoemaker, Content, color, and character I: Against standard representationalism
- Sydney Shoemaker, Content, color, and character II: A better sort of representationalism
- Sydney Shoemaker, Introspection and phenomenal character
- Daniel Stoljar, The argument from diaphanousness
- Daniel Stoljar, Consequences of intentionalism
- Pär Sundström, An argument against spectrum inversion
- Michael Thau, Spectrum inversion
- Brad Thompson, Color constancy and Russellian representationalism
- Brad Thompson, Representationalism and the argument from hallucination
- Michael Tye, Phenomenal externalism, Lolita, and the planet Xenon
- Michael Tye, Representationalist theories of consciousness
- Michael Tye, Precis of Color, Content, and Consciousness (with comments: Byrne and reply, Maund and reply, Seager and reply)
- Michael Tye, Representationalism and the transparency of experience
- Michael Tye, Reply to Block, Jackson, and Shoemaker on Ten Problems of Consciousness
- Michael Tye, Visual qualia and visual content revisited
- Michael Tye, What what it's like is really like
- Michael Tye, Inverted Earth, Swampman, and representationalism
- Wayne Wright, Projectivist representationalism and color
- Wayne Wright, Tye, tree-rings, and representation
- Alex Byrne, Some like it HOT: Consciousness and higher-order thought
- Alex Byrne, What phenomenal consciousness is like
- Peter Carruthers, Higher-order theories of consciousness
- Peter Carruthers, Natural theories of consciousness (and commentaries by Browne, Cavalieri and Miller, Krause and Burghardt, Lurz, Lycan, Lyvers, Robinson, Saidel, Shapiro, Weisberg, and reply)
- Peter Carruthers, Precis of Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory (with commentaries by Colin Allen and reply, Jose Bermudez, reply and Bermudez's response, Joseph Levine and reply, William Seager and reply; also review by Alex Byrne)
- Peter Carruthers, HOP over FOR, HOT theory
- David Cole, Sense and sentience
- Rocco Gennaro, Between pure self-referentialism and the (extrinsic) HOT theory of consciousness
- Rocco Gennaro, Fiction, pleasurable tragedy, and the HOT theory of consciousness
- Rocco Gennaro, Higher-order theories of consciousness: An overview
- Rocco Gennaro, Higher-order thoughts, animal consciousness, and misrepresentation: A reply to Carruthers and Levine
- Rocco Gennaro, Jean-Paul Sartre and the HOT theory of consciousness
- Rocco Gennaro, Papineau on the actualist HOT theory of consciousness
- Rocco Gennaro, The HOT theory of consciousness: Between a rock and a hard place?
- Benj Hellie, The trouble with relation intentionalism
- Pierre Jacob, State consciousness revisited
- Uriah Kriegel, The same-order monitoring theory of consciousness
- Uriah Kriegel, The Self-Representational Theory of Consciousness
- Eric Lormand, Inner sense until proven guilty
- Robert Lurz, Neither HOT nor COLD: An alternative account of consciousness
- William Lycan, A simple argument for a higher-order representation theory of consciousness
- William Lycan, Consciousness as internal monitoring
- William Lycan, The superiority of HOP to HOT
- William Lycan and Zena Ryder, The loneliness of the long-distance truck-driver
- Jennifer Matey, Two HOTS to handle: The concept of state consciousness in the higher-order thought theory of consciousness
- Paul Raymont, From HOTs to self-representing states
- David Rosenthal, A theory of consciousness
- David Rosenthal, Apperception, sensation, and dissociability
- David Rosenthal, Consciousness and higher-order thought
- David Rosenthal, Consciousness, content, and metacognitive judgments (and response to commentators)
- David Rosenthal, Consciousness and metacognition
- David Rosenthal, Higher-order thoughts and the appendage theory of consciousness
- David Rosenthal, Perceptual and cognitive models of consciousness
- David Rosenthal, State consciousness and what it's like
- David Rosenthal, Varieties of higher-order theory
- David Rosenthal, Multiple drafts and higher-order thoughts
- William Seager, On dispositional HOT theories of consciousness
- Robert Van Gulick, Higher-order global states: An alternative higher-order view
- Robert Van Gulick, Mirror, mirror, is that all?
- Wayne Wright, Distracted drivers and unattended experience
- Murat Aydede, Is introspection inferential?
- Jose Luis Bermudez, Self-deception, intentions and contradictory beliefs
- Alex Byrne, The puzzle of transparency
- Fred Dretske, How do you know you are not a zombie
- Fred Dretske, Knowing what you think vs. knowing that you think it
- Fred Dretske, The mind's awareness of itself
- Jonathan Ellis, Content externalism and phenomenal character: A new worry about privileged access
- Jordi Fernandez, Privileged access naturalized
- Eric Funkhouser, Do the self-deceived get what they want?
- Eric Funkhouser, Self-deception and self-knowledge
- Brie Gertler, Introduction to Privileged Access: Philosophical Theories of Self-Knowledge
- Brie Gertler, Self-knowledge
- Brie Gertler, Introspecting phenomenal states
- Brie Gertler, The mechanics of self-knowledge
- Brie Gertler, Can feminists be Cartesians?
- P.M.S. Hacker, Of knowledge and knowing that someone is in pain
- Robert Howell, Self-knowledge and self-reference
- Pierre Jacob, Do we know how we know our own minds yet?
- William Larkin, A broad perceptual model of privileged introspective judgments
- William Larkin, Concepts and introspection: An externalist defense of inner sense
- Eric Lormand, Inner sense until proven guilty
- Eric Lormand, Phenomenal impressions
- Eric Lormand, Shoemaker and "inner sense"
- Kirk Ludwig, First-person knowledge and authority
- William Lycan, Dretske's ways of introspecting
- Cynthia MacDonald, Self-knowledge and the first person
- Cynthia MacDonald, Self-knowledge and the "inner eye"
- Cynthia MacDonald, Shoemaker on self-knowledge and inner sense
- Shaun Nichols & Stephen Stich, Reading one's own mind: A cognitive theory of self-awareness
- Lucy O'Brien, Moran on agency and self-knowledge
- Lucy O'Brien, On knowing one's own actions
- Lucy O'Brien, Self-knowledge, agency, and force
- David Owens, Knowing your own mind
- Christopher Peacocke, Conscious attitudes, attention, and self-knowledge
- Jim Pryor, Immunity to error through misidentification
- Philip Robbins, Knowing me, knowing you: Theory of mind and the machinery of introspection
- Jay Rosenberg, Perception vs. inner sense: A problem about direct awareness
- David Rosenthal, Introspection
- Eric Schwitzgebel, How well do we know our own conscious experience? The case of imagery
- Eric Schwitzgebel, Why did we think we dreamed in black and white?
- Eric Schwitzgebel & Michael Gordon, How well do we know our own conscious experience? The case of human echolocation
- William Seager, Introspection and the elementary acts of mind
- Joel Smith, Which immunity to error?
- Julia Tanney, Self-knowledge, normativity, and construction
- Amie Thomasson, Introspection and self-knowledge
- Robert Van Gulick, Inward and upward: Reflection, introspection, and self-awareness
- Aaron Zimmerman, Infallible introspection
- George Bealer, Self-consciousness (and replies to McCullagh and Tooley)
- Jose Luis Bermudez, Nonconceptual self-consciousness and cognitive science
- Jose Luis Bermudez, Nonconceptual self-awareness and the paradox of self-consciousness
- Jose Luis Bermudez, Precis of The Paradox of Self-Consciousness (and discussion, and more discussion)
- Jose Luis Bermudez, Sources of self-consciousness: Epistemic and genetic
- Bill Brewer, Bodily awareness and the self
- Bill Brewer, Self-location and agency
- Andrew Brook, Externalism and the varieties of self-awareness
- Andrew Brook, Kant, self-awareness, and self-reference
- John Campbell, Immunity to error through misidentification and the meaning of a referring term
- John Campbell, The structure of time in autobiographical memory
- Naomi Eilan, Self-location, consciousness, and attention
- Shaun Gallagher, Self-reference and schizophrenia: A cognitive model of immunity to error through misidentification
- Shaun Gallagher and Andrew Meltzoff, The earliest sense of self and others: Merleau-Ponty and recent developmental studies
- Shaun Gallagher, Bodily self-awareness and object perception
- Shaun Gallagher, Ways of knowing the self and the other
- Rocco Gennaro, Leibniz on consciousness and self-consciousness
- George Graham, Self-consciousness, psychopathology, and realism about self
- Andy Hamilton, Proprioception as basic knowledge of the body
- Susan Hurley, Nonconceptual self-consciousness and agency: Perspective and access
- William James, The consciousness of self
- Tomis Kapitan, The ubiquity of self-awareness
- Uriah Kriegel, Consciousness and self-consciousness
- Uriah Kriegel, Consciousness as intransitive self-consciousness: Two views and an argument
- Uriah Kriegel, Naturalizing subjective character
- Joseph Levine, Conscious awareness and (self-)representation
- Thomas Metzinger, Phenomenal transparency and cognitive self-reference
- Gregory Mulhauser, What is self-awareness?
- Shaun Nichols, The mind's "I" and the theory of mind's "I": Introspection and two concepts of self
- Alva Noë, Is perspectival self-consciousness nonconceptual?
- Lucy O'Brien, Solipsism and self-reference
- John Perry, Myself and "I"
- Phillip Robbins, The paradox of self-consciousness revisited
- David Rosenthal, Being conscious of ourselves
- Joel Smith, Bodily awareness, imagination, and the self
- Josh Weisberg, Being all that we can be: Review of Metzinger's Being No-One
- Kenneth Williford, The self-representational structure of consciousness
- Torin Alter, What do split-brain cases show about the unity of consciousness?
- Tim Bayne, Co-consciousness: Review of Dainton's Stream of Consciousness
- Tim Bayne, Self-consciousness and the unity of consciousness
- Tim Bayne, Unified phenomenology and divided brains: Critical notice of Michael Tye's Consciousness and Persons
- Tim Bayne and David Chalmers, What is the unity of consciousness?
- Andrew Brook, The unity of consciousness
- Andrew Brook, Judgments and drafts eight years later
- Barry Dainton, Precis of Stream of Consciousness (and commentaries by Gallagher, Gilmore, Meehan, Revonsuo, and replies)
- Jonathan Edwards, Is consciousness only a property of individual cells?
- Bret Hughes, The functioning hypothesis of consciousness
- Susan Hurley, Action, the unity of consciousness, and vehicle externalism
- Susan Hurley, Self-consciousness, spontaneity, and the myth of the giving
- Nicholas Humphrey, One-self: A meditation on the unity of consciousness
- Gerard O'Brien & Jon Opie, The disunity of consciousness
- Gerard O'Brien & Jon Opie, Disunity defended: A reply to Bayne
- Gerard O'Brien & Jon Opie, The multiplicity of consciousness and the emergence of the self
- Gregg Rosenberg, The boundary problem for experiencing subjects
- Warren Schrader, A unity of consciousness argument against causal emergence
- Warren Shrader, The unity of consciousness: Trouble for the materialist or the emergent dualist?
- Warren Shrader, What is the unity of consciousness argument?
- Michael Tye, The problem of common sensibles
- Christoph von der Malsburg, The coherence definition of consciousness
- Bernard Baars, The functions of consciousness
- J.M. Baldwin, Consciousness and evolution (and sequel)
- Ned Block, On a confusion about a function of consciousness
- Selmer Bringsjord & Ron Noel, Why did evolution engineer consciousness?
- Peter Carruthers, The evolution of consciousness
- Fred Dretske, What good is consciousness?
- Owen Flanagan & Thomas Polger, Zombies and the function of consciousness
- David Hilbert, Why have experiences?
- Nicholas Humphrey, Consciousness: A just-so story
- Nicholas Humphrey, The uses of consciousness
- Uriah Kriegel, The functional role of consciousness
- George Mandler, Consciousness redux
- Shaun Nichols & Todd Grantham, Adaptive complexity and phenomenal consciousness
- Thomas Polger & Owen Flanagan, Explaining the evolution of consciousness: The other hard problem
- Thomas Polger, Rethinking the evolution of consciousness
- Aaron Sloman, The evolution of what?
- Arnold Tannenbaum, The sense of consciousness
- Max Velmans, Is human information processing conscious? (plus first, second, and third reply to commentators)
- Max Velmans, How could conscious experience affect brains? (and first and second reply to commentators)
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