Five mountains

Thursday, Aug. 23, 2007 THE GOZAN TEMPLES A rich repository of traditional Zen art By MICHAEL DUNN Special to The Japan Times For a subject in which words are considered an impediment to meditative insight, it is daunting just how many words are needed to explain Zen. It uncannily dodges any attempt at definition, and at least some exposure to the practice seems necessary before embarking on any worthwhile discussion of the subject. Four ink paintings from a set of 10 attributed to Tenshu Shubun (1414-63) illustrate the Zen pursuit of a state of "no mind" with a parable about a young boy taming a water buffalo. IMAGES COURTESY OF TOKYO NATIONAL MUSEUM Nonetheless, it is hard to imagine anything that has had a more profound influence on Japanese culture than Zen, apart from the natural world before the modern period. This is evident everywhere — in martial arts, tea ceremony, flower-arranging, Japanese architecture, garden design, noh drama — even in the scrubbed wood and clean lines of a sushi restaurant or the dancing calligraphy on its matchboxes. Zen is also a "way," like those cultural pursuits, in which practice and experience are far more valuable than a manual. A Buddhist concept imported in the 13th century from China, Zen espouses spiritual enlightenment through meditation and other contemplative practices, and the realization of truth through intuition rather than intellect. We can see parallels in the otherwise inexplicable psychological processes of artistic creation. An exhibition at the Tokyo National Museum, "Zen Treasures from the Kyoto Gozan Temples," is currently showing masterpieces associated with the Gozan (five mountains) Zen temples: Tenryuji, Shokokuji, Tofukuji, Kenninji and Manjuji. After meeting brief hostility from entrenched sects of esoteric Buddhism when it was first imported, Zen attracted the support of military rulers. The five temples, modeled after a Song Dynasty (960-1279) system in China, were established in Kyoto to promote the new sect of Buddhism. Ranking above these five temples was the huge Nanzenji Temple, which enjoyed Imperial support, and below them was an extensive network of subsidiary temples spread throughout the country. The Gozan temples functioned as de facto ministries for the dissemination of government directions and the monitoring of regional conditions, continuing the Chinese system on which they were modeled. Thus military rulers were able to promulgate control under a religious cloak, while high-ranking clerics — especially those with experience in China — took on government-service roles as translators, diplomats and advisers on foreign affairs. Mixing easily with the political and cultural elite, and well-supported by them financially, such clerics soon assumed a more secular, courtly style, living in palatial quarters and wearing silk robes, with the leisure to cultivate gentlemanly skills of social entertaining, painting and poetry. Many of the arts of the Gozan temples show elaborate features of the older sects of esoteric Buddhism and iconographic similarities with Song Dynasty culture. The temples served as repositories of art treasures brought back by monks who had studied Zen in China. These paintings, sculptures and ceramics were held in similar high regard to foreign brand-name luxuries today and were avidly collected, studied and imitated. Chinese subjects such as celebrated sites of natural beauty and figures from religious legend and history entered the artistic repertoire, so that many Japanese paintings show inspiration from the mainland even up to the modern period. Kamakura Period (1192-1333) Zen art is characterized by portrait paintings and sculptures of leading temple clerics. The sculptures are super-realistic — this was, after all, the golden age of religious sculpture in Japan — with inlaid crystal eyes that seem to follow every move. Almost without exception they are armed with a flat stick (keisaku), ever ready to give a salutary and reviving whack on the shoulders of monks who show signs of flagging diligence during meditation sessions. Those practicing Zen meditation are told to sit and think about nothing — far easier said than done — an achievement likened to the efforts of a young boy taming a water buffalo. A set of 10 ink paintings attributed to Tenshu Shubun (1414-63) show the stages of capturing the gentle but wayward beast, ending with the boy in total control, seated on its back, playing a flute — an analogy to the calmed state of mind, thinking about nothing, but intuitively alert. The exhibition provides a chance to see well-known but rarely displayed National Treasures familiar to students of Japanese art history. A famous pair of scroll-paintings of a scowling dragon and grumpy tiger attributed to Mokkei (or Mu Qi in Chinese) from Daitokuji Temple are shown, as is his landscape "River and Sky in Evening Snow" from Rokuonji Temple, which captures atmosphere in much the same way as the later English painter Joseph Mallord William Turner (1775-1851) did. Landscapes were a common theme for Zen priest-painters from the 14th to the 16th century. Color was used sparingly, if at all, and ink was the favored medium used to capture feeling and atmosphere. With the phrase "the colors of ink," Japanese describe how, in the hands of a master, ink tones can suggest the flamboyance of fall or the hues of spring blossoms more effectively than mere pigments. They depict towering mountains, placid lakes punctuated by a boat and a lonely fisherman, gnarled pine trees and a hermitage retreat for a lucky Zen monk, dwarfed by the magnificence of nature. These artists knew nothing of the vanishing point in perspective, but captured distance by using fading ink tones, and leaving blank space to suggest mist and vastness. The smaller hanging scrolls are haunting and evocative, and seem to provide portals to another, idyllic world — all the more poignant when we consider the wars and ever-present insecurity of the time when they were painted. Perhaps the feeling of Zen can be felt most in haboku (broken ink) landscapes that are almost abstract. A few hasty brush strokes of ink in various intensities suggest a sheer cliff, withered trees, a rustic roof in an infinity of space and diffused light — so seemingly simple and yet so difficult to accomplish. Landscape painting by Shubun Perhaps the most famous example is a landscape painting by Sesshu Toyo (1420-1506) with inscriptions by the monk Getto Shukyo and five others, now a National Treasure in the Tokyo National Museum. Almost completely abstract, this painting feels strangely modern and, in another format, would not look out of place in a modern gallery. This is truly an example of painting with "no mind," where the brush-hand works as a direct extension of expression without the interference of thought. A full-color catalog accompanies the exhibition, containing an informative essay by Asami Ryusuke in an excellent and clear English translation. Almost nothing of note about Zen has appeared in English since Suzuki Daisetsu's (1870-1966) "Zen and Japanese Culture" (1959) and Hisamatsu Shin'ichi's (1889-1980) "Zen and the Fine Arts" (1971). Asami gently points out the slightly opinionated, though well-argued direction of these books and adds much new insight in light of recent scholarship into how Zen established itself within Japan's military power structure. In their time, both Suzuki and Hisamatsu purported that certain aesthetic characteristics, such as asymmetry, simplicity, otherworldliness and subtle profundity, are evidence of Zen in works of art. But Asami points out that such sensitivity existed long before the arrival of Zen, and can be seen in earlier poetry such as a one-verse waka poem by Fujiwara Sadaie (1162-1241): My hut by the water in the autumn twilight — wherever I look, neither blossoms nor autumn leaves . . . Note how the verse conjures a monotone image without a trace of the expected exuberant colors of the season, and suggests the restrained atmosphere and sensitivity that we associate with the works of later Zen monks. With such observations, this is a fascinating and scholarly new appraisal of Zen art that is highly recommended for all with serious interest in this profound culture. "Zen Treasures from the Gozan Temples" shows till Sept. 9 at the Tokyo National Museum, Ueno Park; it then travels to Kyushu National Museum, Jan. 1, 2008-Feb. 24. For more information call (03) 3822-1111 or visit www.tnm.jp

09/27/2012 By Nina Weber Iron Man was carved from the remains of a meteorite, say scientists.Zoom AFP/ Uni. Stuttgart/ Elmar Buchner Iron Man was carved from the remains of a meteorite, say scientists. The statue was first discovered by the Nazis in Tibet as they were searching for the origins of the Aryan race. Now, scientists have established that an ancient Buddha statue known as the "Iron Man" was carved from the remains of a meteorite. Info The statue is some 24 centimeters tall, weighs 10.6 kilograms and depicts a male figure presumed to be the Buddhist god Vaisravana. It is believed to be 1,000 years old and it is made out of a material almost as hard as steel. Dubbed the Iron Man, researchers have now figured out exactly what that material is: meteorite. They published their findings in the journal Meteorics and Planetary Science on Thursday. Furthermore, the chemical make-up of the material reveals that it comes from the Chinga meteorite which slammed into the border region between Siberia and Mongolia some 15,000 years ago. Fragments of the meteorite have previously been found in the region. According to an interdisciplinary research team, it is the only human figure ever to have been found that is carved out of meteorite stone. The material's hardness comes from its high iron content in addition to containing some 16 percent nickel. Geologist Elmar Buchner from the University of Stuttgart, the primary author of the study, says the result is a material similar to steel. By now, the statue is well-travelled. It was brought to Europe in the late 1930s by Ernst Schäfer, a zoologist and ethnologist who visited Tibet on an expedition funded by the Nazis: Schäfer and his team were exploring the roots of the Aryan race. Soon to Be on Public Display Most probably, the team took the iron man with them because of the ancient Hindu swastika, a symbol of good luck and success, on his stomach. The Nazis, of course, used a right-facing swastika as a symbol of the Aryan race. According to Buchner, Schäfer had returned to Germany with a catalogue of objects found on the expedition, many of which were decorated with swastikas. But since this catalogue is no longer complete, it is unclear where Schäfer found the statue and how he came to bring it back to Europe. The statue then disappeared into a private collection for decades and was only brought to the attention of experts several years ago. Meteorites are considered in many cultures to be heavenly signs. In some places, the rocks are worshipped as holy objects, for example, by Native Americans in North America and the Aborigines in Australia. Knives and other objects made from meteorites, including bird figures, have been found in a wide range of locations. But the depiction of a human figure is thus far unique. The scientists have not been able to answer when exactly the statue was made. They presume it dates to the 11th century in the region of modern-day Tibet, and was made with a great deal of effort, because the artist had to work with the extremely hard material. He covered a large portion of the front part with a golden gild. Now that the scientists have determined the exceptional origin of the statue, they want to make it available to the public. "We plan to have it become part of a permanent collection in a museum, where it can be exhibited," Buchner says.

http://www.scribd.com/doc/43691507/The-Buddhist-Doctrine-of-Momentariness-A-Survey-of-the-Origins-and-Early-Phase-of-this-Doctrine-up-to-Vasubandhu

The Benefits of Meditation and Sacrifice by Aung San Suu Kyi

The rainy season retreat has begun. It is a time for offering robes to monks and for making special efforts toward gaining a better understanding of Buddhist values. In Burma, we look upon members of the sangha (the Buddhist religious order) as teachers who will lead us along the noble eightfold path. Good teachers not merely give scholarly sermons, they show us how we should conduct our daily lives in accordance with right understanding, right thought, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness and right concentration.

Not long ago before my house arrest in 1989, I was granted an audience with the venerable U Pandita, an exceptional teacher in the best tradition of great spiritual mentors whose words act constantly as an aid to a better existence. U Pandita, the hole teacher, spoke of the importance of right speech. Not only should one speak only the truth, one's speech should lead to harmony among beings, it should be kind and pleasant and it should be beneficial. One should follow the example of the Lord Buddha who only spoke words that were trustful and beneficial, even if at times such speech was not always pleasing to the listener.

The holy teacher also urged me to cultivate mindfulness. Of the five spiritual faculties (ie, faith, energy, concentration, wisdom, and mindfulness), it is only mindfulness that can never be in excess. Excessive faith without sufficient wisdom leads to blind faith, while excessive wisdom without sufficient energy leads to undesirable cunning. Too much energy combined with weak concentration leads to indolence. But as for mindfulness, it is in excess, but always in deficiency. The truth and value of this Buddhist concept that holy teacher U Pandita took such pains to impress on me became evident during my years of house arrest. Like many of my Buddhist colleagues, I decided to put my time under detention to good use by practicing meditation. It was not an easy process. I did not have a teacher and my early attempts were more than a little frustrating. There were days when I found my failure to discipline my mind in accordance with prescribed meditation practices so infuriating I felt I was doing myself more harm than good. I think I would have given up but for the advice of a famous Buddhist teacher, that whether or not one wanted to practice meditation, one should do so for one's own good.

So, I gritted my teeth and kept at it, often rather glumly. Then my husband gave me a copy of Sayadaw U Pandita's book, "In this Very Life, the Liberation Teachings of the Buddha."

By studying this book carefully, I learned how to overcome difficulties of meditation and to realize its benefits. I learned how practicing meditation led to increased mindfulness in every day life and again and again. I recalled the holy teacher's words on the importance of mindfulness with appreciation and gratitude.

In my political work, I have been helped and strengthened by the teachings of members of the sangha. During my very first campaign trip across Burma, I received invaluable advice from monks in different parts of the country. I Prome, a holy teacher told me to keep in mind the hermit Sumedha, who sacrificed the possibility of early liberation for himself alone and underwent many lives of striving that he might save others from suffering. So must you be prepared to strive for as long as might be necessary to achieve good and justice, exhorted the holy teacher.

In a monastery at Pakokku, the advice that an abbot gave to my father when he went to that town more than 40 years ago was repeated to me: "Do not be frightened every time there is an attempt to frighten you, but do not be entirely without fear. Do not become elated every time you are praised, but do not be entirely lacking in elation."

In other words, while maintaining courage and humility, one should not abandon caution and healthy self-respect.

When I visited Natmauk, my father's home town, I went to the monastery where he studied as a boy.

There the abbot gave a sermon on the four causes of decline and decay: failure to recover that which had been lost; omission to repair that which had been damaged; disregard of the need for reasonable economy; and the elevation to leadership of those without morality and learning. The abbot went on to explain how these traditional Buddhist views should be interpreted to help us build a just and prosperous society in the modern age.

Of the words of wisdom I gathered during that journey across central Burma, those of a 91-year-old holy teacher of Sagaing are particularly memorable. He sketched out for me how it would be to work for democracy in Burma.

"You will be attacked and reviled for engaging in honest politics," pronounced the teacher, "But you must persevere. Lay down an investment in suffering and you will gain bliss."

Aung San Suu Kyi, Bangkok Post, September 1996.

PERCEPCIÓN

http://www.thebuddhistsociety.org.uk/abhidhamma.htm

The Abhidhamma Version of the Theory of Perception
by Y Karunadasa
(volume 75:4 p. 211) February 2001

The Abhidhamma theory of perception is the subject of a study made by E R Sarathchandra in his Buddhist Psychology of Perception . In this article we shall refer to it where necessary while making our own observations. Besides, we propose to refer to the theory of perception, developed by the Vaibhasikas and the Sautrantikas, wherever it helps to provide a better understanding of the Theravada version of the theory.

What could be considered as the earliest Buddhist teaching pertaining to sense-perception is found in the Madhupindika Sutta of the Majjhima Nikaya. As far as the Theravada is concerned, its subsequent version in its most developed form is found in the post-canonical commentaries and Abhidhamma compendiums. Although the two versions differ in some important aspects, there is one feature that is common to both. This is the fact that an act of complete perception does not arise as an immediate result of the contact between the organ and the sense-object. Perception is regarded as involving a process of thought that begins as a simple sensation and ends up with the complete apprehension of the object.

For background to our subject, let us first examine briefly the earlier version of the theory. According to this, a process of perception consists of six stages. The first stage is (for example) visual consciousness ( cakkhuvinnana ), which arises with the visual organ and a visible object as its conditions. Here the context demands that we understand visual consciousness not as an act of complete perception but as some kind of bare sensation that occurs before the object is fully apprehended. In the Abhidhamma version too the term is understood in the same sense. The second stage of the process is sensory impression ( phassa ). It is defined as the co-ordination among the sense-organ, the sense-object and sense-consciousness ( tinnam sangati phasso ). The third stage is vedana or feeling. It refers to the hedonic tone or the emotional value of the experience so obtained. The fourth stage is sanna or perception. The fact that sanna occurs after vinnana (bare sensation) shows that the former represents a more complex form of awareness. If, as mentioned above, vinnana refers to mere sensory awareness, sanna seems to suggest a state of awareness obtained by introducing distinctions to the earlier stage of bare awareness. The fifth stage of the process is vitakka , which is usually translated as 'the initial application of thought'. This seems to suggest a stage where the object of perception becomes an object of interpretation. The sixth and last stage of the process is called papanca , which may be explained as 'expansion' or 'diffusion' of thought. Bhikkhu Nanananda in his Concept and Reality observes that papanca here means 'prolificity in ideation' and that it 'hints at the tendency of the individual's imagination to break loose'. We may, therefore, interpret papanca as a very complex level of experience that is tainted by the individual's own desires and prejudices.

Now one important question that arises here is this: of the six stages described above, which stage should be considered as the final stage of sense-perception? Sarathchandra and also Bhikkhu Nanananda believe that it is the stage called papanca that should be considered the final one. However, it seems more reasonable to consider sanna , which in the above process is the fourth stage, as the final stage of sense-perception. What follows after sanna could be understood not as a process of sense-perception but as a purely ideational process set up by a process of perception. In point of fact, both Sarathchandra and Bhikkhu Nanananda explain the stages subsequent to sanna as a process of interpretation and judgement.

As generally understood, the Buddhist term for perception is sanna , not papanca . This is also suggested by the fact that in the Pali suttas the unenlightened ordinary person is said to cognize things by way of sanna ( sanjanati ). In contrast, the enlightened person cognizes things by way of abhinna ( abhijanati ) and parinna ( parijanati ). The contrast between sanna , on the one hand, and abhinna and parinna , on the other, refers to two levels of knowledge corresponding to the ordinary worldling and to the enlightened person. Our suggestion that sanna represents what early Buddhism means by sense-perception has direct relevance to a proper understanding of the Abhidhamma version of the theory of perception.

The Abhidhamma version of the theory of perception differs from the previous one in that it is based on two new developments. One is the theory of moments, which we have discussed previously. The other is the theory of bhavanga or the unconscious. As this latter theory is intimately connected with our subject of discussion, we propose to examine it here briefly.

The theory of bhavanga is an Abhidhammic development that, as Sarathchandra observes, seeks to provide an answer to a problem left unexplained in early Buddhist psychology. In early Buddhism consciousness is described as a mental phenomenon that can never arise without the appropriate conditions. It is not regarded as a permanent entity residing within the human body and manifesting itself in mental activity. It is not something that lies dormant when mental activities do not operate. Then the question arises as to the position of consciousness on such occasions as when perceptual activities are apparently completely still, such as in deep, dreamless sleep. What would explain the uninterrupted continuity of the life process? Hence it is very likely that, as Sarathchandra observes, it was as a solution to this problem that the theory of bhavanga came to be developed.

To this we may add another reason. This has reference to the Buddhist teaching on sannavedayita-nirodha . This is the attainment of the highest level of concentration, when all sense-activity comes to a complete end. In such a situation what happens to the mind? If nirodha-samapatti means the suspension of all mental activities, how could one who has attained it emerge from it? This was a problem that confronted the various schools of Buddhist thought, and it was as an answer to this that the Sautrantikas posited a suksma-citta , a subtle consciousness that persists during the nirodha-samapatti . That the theory of bhavanga was intended as a solution to both is clear from the Milindapanha. Here, in an answer to a question raised by King Milinda, Nagasena says that on two occasions the mind does not function in the body ( sarire cittam appavattam hoti ), i.e. during deep sleep and during nirodha-samapatti . It is therefore maintained that when a man is in deep sleep his mind has 'gone into bhavanga ' ( cittam bhavangagatam ). This implies that the same is true of nirodha-sampatti .

What is called bhavanga , then, means the unconscious, a kind of anoetic consciousness. The fact that it is described as bhavanga-sota , the stream of the unconscious, shows that, like the normal, surface consciousness, it too operates as a series of momentary events. The theory of bhavanga is resorted to for explaining not only occasions when surface mental activity ceases but also the Buddhist teaching on rebirth. Hence it is maintained that the last moment before death and the first moment at rebirth are also two varieties of bhavanga consciousness.

What is the relevance of the theory of bhavanga to the theory of sense-perception? If bhavanga means the unconscious process, it does not continue to persist when a conscious thought-process operates. This means that the former does not function as an undercurrent when we are conscious. The two processes alternate in the sense that when one ceases, the other begins to operate. They alternate continually in such a manner that every act of sense-perception is immediately preceded and succeeded by the bhavanga consciousness. The series of the bhavanga consciousness flows on undisturbed as long as there is no conscious thought to interfere with it. A stream of surface consciousness, which is a process of perception, is called citta-vithi. Therefore, the unconscious when it remains undisturbed is called vithi-mutta , i.e. free from a perceptual process.

Now let us examine how bhavanga and the theory of moments become a basis for the Abhidhamma theory of perception. As we have already mentioned, both according to early Buddhism and the Abhidhamma a series of mental events is necessary in order to culminate in complete perception. In the Abhidhamma such a thought process is called cittavithi and is said to consist of 17 thought-moments. Before we examine why the number is fixed at 17, let us see how the process begins.

When a visual object, for instance, comes within the range of the eye, it makes an impact on the sensitive portion of the eye. By the force of that impact there is set up a vibration in the unconscious. This vibration in the unconscious occurs during two moments. During the first moment, which is called bhavanga-calana , the unconscious stream gets disturbed. During the second moment, called bhavangupaccheda , the unconscious stream gets interrupted. The disturbance and the subsequent interruption are both due to the force exerted by the material object before it comes to be fully cognized. With the immediate interruption of the unconscious, a stream of surface consciousness arises, which has seven stages.

The first stage is called avajjana or attention. It is at this stage that the conscious mind turns its attention to the material object. This focusing of attention is a passive reaction on the part of the individual to the impact of the external stimulus. The second stage is called cakkhu-vinnana or visual consciousness. This is not full cognition but bare awareness. It is defined as dassana-matta , the mere awareness of the presence of the object. It does not produce any kind of knowledge ( pancahi vinnanehi na kan ci dhammam pativijanati ). The third stage is sampaticchana , i.e. receiving or welcoming the object. It is at this stage that the mind assimilates it. The fourth stage is santirana or investigation. The object that has been assimilated now begins to be investigated. The fifth stage is votthapana , when the object begins to be determined. The sixth stage is javana , which is the Abhidhamma term for full perception or cognition. It is at this stage that the mind experiences ( anubhavati ) the object. It is on javana, therefore, that the process of perception culminates. The last stage, which is called tadarammana , refers to the act of registering the object.

This process of perception, which begins with the vibration in the unconscious and ends with the registration of the object, is a process of thought-moments, which arise and perish in rapid succession. Therefore, to each of its different phases an appropriate number of moments are assigned: the first seven phases are each assigned one moment. Of the last two phases, javana is said to occur during seven moments, i.e. it vibrates seven times. The last, which is tadarammana , is assigned two moments. Thus we have in all 16 thought-moments. This number is made up to 17 by adding one moment of thought at the very beginning of the perceptual process.

The additional thought-moment is said to occur immediately before the material object makes an impression on the sense-organ. It is introduced by the technical term atita-bhavanga . Its recognition seems to be due to two reasons. A moment of matter, unlike a moment of thought, is said to exert its influence not at the time of its origination but at the time of its duration. It thus follows that when a material object impinges on a sense-organ, it does so during its moment of duration. Therefore, its time of origination has to be considered as a time of preparation to exert its impact. A second reason for the recognition of the additional moment can be seen in light of the statement that there is always a momentary gap between two thought-processes. This gap is represented by bhavanga , the unconscious. This means, in other words, that bhavanga intervenes between two thought-processes. Quite probably it is in order to recognize this situation that another moment was added to the very beginning of the perceptual process.

Continued in The Middle Way February 2001 p. 215 (volume 75: 4)

从“意义治疗”观点论“普贤行”之意涵－－以善财童子五十三参为主

［ 作者: 陈瑞熏 来自：硕博文库 已阅：2757 时间：2006-9-26 录入：gaoshentao


【资料形态】硕博文库|中国台湾
【文献属性】[台湾]华梵大学,东方人文研究所，2004年度，硕士学位论文
【出版年代】2005年
【文章标题】从“意义治疗”观点论“普贤行”之意涵－－以善财童子五十三参为主
【英文标题】An Analysis of “samanta-bhadra-carya-pranidhana” based on Logothreapy -- focus on “fifty-three visits of sudhana-sresthi-daraka”
【文章作者】陈瑞熏
【指导教师】郭朝顺
【文章页数】176页

【中文关键词】普贤菩萨|普贤行|傅朗克|意义治疗|十大愿王|善财童子|五十三参|善知识|菩提心。

【中文摘要】本研究从“普贤行”对自己生命内涵提升之帮助，以及对普世大众之影响，尝试以意义治疗为背景指针，将研究目标锁定于《华严经．入法界品》，以“对治”的角度探究善财童子参访过程中的表现，以及诸善知识所教授法门所显发之治疗意义，进而呈现佛教式意义治疗的可能面貌及特色。
本文共分六章：第壹章绪论，主要说明研究动机、范围、方法及目标。第貮章论述西方“意义治疗”之理论及“佛教意义治疗”的可能发展，主要介绍倡导者传朗克以及意义治疗之思想渊源、理论，其虽然不是本研究的重点，但诚然为论文开展的重要参考指标，以此为背景观察“佛教意义治疗”的可能发展。
　　第参章进入本研究的核心论点，探讨普贤菩萨之修行特色及“普贤行”，并提出“普贤行”为菩萨行的究极表现，并统摄十大愿王。
第肆章从善财童子为“普贤行”的实践者开场，介绍善财参访的动机，并尝试以“对治”的眼光解读善知识教导的法门，以此作为开启与西方意义治疗对话的凭借。
　　第伍章则将第参、肆章所讨论的结果作一统整的收摄，但在作此动作之前，首先回到研究动机上作更深刻的省思──观察“超越”在佛法的意义基础下，吾等可发觉普贤行、善财参访知识的表现，皆是精采的生命超越，企图从生命的实然中而有所“应然”之实际行动，赋予生命终极之目的。
第六章为本文结论。经过与西方意义治疗的对话，由五十三参中之普贤行显发“自度、化他”的大乘佛法精神，以智慧及深具华严深义的圆融眼光诠释世间种种现象，以精进积极的态度面对生命，以恢阔的格局包容所有的障碍阻逆，也广纳他人进入自己的生命领域并互为增上，依此建立一个动态、健全、自利、利他的生命观。


【英文摘要】The subject of this research is trying to find out all the possibilities and characteristics for developing the Logotherapy of Buddhism. We have taken Logotherapy by Viktor E. Frankl, as the background index and focused our research on the “gaNDavyUha-sUtra”. We have studied and analyzed the example of “fifty-three visits of sudhana-zreSThi dAraka”, strove to reach the pinnacle of “samanta-bhadra-caryA-praNidhAna”.The “samanta-bhadra-caryA-praNidhAna”, which enables samanta-bhadra-bodhisattva himself to grow enormously, has　influenced people all over the world, especially sudhana-zreSThi dAraka. sudhana-zreSThi wanted to follow the spirit of “samanta- bhadra-caryA-praNidhAna” and indeed finished his fifty-three visits. We try to explore the deep meaning of Logotherapy through sudhana-zreSThi dAraka visits as well as all kinds of friends that the saints, or devout worshippers of Buddha, have taught.
If we can start the dialog between Western Logotherapy and the Logotherapy of Buddhism, then no matter how one goes about the “samanta-bhadra-caryA-praNidhAna” or the “fifty- three visits of sudhana-zreSThi dAraka”, both can reveal the spirit of mahA-yAna, which means if we can help ourselves, then we can help other people. This will enable us to learn how to see various things in the world through the explanatory views of “Hua Yan”. It would also help us more easily and quickly make key decisions and choices on difficult matters in our lives. We also suggest that people face all of life obstacles by examining them through a broad range of perspectives befoe acting on them. We should try to invite more people into our lives and help each other improve our lives. In so doing, we believe that we can build up a vigorous, nergetic and healthy ,life view which will enable us to help ourselves and others.

【论文目次】


第壹章　绪论 1
第一节　研究动机与问题意识 1
一、个人动机──从个人安身立命谈起 1
二、学术动机与问题意识 2
第二节　研究范围 3
第三节　历来相关研究回顾 4
一、有关“意义治疗”之研究 5
二、“普贤行”及“善财童子参访”相关之研究 9
第四节　文献依据与研究方法 11
第五节　研究目标 13
第贰章　西方“意义治疗”之理论及“佛教意义治疗”的可能发展 15
第一节　西方“意义治疗”之思想源头 16
一、倡导者──傅朗克 16
二、“意义治疗”思想之滥觞及背景 18
第二节　“意义治疗”理论与特色 19
一、“意义治疗”之基本理论 20
（一）基本原理 21
（二）人生意义具有三种价值 21
（三）精神高度之生存意义探索 23
二、“意义治疗”之特色 24
（一）极度肯定人存在之独特性 24
（二）协助患者建立健全的生死观 24
（三）乐观的生命态度 25
（四）进入灵性之意义治疗 25
第三节　佛教意义治疗之可能发展 25
一、从观察、解决痛苦出发 26
（一）寻找对治之道──四圣谛的提示 27
（二）放下自我──观察五蕴 28
（三）浅尝即止──截断觉受的漫延 28
（四）道品增上──三十七道品的修学 29
（五）生命格局的开展──自利与利他 31
二、佛法救度学之意义 32
（一）逆境所显发之积极态度 32
（二）转凡成圣──圣贤与凡俗之交涉 33
三、佛教的终极关怀──积极进取、无限开展之生命观 34
第参章　普贤菩萨与“普贤行” 37
第一节　普贤菩萨之名 37
一、梵文意义之“普贤” 38
二、经论对“普贤”之定义 38
第二节　普贤菩萨的身分 41
一、诸佛之长子 41
二、近代学者之研究 42
第三节　“普贤行”中之十大愿王 43
一、普贤十大愿王 44
（一）礼敬诸佛 44
（二）称赞如来 46
（三）广修供养 46
（四）忏悔业障 47
（五）随喜功德 49
（六）请转法轮 50
（七）请佛住世 51
（八）常随佛学 52
（九）恒顺众生 53
（十）普皆回向 54
二、“普贤行”为菩萨行之基础与究极表现 56
（一）“普贤行”之意义 56
（二）“普贤行”为菩萨行之基础与究极表现 57
三、以十大愿王统摄“普贤行” 59
第四节 普贤菩萨修行之特色 61
一、他力、自力融摄之修行 61
二、精进不懈的精神 63
三、行愿相资 66
四、自在出入法界 67
五、无限格局为修行舞台 69
第肆章　“普贤行”与善财童子五十三参 71
第一节　善财童子与其参访之动机 71
一、善财童子──“普贤行”之实践者 71
二、善财参访善友之动机 72
（一）依发心而成就佛道 74
1、发菩提心因缘 75
2、菩提心之内涵 75
（二）显发善知识在修行引导的重要性 77
1、“善知识”之定义 77
2、“善知识”于佛法修行的意义 78
第二节　善知识与“普贤行”的关系 80
第三节　诸善知识及所教授的法门 82
一、诸善知识的真正身分 82
二、“法门”在佛法修行中的定义 83
三、诸善知识所教授之法门 84
（一）比丘、比丘尼组群 85
1、【1】德云比丘（《大正》10，页334上－334下） 86
2、【2】海云比丘（《大正》10，页335上－336中） 88
3、【3】善住比丘（《大正》10，页336中－337中） 89
4、【6】海幢比丘（《大正》10，页340中－342下） 90
5、【11】善见比丘（《大正》10，页349中－350中） 91
6、【24】师子频申比丘尼（《大正》10，页363上－365上） 92
组群小结 93
（二）长者组群 95
1、【5】解脱长者（《大正》10，页338中－340上） 95
2、【15】法宝髻长者（《大正》10，页353下－354中） 96
3、【16】普眼长者（《大正》10，页354中－355上） 98
4、【21】优钵罗华长者（《大正》10，页360下－361中） 98
5、【23】无上胜长者（《大正》10，页362中－363上） 100
6、【46】坚固解脱长者（《大正》10，页419上） 101
7、【47】妙月长者（《大正》10，页419上－419中） 102
8、【48】无胜军长者（《大正》10，页419中） 103
组群小结 104
（三）优婆夷组群 105
1、【7】休舍优婆夷（《大正》10，页343上－345上） 105
2、【13】具足优婆夷（《大正》10，页351中－352中） 106
3、【19】不动优婆夷（《大正》10，页358上－359下） 107
4、【45】贤胜优婆夷（《大正》10，页418下－419上） 108
组群小结 109
（四）居士组群 110
1、【14】明智居士（《大正》10，页352中－353中） 110
2、【26】鞞瑟胝罗居士（《大正》10，页366上－366下） 111
组群小结 111
（五）童子、童女组群 112
1、【10】慈行童女（《大正》10，页348上－349中） 112
2、【12】自在主童子（《大正》10，页350中－351上） 113
3、【44】善知众艺童子（《大正》10，页418上－418下） 113
4、【50】德生童子、有德童女（《大正》10，页419下－422中） 114
组群小结 115
（六）国王组群 117
1、【17】无厌足王（《大正》10，页355上－356上） 117
2、【18】大光王（《大正》10，页356上－358上） 118
组群小结 119
（七）菩萨组群 119
1、【27】观自在菩萨（《大正》10，页366下－367中） 119
2、【28】正趣菩萨（《大正》10，页367中－367下） 120
3、【51】弥勒菩萨（《大正》10，页422中－439上） 121
4、【52】文殊菩萨（《大正》10，页439中－440上） 122
5、【53】普贤菩萨（《大正》10，页440上－444下） 123
组群小结 124
（八）婆罗门、外道组群 125
1、【9】胜热婆罗门（《大正》10，页346上－348上） 125
2、【20】遍行出家外道（《大正》10，页360上－360下） 127
3、【49】最寂静婆罗门（《大正》10，页419中－419下） 128
组群小结 128
（九）天神等组群 129
1、【29】大天神（《大正》10，页367下－368中） 130
2、【30】安住主地神（《大正》10，页368上－368中） 130
3、【31】婆珊婆演底主夜神（《大正》10，页369上－371下） 131
4、【32】普德净光主夜神（《大正》10，页372上－372下） 132
5、【33】喜目观察众生夜神（《大正》10，页372下－378上） 132
6、【34】普救众生妙德夜神（《大正》10，页378上－384上） 132
7、【35】寂静音海主夜神（《大正》10，页384上－387下） 133
8、【36】守护一切城增长威力主夜神（《大正》10，页387下－390中） 133
9、【37】开敷一切树华主夜神（《大正》10，页390中－396上） 133
10、【38】大愿精进力救护一切众生夜神（《大正》10，页396中－401下） 133
11、【39】妙德圆满园神（《大正》10，页401下－405中） 134
组群小结 135
（十）释种女、摩耶夫人与天主光女 136
1、【40】瞿波释种女（《大正》10，页405下－412下） 136
2、【41】摩耶夫人（《大正》10，页412下－417中） 136
3、【42】天主光女（《大正》10，页417中－417下） 137
组群小结 137
（十一）其它组群 138
1、【4】弥伽人（《大正》10，页337中－338中） 138
2、【8】毘目瞿沙仙人（《大正》10，页345上－346上） 139
3、【22】婆施罗船师（《大正》10，页361中－362中） 140
4、【25】婆须蜜多女（《大正》10，页365上－366上） 141
5、【43】遍友童子师（《大正》10，页417下－418上） 142
组群小结 143
第伍章　善财童子五十三参之“普贤行”中的意义治疗 145
第一节　生命内涵 145
一、生命之“实然”与“应然” 145
二、生命之代谢与超越 146
第二节　“五十三参”所显发“佛教意义治疗”的内涵 150
一、善财童子为代表之“普贤行者”的生命观 150
（一）谦虚的求道精神 151
（二）积极进取的修行态度 151
（三）自度、化他的解脱观 151
二、五十三参中诸法门所展现之“佛教意义治疗” 152
（一）诸善知识之身分与法门之关系 152
（二）诸善友教导法门所展现之“佛教意义治疗” 154
1、“自度、化他”的意义治疗 154
2、“缘起”为基础的意义治疗 155
3、智慧为导的意义治疗 156
4、行愿为依的意义治疗 156
5、“华严式”的意义治疗 157
第三节　西方“意义治疗”与“佛法意义治疗”之比较 158
一、从痛苦中超拔而出的立场出发 158
二、生命层次与内涵的提升 159
三、“华严式”的诠解眼光 160
（一）圆融无碍的华严法界 161
（二）自度、化他融摄互资 162
第陆章 结论 163
第一节　研究成果 163
第二节　本研究的可能发展 164
参考书目 167
一、原典资料 167
二、中文数据 168
（一）图书 168
（二）博硕士学位论文 170
（三）期刊资料 171
（四）其它 172
三、外文资料 172
（一）日文专书与学术论文 172
（二）日文期刊 173
（三）英文专书 174
（四）英文期刊 175
四、工具书 176

善用法门 趣正法城

一、法门广开皆由方便，良药对症各有千秋

　　我们常常说佛法有“八万四千法门”，也常常说“一门深入，广学多闻”。广学多闻就是学习众多的法门，那么一门与多门有什么关系、又有什么区别呢？很多人因为弄不清楚、没有理解好而在学佛法过程中产生很多疑惑：自己是学戒，还是修定？是开智慧，还是集福德？是学禅宗，还是学净土？是学密宗，还是学显宗？……不明白自己究竟要学什么，这都是对佛法没有理解透彻造成的。
　　首先要清楚“门”的含义。每栋建筑内外都要设置许多门，为什么要开设这么多门？是为了让我们生活、学习、工作使用更方便。试想要是没有设置可以开关的门，外面的大风直接吹进来，室内就不能保暖；一个人正在房间工作或学习时，其他人路过，就会受到干扰；要是没有设置分隔的房间和相应的门，整个建筑就会变成一个很大的单一空间。所以，门是为了保暖、通行便利、划分功能区间等实用目的而开设的，是为我们服务的。既然如此，我们就要懂得如何使用门，从哪个门进、从哪个门出，以及通过哪些门才能前往我们想去的房间。


　　这个道理看似简单，其实里面有很深的学问，与佛法也完全相通。法门是修行成佛的方便，每个法门针对不同的烦恼，有其不同的功能和作用。如姚秦僧肇法师《注维摩诘经》云：“言为世则谓之法，众圣所由谓之门。”（卷第八）《方广大庄严经》说：“何等名为百八法门？信是法门，意乐不断故；净心是法门，除乱浊故；喜是法门，安隐心故；爱乐是法门，心清净故；身戒是法门，除三恶故；语戒是法门，离四过故；意戒是法门，断三毒故；念佛是法门，见佛清净故；念法是法门，说法清净故；念僧是法门，证获圣道故；念舍是法门，弃一切事故；念戒是法门，诸愿满足故；念天是法门，起广大心故；慈是法门，超映一切诸福事业故；悲是法门，增上不害故；喜是法门，离一切忧恼故；舍是法门，自离五欲及教他离故；无常是法门，息诸贪爱故；苦是法门，愿求永断故；无我是法门，不着我故；寂灭是法门，不令贪爱增长故；惭是法门，内清净故；愧是法门，外清净故；谛是法门，不诳人天故；实是法门，不自欺诳故；法行是法门，依于法故；三归是法门，超三恶趣故；知所作是法门，已立善根不令失坏故；解所作是法门，不因他悟故；自知是法门，不自矜高故；知众生是法门，不轻毁他故；知法是法门，随法修行故；知时是法门，无痴暗见故；破坏憍慢是法门，智慧满足故；无障碍心是法门，防护自他故；不恨是法门，由不悔故；胜解是法门，无疑滞故；不净观是法门，断诸欲觉故；不瞋是法门，断恚觉故；无痴是法门，破坏无智故；求法是法门，依止于义故；乐法是法门，证契明法故；多闻是法门，如理观察故；方便是法门，正勤修行故；遍知名色是法门，超过一切和合爱着故；拔除因见是法门，证得解脱故；断贪瞋是法门，不着痴垢故；妙巧是法门，遍知苦故；界性平等是法门，由永断集故；不取是法门，勤修正道故；无生忍是法门，于灭作证故；身念住是法门，分析观身故；受念住是法门，离一切受故；心念住是法门，智出障翳故；四正勤是法门，断一切恶、修一切善故；四神足是法门，身心轻利故；信是法门，非邪所引故；精进是法门，善思察故；念根是法门，善业所作故；定根是法门，由心解脱故；慧根是法门，智现前证故；信力是法门，能遍超魔力故；精进力是法门，不退转故；念力是法门，不遗忘故；定力是法门，断一切觉故；慧力是法门，无能损坏故；念觉分是法门，如实住法故；择法觉分是法门，圆满一切法故；精进觉分是法门，智决定故；喜觉分是法门，三昧安乐故；轻安觉分是法门，所作成办故；定觉分是法门，平等觉悟一切法故；舍觉分是法门，厌离一切受故；正见是法门，超证圣道故；正思惟是法门，永断一切分别故；正语是法门，一切文字平等觉悟故；正业是法门，无业果报故；正命是法门，离一切希求故；正精进是法门，专趣彼岸故；正念是法门，无念无作无意故；正定是法门，证得三昧不倾动故；菩提心是法门，绍三宝种使不断故；大意乐是法门，不求下乘故；增上意乐是法门，缘无上广大法故；方便正行是法门，圆满一切善根故；檀波罗蜜是法门，成就相好净佛国土，教化众生除悭吝故；尸波罗蜜是法门，超过一切恶道难处，教化众生守禁戒故；羼提波罗蜜是法门，永离憍慢、瞋恚等一切烦恼，教化众生断诸结故；毗离耶波罗蜜是法门，成就引发一切善法，教化众生除懒惰故；禅波罗蜜是法门，出生一切禅定神通，教化乱意众生故；般若波罗蜜是法门，永断无明有所得见，教化愚痴暗蔽恶慧众生故；方便善巧是法门，随诸众生种种意解，现诸威仪及示一切佛法安立故；四摄事是法门，摄诸群生令求趣证大菩提法故；成熟众生是法门，不着己乐、利他无倦故；受持正法是法门，断一切众生杂染故；福德资粮是法门，饶益一切众生故；智慧资粮是法门，圆满十力故；奢摩他资粮是法门，证得如来三昧故；毗钵舍那资粮是法门，获得慧眼故；无碍解是法门，获得法眼故；决择是法门，佛眼清净故；陀罗尼是法门，能持一切佛法故；辩才是法门，巧说言词令一切众生欢喜满足故；顺法忍是法门，随顺一切佛法故；无生法忍是法门，得授记莂故；不退转地是法门，圆满一切佛法故；诸地增进是法门，受一切智位故；灌顶是法门，从兜率天下生，入胎初生，出家苦行，诣菩提场，降魔成佛，转正法轮，起大神通，从忉利天下，现入涅槃故。”（卷第一）
　　虽然佛法本身是一味的，都是关于用心的方法，是治疗心病的法药，但不可乱用。就像人生病不能乱吃药一样，如果吃错了药，吃得越多越糟糕，最后还会产生抗药性，药也就彻底失去作用了。佛法亦然，四悉檀中的“对治悉檀”指的就是解决烦恼必须找正对治的方法。针对不同的烦恼，要运用不同的法门去对治。蕅益大师在《灵峰宗论》说：“一大小经律论，虽字字明珠、言言见谛，然各就习气所重、对治所宜，或随时弊不同，救拯有异。”（卷第二）


　　很多人修行出偏差也是因为不了解不同法门的各自作用，用错了法门。比如修不净观对治贪欲，修慈悲观对治瞋恚，修无常观策励精进。而如果用错了法门就会适得其反。如果瞋心重的人去修不净观，可能越修瞋心越重；贪心重的人修慈悲观，可能越修越贪着；修无常观修过头了，可能慈悲心就没有了。《大乘阿毗达磨集论》中说：“多贪行者缘不净境，多瞋行者缘修慈境，多痴行者缘众缘性诸缘起境，憍慢行者缘界差别境，寻思行者缘入出息念境。”（卷第六）《解脱道论》中说：“欲行人，四无量不应修行，以净相故。何以故？欲行人作意净想，非其所行，如痰病人多食肥腴，非其所宜。瞋行人，十不净想不应修行，瞋恚想故。瞋恚作意非其所行，如瞻病人饮食沸热，非其所宜。痴行人，未增长智，不应令起修行处，离方便故。若离方便，其精进无果，如人骑象无钩。欲行人应修不净想及观身，是其欲对治故；瞋行人应修四无量心，是瞋对治故，或当修色一切入，心随逐故；信行人当修六念处，念佛为初信定故；意行人当修观四大、于食不净想、念死、念寂，寂深处故，复次意行人于一切行处无所妨碍；觉行人当修念数息，以断觉故；痴行人以言问法，以时闻法，以恭敬法与师共住，令智增长。”（卷第三）
　　选择学习什么法门，首先要弄清楚自己的问题，如此才知道该用哪个法门。就如在一座大楼里面，要到达同一个目的地，可以有很多不同的路，但必须清楚先到哪个门、然后再到哪个门、最后再进哪个门。法就是一扇扇门，只有选对了门，才能走对路，从而解决问题。这些其实都有非常明确的标准，即从哪个门入是最方便、最直接、最安全、最稳妥的。对此必须要非常有把握，糊里糊涂是不行的。
　　一般人学了几年佛法，很容易觉得自己什么都懂了，以为自己可以帮助别人解决问题了，其实不然。人与人千差万别，就像有些人喜欢吃西药而有些人喜欢吃中药，有些人喜欢吃汤药而有些人喜欢吃药丸或是胶囊。如果一个人不喜欢吃汤药，你非让他吃，他就会起烦恼。那个人喜欢吃胶囊，就拿胶囊给他吃好了，吃了就能治病。有的人很忙，不方便吃汤药，只能吃胶囊。佛法也一样，我们不能随便给别人开药方。随便让别人服药，就很可能会出问题。

　　二、法法相融无有障碍，门门相通入佛殿堂
　　佛为什么要开八万四千法门？普贤菩萨为什么要发十大愿？阿弥陀佛为什么要发四十八愿？是否发一个愿就可以了？其实不然。不同的愿代表不同的法门，都源自佛菩萨对众生的大悲心。正是为了照顾不同根基众生的需要，佛菩萨才开出众多法门。《华严经》说：“欲安一切众生类，出生自在胜三昧，一切所行诸功德，无量方便度众生。或现供养如来门，或现一切布施门，或现具足持戒门，或现无尽忍辱门，无量苦行精进门，禅定寂静三昧门，无量大辩智慧门，一切所行方便门，现四无量神通门，大慈大悲四摄门，无量功德智慧门，一切缘起解脱门，清净根力道法门，或现声闻小乘门，或现缘觉中乘门，或现无上大乘门，或现无常众苦门，或现无我众生门，或现不净离欲门，寂静灭定三昧门，随诸众生起病门，一切对治诸法门，随彼众生烦恼性，如应说法广开化。如是一切诸法门，随其本性而济度，一切天人莫能知，是自在胜三昧力。”（六十卷之六）禅宗六祖慧能大师《坛经》说：“一切修多罗及诸文字，大小二乘十二部经，皆因人置。因智慧性，方能建立。若无世人，一切万法本自不有。故知万法本自人兴，一切经书因人说有。”太虚大师在《佛乘宗要论》说：“佛之与法皆随世间众生发现流行。世间众生染有深浅，觉有先后，种种差别，各各不同，而佛法因之亦有种种差别、各各不同以应之。约言佛法为八万四千法门，虽云繁多，而利乐众生则一。是为佛法随世界众生现行的原则。”
　　在学佛上，因各类人的契合点不完全相同，其适用的法门也就有所差异。对个人而言，光靠一个法门可能也是不够的。在修行的整个心路历程之中，不同的阶段可能要用不同的法对治自己的问题，所以一般会用到多种法门。如果只执著用一个法，就可能会障碍其他无量法。就如一个人一生中可能会得各种病，但如果无论生什么病都只用一味药，而排斥其它的药，怎么能保证有好的疗效呢？《华严经》中说：“若有贪欲、瞋恚、痴，忿、覆、悭、嫉及憍、谄，八万四千烦恼异，皆令闻说彼治法。若未具修白净法，令其闻说十戒行；已能布施调伏人，令闻寂灭涅槃音。”（卷第八十）《大智度论》说：“六波罗蜜是菩萨初发心道；次行四禅、八背舍、九次第定及三十七道品，但求涅槃；十八空、佛十力等微细，但为求佛道。六波罗蜜道多为众生故；三十七品等但求涅槃；十八空等于涅槃中出过声闻、辟支佛地，入菩萨位道。是三种皆是生身菩萨所行。所以者何？分别诸法故。今又一切法皆是菩萨道，是法性生身菩萨所行，不见诸法有好恶，安立诸法平等相故。此中佛自说因缘：菩萨应学一切法；若一法不学，则不能得一切种智。学一切法者，用一切种门，思惟筹量、修观通达。”（卷第九十二）
　　当我们与一个法门非常相应并产生好乐心理时，很容易心生骄慢而轻视其他人所学的法门。这其实是一种错误的心态，我们不可把八万四千法门对立起来，因为法法皆相通相融、相得益彰。比如一座大楼，每个门都是相通的，每个门都有用，我们不能只要一个门而舍弃其它的门。所有的法门共同构成了整个佛教大厦的整体，因此不应以一种比较高下的世俗心态来学习佛法。无论对哪一个法门，都决不可随意轻毁。《菩提道次第广论》说：“如《白莲华》及《谛者品》宣说：一切佛语，或实或权，皆是开示成佛方便。有未解是义者，妄执一类为成佛方便及执他类为成佛障碍，遂判好恶，应理非理，及大小乘，谓其菩萨须于是学，此不须学，执为应舍，遂成谤法。《遍摄一切研磨经》云：‘曼殊室利！毁谤正法，业障细微。曼殊室利！若于如来所说圣语，于其一类起善妙想，于其一类起恶劣想，是为谤法。若谤法者，由谤法故，是谤如来，是谤僧伽。若作是云：此则应理，此非应理，是为谤法。若作是言：此是为诸菩萨宣说，此是为诸声闻宣说，是为谤法。若作是言：此是为诸独觉宣说，是为谤法。若作是言：此者非诸菩萨所学，是为谤法。’”（卷第一）太虚大师在《佛法僧义广论》说：“无论哪一宗，都有最殊胜的宗致，才能成立一宗。各宗所修的路途不同，但所趣向目的无非是唯一佛果，亦皆以真如实相为本，这就是殊途同归。所以无论修学哪一宗，都有莫大的利益，不得专赞此而谤斥彼宗，应当不相障碍。各宗各阐扬其特殊的胜义，同时并了知真本觉果之无二无别。倘使能悟平等性、发大悲心而修证，不管走哪一条路，总可证到阿耨多罗三藐三菩提果，都是没有差别，平等平等。所以中国佛教有大乘八宗者，亦是历代菩萨祖师依佛开的方便法门而施设。众生喜欢哪一宗法门就随意择取修行，各各皆可起殊胜的观行，证无二的真理及成无上的佛果。”
　　从终极意义上讲，既然要建立成佛的宗旨，就必须具备开阔的心胸，对任何法门都不排斥，以策发“法门无量誓愿学”的精神。《大乘入道次第》亦说：“夫天池别乎行潦者，百川纳而莫遗；地岳殊于推阜者，众尘积而无弃故；求无上正等菩提，一切诸行莫不备习。”
　　如何有序地修习无量法门呢？如何入一法门而兼通众多法门呢？依师至关重要。因为依师能帮我们熏习正知见。所谓正知见，就是能准确看见门在什么地方，知道从哪个门进去，从哪个门出来。善知识以正知见来教授和引导我们走入正确的门道。有了正知见，才知道如何用功修行，才能非常清楚下手处在哪里、下一步该怎么走。《圆觉经》说：“末世众生将发大心、求善知识、欲修行者，当求一切正知见人。”（卷第一）《解脱道论》说：“若初坐禅人欲生禅定，当觅胜善知识。何以故？初坐禅欲生禅定、得最胜定，若离善知识，成不住分，如经中说。有云：比丘成于退分，如人独游远国，无侣开示，随意自行，如象无钩。若坐禅人所修之行，得善知识说法教诫，令其摄受，示除过患，使得善法，从教修行，精勤苦行，得最胜定，如富商主众所敬贵，如亲善人，如亲父母。善知识者，如象所系，令不动故；如御车人，使随去住故；如人执舵，为得善道；如医治病，为消苦楚；犹如天雨，润益诸种；如母养儿，如父教子，如亲无难，如友饶益，如师教诫，一切善法依是成满。是故世尊教于难陀一切梵行、所谓善知识，是故当觅胜善之人为善朋友。”（卷第二）
　　即使宿生修行等流很强的人也要靠善知识的点化，更何况从未走过修行之路的普通人呢？《大乘起信论》说：“又诸佛法有因有缘，因缘具足乃得成办。如木中火性是火正因，若无人知，不假方便能自烧木，无有是处。众生亦尔，虽有正因熏习之力，若不值遇诸佛、菩萨、善知识等以之为缘，能自断烦恼入涅槃者，则无是处。若虽有外缘之力，而内净法未有熏习力者，亦不能究竟厌生死苦、乐求涅槃。若因缘具足者，所谓自有熏习之力，又为诸佛菩萨等慈悲愿护故，能起厌苦之心，信有涅槃，修习善根，以修善根成熟故，则值诸佛菩萨示教利喜，乃能进趣，向涅槃道。”《坛经》中亦说：“我于忍和尚处，一闻言下便悟，顿见真如本性。是以将此教法流行，令学道者顿悟菩提，各自观心，自见本性。若自不悟，须觅大善知识、解最上乘法者，直示正路。是善知识有大因缘，所谓化导令得见性，一切善法因善知识能发起故。”
　　跟随不同的善知识，熏习出来的知见是不同的，这就形成了不同的风格和不同的道路，但都能通达佛法的殿堂。而如果我们到处乱熏，这里听一下，那里听一下，分别计较，不能会通，知见就熏习不成；熏不成，就不能通达。以分别心，认为处处相违，这是不行的。《灵峰宗论》说：“学不难努力自修，难亲近知识；不难高谈名理，难实践躬行。盖单恃己灵，错修多端；尊师取友，熏习成性。”（卷第二）

　　三、一切法门返观自心，善观五蕴广演万法
　　各种法门千差万别，如何能不相违？如何善巧修习？这里的关键在于要认识到三藏十二部中的所有法门都是用来对治自己的烦恼的。修道人首先要面对的就是自己，而非他人。如《坛经》说：“菩提只向心觅，何劳向外求玄？”《灵峰宗论》说：“无法不从心造，无法不即心具，识取自心，佛祖道尽矣！”（卷第二）心向内缘，把自己心中的问题弄清楚了，外在问题就不会成为问题，或者很容易就可以化解。
　　面对自己，从五蕴法开始。人由五蕴和合而成，身心的各种问题都可以纳入五蕴的范畴，即色、受、想、行、识。五蕴法时时刻刻与我们在一起，所以最容易修习。内在的五蕴法悟透了，然后再由此推广到一切法，都能跟五蕴法相摄。佛法可以用五蕴、十二处、十八界来涵摄一切。五蕴是略法，十二处是中法，十八界是广法，从此再开出无量无边的法。《大乘阿毗达磨集论》说：“蕴、界、处各有几？蕴有五，谓色蕴、受蕴、想蕴、行蕴、识蕴。界有十八，谓眼界、色界、眼识界；耳界、声界、耳识界；鼻界、香界、鼻识界；舌界、味界、舌识界；身界、触界、身识界；意界、法界、意识界。处有十二，谓眼处、色处；耳处、声处；鼻处、香处；舌处、味处；身处、触处；意处、法处。”（卷第一）
　　一切众生的身形和外在的山河大地，都摄入色蕴的范畴。《大乘阿毗达磨集论》云：“云何建立色蕴？谓诸所有色，若四大种及四大种所造。云何四大种？谓地界、水界、火界、风界。何等地界？谓坚硬性。何等水界？谓流湿性。何等火界？谓温热性。何等风界？谓轻等动性。云何所造色？谓眼根、耳根、鼻根、舌根、身根，色、声、香、味、所触一分，及法处所摄色。何等眼根？谓四大种所造眼识所依清净色。何等耳根？谓四大种所造耳识所依清净色。何等鼻根？谓四大种所造鼻识所依清净色。何等舌根？谓四大种所造舌识所依清净色。何等身根？谓四大种所造身识所依清净色。何等为色？谓四大种所造眼根所行义，谓青、黄、赤、白、长、短、方、圆、粗、细、高、下、正、不正、光、影、明、暗、云、烟、尘、雾、迥色、表色、空一显色。此复三种，谓妙、不妙、俱相违色。何等为声？谓四大种所造耳根所取义，或可意，或不可意，或俱相违，或执受大种为因，或不执受大种为因，或俱大种为因，或世所极成，或成所引，或遍计所起，或圣言所摄，或非圣言所摄。何等为香？谓四大种所造鼻根所取义，谓好香、恶香、平等香、俱生香、和合香、变异香。何等为味？谓四大种所造舌根所取义，谓苦、酢、甘、辛、咸、淡，或可意，或不可意，或俱相违，或俱生，或和合，或变异。何等所触一分？谓四大种所造身根所取义，谓滑性、涩性、轻性、重性、软性、缓、急、冷、饥、渴、饱、力、劣、闷、痒、黏、病、老、死、疲、息、勇。何等法处所摄色？有五种应知，谓极略色、极迥色、受所引色、遍计所起色、定自在所生色。”（卷第一）
　　我们很容易在色上去比较，如大的、小的、长的、短的、宽的、窄的、美的、丑的……心被外在的境界所转。例如买一辆汽车，我们往往讨论品牌、外观、性能、装饰等，而其实真正关键的问题是：谁来开、谁来坐、要去哪里、去做什么？学佛法也一样，最重要的是目的，有目的才有方向感，才不会迷惑、走错路。学佛走不下去的原因往往就是方向不清楚。学佛的方向不是攀援外境，而是在内心用功。外境上很圆满、很成功，但是内心没有进步，问题还会再次出现。反之，内心成就了，就能超越所有外在问题，而所谓的问题也就不再是真正的问题了。真正的问题还是在内心。
　　受蕴就是感受，可以分为苦受、乐受和不苦不乐的舍受。《大乘五蕴论》云：“云何受蕴？谓三领纳：一、苦，二、乐，三、不苦不乐。乐谓灭时有和合欲，苦谓生时有乖离欲，不苦不乐谓无二欲。”《大乘阿毗达磨集论》云：“受蕴何相？领纳相是受相。谓由受故，领纳种种净不净业诸果异熟。……云何建立受蕴？谓六受身：眼触所生受、耳触所生受、鼻触所生受、舌触所生受、身触所生受、意触所生受。如是六受身，或乐、或苦、或不苦不乐。复有乐身受、苦身受、不苦不乐身受；乐心受、苦心受、不苦不乐心受。复有乐有味受、苦有味受、不苦不乐有味受；乐无味受、苦无味受、不苦不乐无味受。复有乐依耽嗜受、苦依耽嗜受、不苦不乐依耽嗜受；乐依出离受、苦依出离受、不苦不乐依出离受。何等身受？谓五识相应受。何等心受？谓意识相应受。何等有味受？谓自体爱相应受。何等无味受？谓此爱不相应受。何等依耽嗜受？谓妙五欲爱相应受。何等依出离受？谓此爱不相应受。”（卷第一）人有着各种各样的感受，当自己有了感受时才能体会到别人的感受，才能感同身受。
　　想蕴就是取相，即观察问题的角度。比如拍照，虽然面对相同的景物，但不同的人拍出来的照片却不尽相同，因为大家是从不同的角度来拍的。《大乘五蕴论》云：“云何想蕴？谓于境界取种种相。”《大乘阿毗达磨集论》云：“想蕴何相？构了相是想相。谓由想故，构画种种诸法像类，随所见、闻、觉、知之义，起诸言说。……云何建立想蕴？谓六想身：眼触所生想、耳触所生想、鼻触所生想、舌触所生想、身触所生想、意触所生想。由此想故，或了有相，或了无相，或了小，或了大，或了无量，或了无少所有无所有处。何等有相想？谓除不善言说无想界定及有顶定想，所余诸想。何等无相想？谓所余想。何等小想？谓能了欲界想。何等大想？谓能了色界想。何等无量想？谓能了空无边处、识无边处想。何等无少所有无所有处想？谓能了无所有处想。”（卷第一）
　　行蕴，就是造作，造的各种各样的业会积累下来。《俱舍论》云：“行名造作，思是业性，造作义强，故为最胜。是故佛说：若能造作有漏有为，名行取蕴。”（卷第一）《大乘阿毗达磨集论》云：“行蕴何相？造作相是行相。谓由行故，令心造作于善、不善、无记品中，驱役心故。……云何建立行蕴？谓六思身：眼触所生思、耳触所生思、鼻触所生思、舌触所生思、身触所生思、意触所生思。由此思故，思作诸善，思作杂染，思作分位差别。又即此思，除受及想，与余心所法、心不相应行，总名行蕴。”（卷第一）行蕴跟想蕴紧密相关，人的造作跟人看问题的角度是联系在一起的，所以取相非常重要。犹如拍照，若聚焦错了，则快门按得越多越麻烦。
　　识蕴即分别判断。《大乘五蕴论》云：“云何识蕴？谓于所缘境了别为性。亦名心、意，由采集故，意所摄故。”《大乘阿毗达磨集论》云：“识蕴何相？了别相是识相。谓由识故，了别色、声、香、味、触、法种种境界。”（卷第一）我们的内心常常充满躁动，这都是妄心。心必须要清楚、明了，智慧现起，才不会虚妄分别。
　　在五蕴法中，苦、空、无常、无我都能经由修习而通达，我们要去观察、思维和反省。如《杂阿含经》说：“观色如聚沫，受如水上泡，想如春时焰，诸行如芭蕉，诸识法如幻，日种姓尊说。周匝谛思惟，正念善观察，无实不坚固，无有我我所。于此苦阴身，大智分别说：离于三法者，身为成弃物，寿暖及诸识，离此余身分，永弃丘冢间，如木无识想。此身常如是，幻为诱愚夫，如杀如毒刺，无有坚固者。比丘勤修习，观察此阴身，昼夜常专精，正智系念住，有为行长息，永得清凉处。’”（卷第十）
　　一切法都要用到我们自己身上，法只有与我们自己的心相续结合时才能发挥作用。佛法归根结底是要对治自己、启发别人，而非对治别人。《法句经·自己品》说：“若欲诲他者，应如己所行；自制乃制他，克己实最难。”《坛经》说：“世人若修道，一切尽不妨，常自见己过，与道即相当。”
　　如果我们佛法学得比较通达、透彻，则举手投足间都能让人有所感悟，因为其间内涵了很多佛法的深意。只有看得出自己和别人的五蕴哪里出了问题，才能进一步解决问题，这样学才能契理契机。通过对治自己、改变自己来影响别人：别人看到了，跟我们接触了，就会受影响，从而发生改变。以佛法解决问题时，与世间法的不同之处即在于用心的方向、方法和下手处上。
　　如果不这样实际修习，光靠说教是不行的。没有对佛法的实际感悟，我们理解的很多东西都难免是支离破碎的、片段的和机械的，对法门的理解也往往停留在表层，不能把握其深义，因而也难以会通各个法门。如果你所讲的不是整个内心相续的自然流露，而只是一些佛学词汇的堆砌，那是起不了什么大作用的。如果我们自己都是支离破碎的，却向别人宣讲佛法，讲来讲去最后自己也会觉得索然无味，甚至讲不下去，最终自己对佛法也不相信了。很多人就是因为这样对佛法丧失了信心，心力退失，最后就修不下去了。
四、大小二乘修善断恶，闻思而修启慧增信
　　法门包括大乘法门和小乘法门。虽然都是运度众生，但有很大的差别。如《大乘庄严经论》说：
　　发心与教授，方便及住持，时节下上乘，五事一切异。释曰：声闻乘与大乘有五种相违：一、发心异，二、教授异，三、方便异，四、住持异，五、时节异。声闻乘若发心、若教授、若勤方便，皆为自得涅槃故；住持亦少，福智聚小故；时节亦少，乃至三生得解脱故。大乘不尔，发心、教授、勤方便，皆为利他故；住持亦多，福智聚大故；时节亦多，经三大阿僧祇劫故。如是一切相违，是故不应以小乘行而得大乘果。（卷第一）
　　小乘有无常，大乘也有无常；小乘有空观，大乘也有空观。但是由于发心不同、方便不同，最终的效果也大不相同。《菩提道次第广论》说：
　　是故龙猛菩萨诸论，明显宣说声闻、独觉亦证一切诸法无性，以说解脱生死要由无性空见乃成办故。声闻、独觉乃至未尽自心烦恼，当修彼见。若烦恼尽，以此便足，不长时修，故不能断诸所知障。诸菩萨者，惟断烦恼自脱生死不以为足，为利一切有情欲求成佛，故至断尽诸所知障，经极长时无边资粮庄严而修。如是拔除二障种子，真能对治，虽是前说空性正见，然由长时修不修故，有惟能断诸烦恼障而不能断所知障者。譬如惟一通达无我，俱是见惑、修惑对治，然由惟能现见无我，若断见惑，不断修惑；断修惑者须长时修。如是断除所知障者，仅长时修犹非能断，亦必观待学余众多广大妙行。不修对治诸所知障，惟修能断诸烦恼障所有方便，故说声闻、独觉证法无我，无圆满修。《入中论释》云：“声闻独觉，虽亦现见此缘起性，然而彼等于法无我未圆满修，有断三界烦恼方便。”……此中可引二种希有定解：一、况云成佛，若无通达一切法无性正见，无余方便解脱生死。由此定解，以多方便发大精勤，求彼净见。二、能判大乘、小乘不共特法，谓菩提心及诸菩萨广大妙行。由此定解，于诸行品特能认为教授中心，受菩萨戒，学习诸行。”（卷第二十三）


　　概而言之，小乘空观是为了断恶，视人的烦恼和恶业为空的；大乘空观不仅要观空，还要修善，即发菩提心、造作善业。断恶与修善的性质不同，断恶并不等于修善。《四分律行事钞资持记·释沙弥篇》说：“大乘中三品即三聚：一、摄律仪，二、摄善法，三、摄众生。初则断恶，二即修善，三即度生。准《智论》中，二乘但有断恶一聚，虽有作持，还归离过；不修方便教化众生故，无摄善，自调自度。”（卷第三）
　　对治问题不等于一定就能生起善法，不犯错误也并不等于一定能够增长功德。例如，在寺庙里遵守规矩与发心承担是不同的。安分守己固然不会伤害别人，但未必就能利益别人；而如果真心利益别人，就肯定不会去伤害人。当善法现起时，烦恼就不易起，恶的力量会越来越弱。当我们起心动念都是善法的时候，就可以降伏恶法，最后就能断恶。如《佛说未曾有因缘经》云：“前心作恶，如云覆日；后心起善，如炬消暗。”（卷第二）《大乘庄严经论》云：“爱他过自爱，忘己利众生，不为自憎他，岂作不善业？释曰：若略示彼义。菩萨爱他过于自爱，由此故忘自身命而利于他。不为自利而损于彼，由此故能于众生绝诸恶业。”（卷第二）《菩提道次第广论》说：“（《入行论》）又云：‘尽世所有乐，悉从利他生，尽世所有苦，皆从自利起。此何须繁说，凡愚作自利，能仁行利他，观此二差别。若不能真换，自乐及他苦，非仅不成佛，生死亦无乐。’谓当思惟，惟自爱执，乃是一切衰损之门；爱执他者，则是一切圆满之本。”（卷第九）因此，要修善心善念必须从众生的福祉入手。假如一天到晚都只想着断自己的烦恼，就发不起大善心。
　　灰身泯智，心心念念想着个人，想着自己不犯错误，这是小乘的出发点。大乘法则不然，它建立在广度众生、自他兼利的出发点上。《菩提道次第广论》说：
　　当知此中，士夫安乐，士夫威德，士夫胜力，谓能担荷利他重担，惟缘自利共旁生故。故诸大士本性，谓专一趣注行他利乐。《弟子书》云：“易得少草畜亦食，渴逼获水亦欢饮；士夫此为勤利他，此圣威乐士夫力。日势乘马照世游，地不择担负世间，大士无私性亦然，一味利乐诸世间。”如是见诸众生众苦逼恼，为利他故而发匆忙，是名士夫，亦名聪睿。即前书云：“见世无明烟云覆，众生迷堕苦火中，如救头然意勤忙，是名士夫亦聪睿。”是故能生自他一切利乐本源，能除一切衰恼妙药，一切智士所行大路，见闻念触，悉能长益一切众生。由行利他兼成自利，无所缺少，具足广大善权方便。（卷第八）
　　“乘”即车辆、运载之意。能度一个，还是二十个、五十个，就要看运输工具的运载能力。要想运载很多众生，就需要动力强劲的车辆。否则一旦人多了车子就跑不动了，甚至还可能出危险。车辆的动力就是我们的信心和愿力。信心就意味着不能有丝毫的怀疑，有疑就说明不确信。一般人平时大部分时间都是在妄念中，真正有信心的时候很少，所以必须一直不断地串习，用佛法的名言来思维。
　　佛法讲闻思修。《楞严经》讲：“从闻思修，入三摩地”。学佛并非随便听听讲座、一场音声佛事那样简单。只有在听法之后认真思维，方能真实获益。如《俱舍论》说：“诸有发心将趣见谛，应先安住清净尸罗，然后勤修闻所成等，谓先摄受顺见谛闻，闻已勤求所闻法义，闻法义已无倒思惟，思已方能依定修习。行者如是住戒勤修，依闻所成慧起思所成慧，依思所成慧起修所成慧。”（卷第二十二）
　　闻、思、修是一个从文字到义理、逐步将佛法领纳于心的过程，其中思维起到承前启后的重要作用。如《俱舍论》云：“闻所成慧唯缘名境，未能舍文而观义故；思所成慧缘名义境，有时由文引义，有时由义引文，未全舍文而观义故；修所成慧唯缘义境，已能舍文唯观义故。譬若有人浮深驶水，曾未学者不舍所依，曾学未成或舍或执，曾善学者不待所依，自力浮渡；三慧亦尔。”（卷第二十二）
　　从广义上说，修慧就是在日常生活中运用所闻思的法义，以产生行为的力量。思维越多，智慧越容易增长。如《菩提道次第广论》说：
　　复如闻所成慧以闻为先，思所成慧以思为先，如是修所成慧亦应以修为先，以其修慧从修成故。若如是者，则修所成慧前行之修，即是修习思所成慧所决定义，故说修慧从思慧生。以是若有几许多闻，亦有尔多从此成慧。此慧几多，其思亦多。思惟多故，从思成慧亦当不鲜。如思慧多，则多修行。修行多故，则有众多灭除过失、引德道理。故诸经论，皆说于修闻思最要。……又如至尊慈氏云：“抉择分见道，及于修道中，数思惟称量，观察修习道。”此说大乘圣者修道，尚有数数思惟、称量观察。（卷第二）
　　思维是修慧的基础和前提。现代人普遍缺乏思维能力，佛法听了不少，但往往不能依照法义去思维。不思维则佛法的道理不能转为自己的修慧，在日常生活中也不能激发行为的力量，最终只能算是掌握了一些知识而已。仅仅掌握很多佛学知识，并不能帮助我们树立正见。佛学知识越多，反而可能知见越有问题。就如一个人拥有许多珠宝，虽然珠宝本身是好东西，但珠宝能当饭吃、能当衣穿吗？只有拿珠宝去换米、油、面、衣服，才能对生命产生实际的作用。
　　听闻佛法是为了让我们树立正知见，培养思维能力。有了思维能力，我们学的法就能在内心等流，从而使善法不断积聚、业障不断消除。《大悲经》云：“应正身律仪、口律仪、意律仪，当作是念：愿我敬信速得具足，愿我深心正直具足，愿我身心具善思惟。……善思惟者，当得五种功德利益。何者为五？一者不妄语，二者不两舌，三者不绮语，四者不贪欲，五者身坏命终，得生善道诸天人中。”（卷第五）《大方等大集经》说：“喻如百千年垢腻，可于一日浣令鲜净。如是于百千劫中所集诸不善业，以佛法力故善顺思惟，于一日一时尽能消灭。”（卷第十八）如果思维能力不够，佛学名词就会在内心越积越多，这样再好的法非但起不了作用，反而会造成诸多障碍。
　　五、执一废万障道丛生，消业除障忏悔法门
　　恶法会障碍我们，善法有时也会障碍我们。这是因为如果执着于“一门深入”，认为只修一个法就可以了，就会给修习其它法造成障道因缘，最终导致修不上去。比如看了一本书或听了几盘录音带，就认为只有这个最好，其它的都不好、都可以不要。一旦产生这种执着后就很麻烦。认定只有自己学的法门才是最好的，别人的都不好、都不对，如果这样一直熏习下去，这种知见就越来越顽固，最后佛法也就学不进去了。一般凡夫往往学什么就执着什么，执着是最深层的我见的体现。
　　佛法归根到底是心，障道因缘都是我们自己的原因而产生的。认识这一点很重要。法是一种境界，我们内心的境界有问题时就需要另外一种境界、另外一种力量来对治，然后慢慢培养一种更高的境界，这样才能步步上升。就如开车遇到路上有大石头挡住去路时必须清除后才能继续前进一样，我们在修行道路上的业障、烦恼障等也必须清除。我们要借助很多法门，才能不断克服各种障碍。如《菩提道次第广论》说：
　　谓于引导修道知识敬心微劣，则断一切善法根本，故当勤修依师之法；如是若心不乐修行，当修暇满；若著现法，当修无常、恶趣过患以为主要；若觉慢缓所受佛制，当自思惟是于业果定解劣弱，则以修习业果为主；若于生死缺少厌患，求解脱心则成虚言，故当思惟生死过患；若凡所作，皆为利益有情之心不猛利者，是则断绝大乘根本，故当多修愿心及因；若受佛子所有律仪，学习诸行，而觉执相系缚猛利，当以理智破执相心一切所缘，而于如空如幻空性，净修其心；若于善缘，心不安住，为散乱奴，则当正修安住一趣。是诸先觉已宣说者，以彼为例；其未说者，亦当了知。总之，莫令偏于一分，令心堪修一切善品。（卷第二十四）
　　烦恼业障犹如毒素。今天中了毒，当天就要赶紧消毒、吃药，这样毒素才不会蔓延。起烦恼造了业，当天就要忏悔。忏悔之后，当天就清净了，这样烦恼业习的力量就不会一直在内心中相续等流下去。若不忏悔，烦恼业习的力量就会一直持续，并且会越来越厉害，这样就会逐渐障碍我们修行、修道，甚至最后使我们在学佛的道路上难以为继。
　　所有修行的障碍都必须净除。忏悔是清除障碍的重要法门。比丘受戒时也要忏悔，忏悔无始以来的种种恶业，受戒的地方就叫忏悔坛。那么应如何忏悔呢？首先要知道忏悔的内涵。忏悔有取白舍黑、修来改往、陈罪断心等多种含义，如智者大师《金光明经文句》云：
　　忏者，首也；悔者，伏也。如世人得罪于王，伏款顺从，不敢违逆。不逆为伏，顺从为首。行人亦尔，伏三宝足下，正顺道理，不敢作非，故名忏悔。又忏名白法，悔名黑法。黑法须悔而勿作，白法须企而尚之，取舍合论，故言忏悔。又忏名修来，悔名改往。往日所作恶不善法，鄙而恶之，故名为悔；往日所弃一切善法，今日已去誓愿勤修，故名为忏。弃往求来，故名忏悔。又忏名披陈众失、发露过咎、不敢隐讳，悔名断相续心、厌悔舍离。能作、所作合弃，故言忏悔。又忏者名惭，悔者名愧；惭则惭天，愧则愧人；人见其显，天见其冥，冥细显粗，粗细皆恶，故言忏悔。（卷第三）
　　忏悔是普贤菩萨十大行愿之一，是从凡夫乃至等觉菩萨的必修法门，无人有可不修之理。如智者大师《金光明经文句》云：
　　人中八苦，一苦尚不可忍，况八苦交横？应当忏悔，灭除业障。……若出家人虽欲修道，为五烦恼所障，心不得停心，为四颠倒所惑，不得入四念处，亦须忏悔，除灭业障。……虽入有余涅槃，犹有果身在，身子（舍利弗）风热，毕陵伽眼痛，欲弃有余（有余涅槃）入无余，亦须忏悔。虽断三界正使（烦恼）尽，习气尚存，亦须忏悔。……辟支佛地，但作神通，不能达文字；菩萨地，未穷至极；如是等位，皆须忏悔，灭除业障。……十住已去，乃至等觉已来，秖如十四日月，非十五日月，匡郭未圆，光未顿足，暗未顿尽，应须忏悔，灭除业障。（卷第三）
　　忏悔的方法包括作法忏、取相忏和无生忏，其用途也不尽相同，首要的是要建立正确的认识和心态。《法苑珠林》中例举了正信因果、惭愧、观命无常、发露向他、要期断恶、发菩提心、修功立德、守护正法、念佛功德、观罪性空等十种心态：
　　一者，正信因果，不迷不谬。为善获福，为恶得罪。虽无作者，果报不失；虽念念灭，业不败亡。信为道源，智为能入；既智且信，众善根本。用此正信，翻破不信一阐提心。由备此心，方能起忏。
　　二者，悔罪要方，惭愧为本。我惭此罪，不复人流；愧我此罪，不蒙天护。是为白法，亦是三乘行人、第一义天出世白法。是为惭愧，翻破无愧之黑法也。要具此心，方能行忏，后条例耳。
　　三者，怖畏无常，命如水沫，一息不还，随业流转。觉无常已，食息无闲。是为无常，翻破保常不畏恶道心也。
　　四者，发露向他，说罪轻重。以露罪故，罪即焦枯，如露树根，枝叶凋落。是为发露，翻破覆藏现净心也。
　　五者，断相续心，毕竟舍恶，克决雄猛，犹若刚刀。是为决定，要期断恶，翻破恶念相续心也。
　　六者，发菩提心，普拔一切苦，普与一切乐。此心弘广，无所不遍，是为大乘菩提之心，翻破遍恶心也。
　　七者，修功补过，勤策三业，精进不休。是为修功立德，翻破不修三业、无辜起恶心也。
　　八者，守护正法，不念外道邪师破坏佛法，誓欲光显，令久住也。是为守护，翻破灭一切善事心也。
　　九者，念十方佛无量功德、神通、智慧，欲加护我，慈哀我苦，赐我除罪清净良药。是为翻破念恶知识心也。
　　十者，观罪性空。罪从心生，心若可得，罪不可无；我心自空，空云何有？善心亦然。罪福无主，非内非外，亦无中间，不常自有。但有名字，名之为心；但有名字，名为罪福。如是名字，名字即空，还源反本，毕竟清净。是为观罪性空，翻破无明颠倒执著心也。”（卷八十六）
　　六、安住当下以法为心，成就团队担佛家业
　　树立起正确的知见，正确处理一门与多门的关系，积极忏悔业障，这样身心就能安住，学修也能稳步增上，就不会躁动乱跑。很多修行人在各种法门间学来学去，跑各种道场，其实都很莫名其妙。到最后自己人老了，体能没了，心力也就没了。
　　学习佛法其实没有什么困难的事情，就是要有信心并树立正见，针对自己的烦恼按部就班地修行，一点一滴去发愿，一点一滴去做，一点一滴去体会，一点一滴去改变，一点一滴去落实。通过自身的造作去利益别人，这样我们对世界、对人生、对社会的看法和感受就会有所不同。就如盖一个房子，准备好建筑材料是必须的，但建筑材料不可能一下子就变成房子，还需要很多其它的辅助材料以及很多人工，按照工序甚至日夜不停地干，最后才能建成房子。没有深入的思考，没有缜密的规划，没有吃苦的毅力，没有长远的发心，没有和合的团队，没有勇猛精进的实干精神，光是空口说大话，是没什么大用的。要发展佛教，整个时空因缘的变化是众生最大的共业。如果不了解时空因缘，连度众生都是很不现实的问题。所以只能从自己开始，从团队开始，然后慢慢地去努力付出，以影响周围的环境。要靠自己一个人的力量做出一番广大的佛法事业，这种想法纯属异想天开，事情并非那么简单。认识到这一点，就会珍惜当下的每一个因缘——出家的因缘、受戒的因缘、学戒的因缘，珍惜当下遇到的师友和团队。
　　我们学佛法的目的是什么？未来要成就什么？对此我们要常常思考。每个人的人生都是一个过程，在这个过程中有过去、现在和未来。不能老是想着“我昨天做了什么事情”、“去年做了什么事情”、“过去有多么了不起”、“过去我有什么问题”……把过去的问题一直放在心里就会出问题，把过去的成绩一直放在心里也会出问题。佛法告诉我们要活在当下，活在当下的目的是面向未来，面向未来就是要我们往前看。往前看是什么意思呢？比如我们每天都要吃饭，做饭的时候一定要有米、菜、燃料。从现在开始准备，到了吃饭的时间才能有饭吃。学佛亦然，今天为明天做准备，今年为明年做准备，今生为来生做准备，生生世世为成佛做准备。明白了这个道理，人就不会没事干。
　　时时刻刻活在当下，就是清楚自己现在在做什么。若连自己都不清楚自己在干什么，岂不成了行尸走肉？不是活在当下的人，只是个肉团，或者说心已经死了，因为他的意识不明了、不清楚，第六意识心的力量很弱，不知道自己在做什么。这样的生命一直都处在轮回之中，白天、黑夜，青年、壮年、老年，生、老、病、死……周而复始，轮转不息。
　　在昼夜交替、年复一年的过程中，若我们失去心愿的主导，随业而流转，就是轮回。菩萨靠愿力主导生命，故能成就无边的功德，从而行愿无尽、生死自在。藏传佛教中有很多活佛不断转世再来，也是这一世做不完，下一世继续做，一直往下延续，就是行愿无尽。愿就是最终成佛，行就是积聚无量的福德智慧资粮，一点一点地积聚，直到圆满，最后就真的成佛了。
　　佛法是可以一点一点去落实和实践的。一定要具有真正的信心，不要怀疑。疑也是烦恼，烦恼与法是冲突的。有烦恼，法就用不上；用不上法，心就随烦恼转；心随烦恼转，做事情就是造恶业、染污业；造恶业、染污业，就会顺着轮回的轨道流转。如果造善业，我们就容易跟菩提大愿相应，心就可以主导现在的业，主导生命。虽然人身是过去异熟的感果，但我们能够通过当下的努力来改变未来的生命。善业不断地持续，等流不断地造作，就可以改变明天、改变未来，从而使现实的世界慢慢从部分开始改变，乃至改变整体。这样，人的生命品质也就越来越高。这就是增上生，一生比一生殊胜；落实到眼前，就是一天比一天好。如果我们不是一天比一天好，那么非升即堕，就很麻烦了。
　　我们应该过得一天比一天好，烦恼一天比一天少，善业一天比一天多。怎样体现善业呢？应通过落实于广大事业来体现。如果什么事都没有，天天睡觉，那怎么行？通过做善事才能广度众生，度众生的心需要缘在具体的事情上。比如听一堂经的时候，需要有人给大家搬柴、煮饭、洗碗。如果在做事的过程中学法、用法，修欢喜心、修随喜心，参加师友的互动并用心地缘念回向，其意义就不仅仅是搬柴煮饭，所做的事情就能成为真正的成佛资粮。
　　做同样一件事情，若是佛法的心在主导，那就是佛法；若不是佛法的心在主导，那就是世间法。在世间买菜，一把菜十块钱就是十块钱的价值；用佛法的心买一把菜，就是无边的资粮，意义就完全不同。世间的价值观都是无常的，会随着人的知见而发生变化；佛法的价值观则不然，佛法是永恒不变的，是颠簸不破的真理。一切世间法都是由人的分别心虚妄分别出来的，因而有种种的差别；佛法就不同，万法回归自心，万法都是从我们内心中开显出来的，都能在我们的内心中得到体现和成就。一切恶法来源于染污的烦恼心，一切善法来源于自性清净心，所以说修行就是修心。《大乘本生心地观经》曰：“汝善男子，当修学者但有一德，是人应住阿兰若处，求无上道。云何为一？谓观一切烦恼根源，即是自心。了达此法，堪能住止阿兰若处。所以者何？譬如狂犬被人驱打，但逐瓦石，不逐于人。未来世中，住阿兰若新发心者，亦复如是。若见色、声、香、味、触、法，其心染著，是人不知烦恼根本，不知五境从自心生，即此名为未能善住阿兰若处。”（卷第九）《坛经》云：“自心众生无边誓愿度，自心烦恼无边誓愿断，自性法门无尽誓愿学，自性无上佛道誓愿成。善知识！大家岂不道‘众生无边誓愿度’恁么道？且不是惠能度。善知识！心中众生，所谓邪迷心、诳妄心、不善心、嫉妒心、恶毒心，如是等心尽是众生。各须自性自度，是名真度。何名自性自度？即自心中邪见烦恼愚痴众生，将正见度。既有正见，使般若智打破愚痴迷妄众生，各各自度。邪来正度，迷来悟度，愚来智度，恶来善度；如是度者，名为真度。又烦恼无边誓愿断，将自性般若智，除却虚妄思想心是也。又法门无尽誓愿学，须自见性，常行正法，是名真学。又无上佛道誓愿成，既常能下心，行于真正，离迷离觉，常生般若；除真除妄，即见佛性，即言下佛道成。”
　　我们学佛也好，持戒也好，都离不开团队。出家人受戒以后称为比丘，四位比丘以上才能称作僧，所以僧本身就有团队、和合之意。出家人如果不具备和合团队的观念，“僧”就会有问题。如果时时刻刻仅想着自己一个人，就会给团队造成麻烦。因为只要有一个人意见不一致，很多僧法就做不了。佛陀制定比丘戒律的根本目的，是让正法久住，让僧团延续壮大。僧团里每个人的善业都能影响别人，别人的善业也会影响自己，因此整个僧团中所有人的生命和业力都是紧密联系在一起的。明白这一点，我们持戒时就不会只缘着自己，就会以成就团队的心来持戒。
　　但是，现在很多人都未能认识到这一点。受戒后，因害怕犯戒、造业，团体的很多事情都不想去做。比如让他去洗菜，他会说：“哎呀！洗菜会把虫子弄死。我不去，你去洗吧！”这其实是很有问题的想法！既然如此，那么你吃饭的时候有没有想：“洗菜弄死了虫子，这菜有关的业不清净，我到底是吃还是不吃呢？”其实我们的心应该转过来，应该去想怎么洗才能够尽量少伤害虫子。如果因不可避免的原因违犯小戒，以惭愧心如法作忏悔，仍然能恢复清净，这样也就自他两全了。如果总是担心犯戒，就不会去做事情。僧团里的很多事情没人做，往往是这样造成的。每个人都说：“这个事情会造恶业，你不要找我，你们去做吧！”只著于一点，没有整体的考量和担当，乃至只考虑自己一个人持戒不堕地狱，毫不慈念他人，这种心行与戒律的根本精神是相违的。
　　大小乘戒律的根本都在于慈悲。如《萨婆多毗尼毗婆沙》说：“于一切众生上慈心，得波罗提木叉戒。”（卷第一）《阿毗达磨大毗婆沙论》说：“问：别解脱律仪由何等心得？答：由普于一切有情起善意乐、无损害心得。若起此心于某处受、某处不受，不得律仪，由此律仪遍于一切所应受处得防护故。”（卷第一百二十）《大乘修行菩萨行门诸经要集》说：
　　有十种菩提心戒：所谓一者为求一切众生利故，非独利己；二者所修道业回施众生，愿速成佛，非专为己；三者以坚牢行利他世业，亦非为己；四者戒行清净，增长菩提，历劫忍辱无有疲倦；五者布施为戒，乃至能舍头目髓脑利众生故；六者持戒为戒，菩萨不舍无戒众生；七者忍辱为戒，菩萨不惧一切魔军；八者精进为戒，为众生故，积集佛道无有疲倦；九者禅定为戒，菩萨为声闹乱定心不动；十者智慧为戒，菩萨见诸世法想同菩提；空相为戒，菩萨不染世间；慈悲为戒，不入涅槃。（卷第三）
　　佛制戒也是本着慈悲心。如《四分律》中说：“世尊慈念众生故，而为说法。”（卷第六十）《阿毗昙毗婆沙论》说：“修多罗依力故说，毗尼依大慈故说，阿毗昙依无畏故说。”（卷第一）因此，我们也应顺应佛心而本着慈悲心来持戒，否则即使持戒滴水不漏，也是有所偏差的，乃至佛所不喜。例如佛世时曾有比丘与居士同睡一个房间，被居士观过讥笑。后来佛就制戒不许比丘与未受比丘戒的人同睡一个房间。比丘们严守这条戒，晚上在僧坊睡觉时，将年幼的沙弥罗睺罗赶出房间。罗睺罗没地方过夜，只好跑到厕所里呆着。佛知道后就将罗睺罗带到自己的房间，让罗睺罗睡觉，佛自己则一夜坐着没睡。第二天早晨，佛召集比丘，呵责他们无有慈心，并更改戒条。如《四分律》记载说：
　　尔时佛在拘睒毗国，诸比丘如是言：“佛不听我曹与未受大戒人共宿，当遣罗云出去。”时罗云无屋住，往厕上宿。时佛知之，往诣厕所，作謦欬声。时罗云亦复謦欬，世尊知而故问：“此中有谁？”罗云答言：“我是罗云。”复问：“汝在此中作何等耶？”答言：“诸比丘言：不得与未受具戒人共宿。驱我出。”世尊即便言：“云何愚痴比丘无有慈心，乃驱小儿出？！是佛子，不护我意耶？！”即便授指与之令捉，将来自入住房，共止一宿。明日清旦集诸比丘，告言：“汝等无慈心，乃驱出小儿！是佛子，不护我意耶？！”（卷第十一）
　　要修习慈悲心，应懂得大家之间都是有关联的，这样才会明白自己应该怎么做，才会明白谁去做都是一样的，这才是菩萨发心。越是苦的、累的，乃至越有危险的事情，越是应该带头去做。过去抗日战争、解放战争期间，像炸碉堡、炸桥梁这种危险的任务都有很多人愿意去做，这是为什么呢？因为他知道个人的幸福离不开国家的安宁。在僧团中，如果时时刻刻只想着自己不下地狱，别人下地狱就不去管了，这样的起心动念根本不符合佛法！这样处理问题，肯定会造成处处与他人对立。现实中这类现象非常多，尤其是学戒律学得比较偏执的人更是如此，他们没有从内心认识到人与人、业与业都是有关联的。一些寺庙里人与人之间不相和睦，其实也是由于这个原因。
　　无论善业还是恶业，都是在与别人相处过程中产生的一种作用和力量。有些业种在我们心里，被外缘引发而产生行为。因此，自己的业与别人是有关联的。同样，别人的业与自己也是有关系的。别人做得好，我们起欢喜心，随喜他的功德，我们也造善业了；别人做不好，我们心里起烦恼，也造了恶业。所以我们要培养大局观，要考虑到问题的整体性、长远性和连续性，这样我们的看法就会不一样。假如天天想的都是个体，怎么会有好的成就呢？而如果时时刻刻考虑的都是团队整体，那么自己的很多问题也就自然不成问题了，最终我们才能有所成就。菩萨考虑的是所有众生的事情，所以才能广度众生。
　　在一个僧团中，我们要把整个僧团的清净、和合、增上作为考虑问题的着眼点和出发点，并不断去熏习这些基本观念。这样慢慢地学，有进步了，有能力了，才有办法承担教法、住持佛法。否则，无论学法、受戒、持戒都会遇到诸多障碍，学一法而障碍一切法，得一法而失无量法。如果真正有所发心并踏踏实实地行持，不好高骛远，不分别拣择，就一定能够有所成就，从而真实荷担如来家业！

文章来源：《法音》2011年第四期

Mrs. Rhys Davids' Dialogue with Psychology (1893-1924)

By Teresina Rowell Havens
Philosophy East & West
V. 14 (1964)
pp. 51-58
Copyright 1964 by University of Hawaii Press　

p.51

"THE BUDDHIST CONCEPTION Of consciousness is, I venture to think, better understood as a mental electrification of the organism than in terms of any other natural force." [1]

This was written forty years ago, before electroencephalograms had been heard of. The author, Mrs. Caroline Rhys Davids, was both a student of psychology and a pioneer translator of early Buddhist texts from Paali into English. The passage quoted above illustrates two characteristics of her early scholarly work: (1) her concern to find the most precise available equivalent in the scientific thought of her own time to convey various aspects of the Paali Buddhist view of how the mind works; and (2) the extent to which she was ahead of her time.

It often happens that a scholar's work will be ignored for many years and then suddenly become relevant to the concerns of a much later epoch. It is the thesis of the present article that this has been true of Mrs. Rhys Davids, and that the time has now come when her earlier work can enter into a fruitful dialogue with the thought of our age.

　
WHY HER WORK HAS BEEN IGNORED

The cultural time-gap was complicated in her case by personal problems. For one thing, her time failed to provide a community of scholars--Orientalists or others--interested in psychology who might have taken her hypotheses seriously enough to undertake to disprove or to modify them in scholarly debate. For another, her most creative period was over before many Western psychologists and psychotherapists had come to be interested in what they could learn from Buddhist approaches to mental and emotional processes. Unfortunately, or so it appears from our present perspective, Mrs.
p.52
Rhys Davids herself moved during the 20s from her early interest in the psychological to a preoccupation with the psychic, inspired by the death of her only son in the First World War, This interest led her to stress texts dealing with clairvoyance, clairaudience, and communication with "other worlds" to a degree unacceptable to the predominant Western academic frame of reference, at the time she was writing and now, (We need not speak of circles interested in ESP and psychical research, since they did not and do not impinge heavily on the academic world.) Her interest in these directions took such an increasingly predominant place in her later books that scholars could no longer take her conclusions seriously. This led to the ignoring also of her earlier, more scholarly studies in Buddhist psychology.
　
HER EARLY INTEREST IN PSYCHOLOGY

Since most of this early solid work was as editor and translator of Paali texts, it is chiefly in Introductions and footnotes that her ideas may be found, Regarding the early awakening of her psychological interest, the following note appears in the Introduction to A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics:

Even a superficial inspection of the Manual should yield great promise to anyone interested in the history of psychology. When... my attention was first drawn to it... by Professor Rhys Davids, I was at once attracted by the amount of psychological material embedded in its pages.[2]

In a series of long introductory essays in each successive volume of Kindred Sayings[3] and Gradual Sayings,[4] she relates her detailed study of technical Paali terms to her broad interests in the workings of the human mind, Western as well as Eastern. This feeling for wider implications is reflected in the following query from her Introduction to Buddhist Psychology:[5] "How far does the greater richness of Buddhist intellectual nomenclature correspond to a greater manifold in modes of knowing or of knowledge?" In other
p.53

words, does a distinction of terms for which we have no equivalents indicate potential levels of inner experience of which we are unaware? Could a Westerner experience these subtleties if he pursued Buddhist training? Supposing that he did experience distinctions of psychic reality corresponding to the terms in question, how could he translate them into English or communicate them verbally to a person whose culture has no words for them? One of the best examples of this kind of problem is the still-vexing term jhaana, which has suffered through a series of mistranslation such as "trance," "ecstasy," "musing," etc. The difficulty lies deeper than the merely verbal. Is it possible that no adequate English term has been found because we have no precisely equivalent discipline in Western religious tradition?

These are the kinds of questions which interdisciplinary research today could begin to answer by combining the resources of Western psychology, anthropology, and linguistics with both Paali expertness and living Buddhist experience. This collaboration seems more feasible, now that subjective data are becoming recognized by some scientific psychologists in the West as proper material for investigation.

Although her times were not ripe for this sort of dialogue, Mrs. Rhys Davids realized in her work of translation that technical psychological terms--on the English as well as on the Paali side--are part of a system with certain assumptions about the nature of mind. Therefore, if the translator is to communicate with Western readers, she must know, not only what a given technical term means in Paali, but also the technical connotation of its English equivalent in current psychological systems. Hence, Mrs. Rhys Davids dug into British psychological works to ascertain as far as possible the exact connotations of such terms as "cognition," "sensation," "feeling," "perception," and "faculties."[6] Many footnotes and entire articles were concerned with working out the closest equivalents for such terms as "vi~n~naana," "indriya," "aayatana," "upaadaana," and the like. At the same time, she was extremely careful to avoid premature parallels. For example, in discussing the technical meaning of ruupa^m she notes:

Ruupa.m would ... appear at first sight to be a name for the external world or for the extended universe, as contrasted with the unextended, mental, psychical or subjective universe. Personally I do not find, so far, that the Eastern and Western concepts can be so easily made to coincide. It will be better before, and indeed without as yet, arriving at any such conclusive judgment, to inquire into the application made of the term in the Manual generally.[7]
p.54

She explored the backgrounds of psychological inquiry in ancient Greece as well as in pre-Buddhist India in order to evaluate the significance of the Buddhist discoveries. For example, she considers the Dhamma-sanga.ni's analysis of types of sensation to be "... the first academic formulation of a theory of sense which ancient India has hitherto produced for us. There is no such analysis of sensation ... put forward in any Indian book of an equally early date."[8]

She quotes from Siebeck's Geschichte der Psychologie[9] concerning Empedokles' theory of sensation or sense-cognition, and observes that Demokritus regarded all sensation as either bare touch or development of touch--a view which, she notes, "is borne out to a great extent by modern biological research." [10]
　
"PSYCHOLOGIZING WITHOUT A PSYCHE"

As she dug deeper into both the technical Buddhist analysis of states of mind and the over-all system behind it, she was struck by the paradoxical truth that Buddhism stresses conscious will, attention, feeling, choice--"just those mental activities ...which seem most to imply a subject, or subjective unity who attends, feels, wills and chooses. And yet this same philosophy is emphatically one that attempts to 'extrude the ego.' "[11]

It is this psychologizing without a psyche that impressed me from the first, and seemed to bring the work, for all its remoteness in other respects, nearer to our own Experiential school of and since Locke, than anything we find in Greek traditions.[12]

And if there was one thing which moved the Master to quit his wonted serenity and wield the lash of scorn and upbraiding, it was just the reading into this convenient generalization of mind or personality that "metaphysical concept of a soul, mind-atom, or mind-stuff," which is put aside by the modern psychologist.[13]

This vehement, almost violent anti-substantialism of early Buddhism stimulated her to look into Aristotle's De Anima in order to contrast his notions of "soul" and "substance" with the Buddhist. Her subsequent reflections, as set down in the Introductory Essay prefacing Buddhist Psychological

p.55

Ethics,[14] can only be summarized here. (The Buddhist Manual was probably written during Aristotle's childhood.)

Aristotle, in applying his theory of mind as a potential "form" which energizes the body, went far "to resolve mind into phenomenal processes."[15] "But he did not, or would not, wrench himself radically out of the primitive soil...as the Buddhist dared to do."[16] Hence, Greek thought remained "saturated with substantialist methods"[17a] and passed them on to the medieval world strengthened by the "animistic standpoint" of the Patristic Christian philosophy.

Modern science, however, has been gradually training the popular mind to a phenomenalistic point of view, and joining hands in psychology with the anti-substantialist tradition of Hume.[17b]

Mrs. Rhys Davids then proceeds to consider a deeply-ingrained tendency of the human mind which lends support to the "philosophical elaboration of soul-theory into Substantialism," namely, the tendency to subsume the particular under the general:

That is to say, this perceiving and judging, by way of generalizing and unifying, is the only way by which we are able to master the infinite diversities and approximate uniformities of phenomena ...Knowledge groups all phenomena under a few aspects of all but supreme generality....

But, after all, this is only the ideal method and economy of intellect. The stenographer's ideal is to compress recorded matter into the fewest symbols by which he can reproduce faithfully.... Psychology teaches us to distinguish our fetches of abstraction and generalization for what they are psychologically-i.e. for effective mental shorthand.... The philosophical concept of the One is pregnant with powerful associations. To what extent is it simply ... a mathematical symbol in a hypothetical cosmos of carefully selected data, whence the infinite concrete is eliminated lest it "should flow in over us" and overwhelm us?[18]

Here Mrs. Rhys Davids has anticipated the approach of several contemporary Western writers to an understanding of the functional anti-conceptualism of Zen. How many obscure scholars may have received stimulation from her introduction to the Dhamma-sanga.ni it is impossible to guess, but it did not enter into a stream of dialogue, partly because neither the philosophy of process nor phenomenological psychology (i.e., concerned with the
p.56

subject's own experience as starting point) had yet come into prominence. Had she been writing today, she might have found a parallel to the Buddhist approach in Harry Stack Sullivan's and other contemporary psychologists' protests against what they consider the out-dated notion of an inner psyche. For Sullivan, "personality" or "individuality" is a hypothetical entity postulated to account for dynamic interpersonal processes and relationships.[19] Mrs. Rhys Davids called attention to this problem---common to Buddhism and to nineteenth- and twentieth-century psychology--of distinguishing between a metaphysical concept of the soul and a functional phenomenological one. She noted that Ward had revived the concept of an Ego or Subject- of mental states, and that all psychologists, even Hume, find it necessary to assume some sort of a mind or conscious subject as a psychological but not a metaphysical concept. In much the same way, she pointed out, Buddhists use the following terms as convenient fictions:[20]

attabhaavo---selfhood or personality, for which Buddhaghosa himself half apologizes;
ajjhatika^m---belonging to the self, subject;
citta^m, mano, and ui~n~n~aanam---"the mind" or "thinking."

In order to avoid the use of "attaa" (Paali for "aatman," which carried the implication of a permanent, static entity outside of causal relations), they were careful, especially in the nominative case, to use the expression "svaya^m" (this one). In oblique cases, "attaa" was usually retained, as she herself noted in a footnote.[21] This fact becomes of significance for Mrs. Rhys Davids' later reversal of position. In her later works,[22] she picked out a number of references to "attaa" in the accusative or other oblique cases and re-translated it as "The Self," "Soul," or "God Within," whereas she or other translators had previously rendered it as a simple reflexive. How did this change in her emphasis come about?

　
RECOVERY OF "BECOMING"

We have seen with what open eyes the youthful scholar confronted the full contradiction or paradox involved in the Buddhist position. As she grew older, however, this dialectical "psychologizing without a psyche" no longer

p.57

seemed to her to do justice to the positive side of the Buddhist path. Confronted at once by the negative anti-becoming formulae of later Singhalese monk-editors and by the impressions of Schopenhauer and other Western thinkers that the Buddha taught "negation of the will to live," Mrs. Rhys Davids felt a mission to publicize the great emphasis which she discovered in early Buddhist texts on spiritual growth, stirring up energy, "making-become" a desired state of mind, etc.

Her favorite tool in this connection was the unearthing of what she called "left-ins": fragments which betray an orientation clearly distinguishable from that of the later monastic editors, and which therefore may be presumed to be remnants of an "original gospel." This is a legitimate device, if properly used, familiar in the "quest of the historical Jesus." With its help, Mrs. Rhys Davids unearthed considerable evidence that the term "becoming" (bhava), later "blacklisted through the growing vogue of monkdom," had originally had a positive connotation. She adduced such terms as

bhabba -- "bound to become" (=Sanskrit bhavya) ... somewhat parallel to the English-Christian idiom of a man who is "saved";
bhavasuddhi -- "salvation in (or of, or by) becoming."[23]

These "left-ins" carry weight because they are not merely isolated fragments, but can be correlated with such key parables as the Hen and the Chicks which stress the disciples' potential for spiritual breakthrough. Mrs. Rhys Davids' labors up to this point provided basic foundations for the recognition that, for Gotama, the self was a process. Even T.R.V. Murti, although he disagrees with Mrs. Rhys Davids' later revival of a Great Self, should acknowledge the debt to her pioneer efforts implicit in his conclusion: "The Real, for Buddhism, is Becoming."[24]

But "becoming" without someone who becomes did not satisfy her for long. Increasingly, as the one-time pioneer grew older, she felt that Gotama's stress on "will" (albeit without a word for it) seemed to call for a "willer," which she then proceeded to find in the Paali texts by uncritically retranslating fragments out of context, translating reflexives as "The Self," and other arbitrary procedures. As this phase of her work has been demolished many　

p.58

times, it is not necessary to deal with it further here, except to stress the fact that the one-sided conclusions of her later years by no means invalidate the "left-in" method of "higher criticism" nor the importance of continuing to seek further light on her question: "What did Gotama really teach?" Rich treasures still await a more scholarly and careful examination of early strata of the documents, especially if combined with the kind of dialogue between Oriental studies and contemporary psychology in which Mrs. Rhys Davids pioneered.
　
NOTES

1. Mrs. C.A.F. Rhys Davids, Buddhist Psychology: An Inquiry into the Analysis and Theory of Mind in Pali Literature (2nd ed., London: Luzac and Co., 1924),p. 16.

2. Caroline A. F. Rhys Davids, ed., A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics of the Fourth Century B.C., being A Translation, now made for the First Time, from the Original Pali, of the First Book in the Abhidhamma Pi.taka entitled Dhamma-Sanga.ni (Compendium of States or Phenomena) (1st ed., London: Royal Asiatic Society. Oriental Translation Fund. New Series. Vol. XII. 1900), p. xvi.

3. Mrs. Rhys Davids, ed., The Book of the Kindred Sayings (Sa^myutta-Nikaaya),5 vols. Vols. I and II translated by Mrs. Rhys Davids; Vols. III, IV, and V translated by F. L. Woodward (London: Pali Text Society, 1917, 1922, 1925, 1927, 1930).

4. Mrs. Rhys Davids, ed., The Book of the Gradual sayings (Anguttara-Nikaaya). 5 vols. Vols. I, II, and V translated by F. L.Woodward; Vols. III and IV translated by E. M. Hare (London: Pali Text Society, 1932, 1933, 1934, 1935, 1936).

5. Mrs. Rhys Davids, Buddhist Psychology, p. 120.

6. Parallel research in the 1960s would find it necessary to re-examine such translations as "illusion," "repressionist," and other terms which have come to have a particular technical meaning in the Freudian system today.

7. Mrs. Rhys, Davids, Introduction to A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics, p. xlii.

8. Ibid., p. li. (Author's italics.)

9. Hermann Siebeck, Geschichte der Psychologie (Gotha: F. A. Perthes, 1880), Vol. I, p. 107.

10. A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics, p. lvi.

11. Ibid., p. lxx. (Author's italics.)

12. Ibid., p. lxxiii.

13. Ibid., p. lxxi. (Quotation marks in text.)

14. Ibid., pp. xv-xcv.

15. Ibid., p. xxxviii, referring to Aristotle, De Anima, III, chaps. vii, viii.

16. Ibid., p. xxxviii.

17. Ibid., (two references.)

18. Ibid., p. xl. (Author's italics.) She quotes the phrase "should flow in over us" from page 351 of the text following her introduction.

19. Patrick Mullahy, The Contributions of Harry Stack Sullivan (New York: Hermitage House, 1952), pp. 16--22.

20. A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics, p. lxxi.

21. Ibid., note 3.

22. See especially Mrs. Rhys Davids, Buddhism, Its Birth and Dispersal, Home University Library (London: Thornton Butterworth Ltd., 1934), pp. 70--82.

23. Ibid., pp. 89-107. On pp. 99-100 she cites "bound to become" from Majjhima-nikaaya, i.104, translated in Lord Chalmers, Further Dialogued of the Buddha (London: Humphrey Milford, 1926), Vol. I, p. 73, p. 257, etc. Bhava-shudhi she cites on p. 100 from six of the A`sokan Edicts, references which she discusses in her Sakya; or Buddhist Origins (London: Kegan Paul. 1931), chap. XXIII.

24. T. R. V. Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1955), p. 26. I am indebted to Miss I. B. Horner of the Pali Text Society, London, for calling my attention to this quotation.

瑜伽行派研究课程参考书目(英、德文

英文、德文文獻
縮寫表
期刊

AP Asian Philosophy
AS/EP Asiatische Studien/Etudes Asistiques
BCS Buddhist Christian Studies
BSOAS Bulletin of School of Oriental and African Studies
CAJ Central Asiatic Journal
EB Eastern Buddhist
IIJ Indo-Iranian Journal
InPQ International Philosophical Quarterly
IPQ Indian Philosophical Quarterly
JAAR Journal of American Academy of Religions
JAOS Journal of American Oriental Society
JBSP Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology
JBE Journal of Buddhist Ethics
JCRT Journal of Cultural and Religious Theory
JIABS Journal of International Association of Buddhist Studies
JIBS /IBK Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies
JIP Journal of Indian Philosophy
JJRS Japanese Journal of Religious Studies
JRAS Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society
JR Japanese Religions
NDJFL Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic
PW Pacific World: Journal of the Institute of Buddhist Studies
PEW Philosophy East and West
R Religion
SCEAR Studies in Central and East Asian Religions
TJ Tibetan Journal
WZKSOA Weiner Zeitschrift fur die kunde sud und ostasiens

出版機構
AHP Asian Humanities Press (California)
ATBSUW Arbeitskreis fur Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien, Universitrt Wien
CP/RCP Curzon Press/RoutledgeCurzon Press (London)
LTWA Library of Tibetan Works and Archives (Dharamsala)
MBP Motilal Banarsidass Publishers (Delhi)
RPC/KAP D.Reidel /Kluwer Academic Publishers (Dordrecht)
SLP Snow Lion Press (New York)
SSP Sri Satguru Publications (Delhi)
SUNY State University of New York
TP Tharpa Publication (London)
UHP University of Hawaii Press (Hololulu)
UMI UMI Dissertation Services
VOAW Verlag der Gstereichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Wien
WP Wisdom Publication (London and Boston)

（一）工具文獻

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3. 1999, pp.401-456.
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12.-----(ed.), Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies Vol. VII : Abhidharma Buddhism to 150 A.D. (Delhi：MBP 1996)
13. J.Powers (ed.), The Yogacara School of Buddhism (American Theological Library 1991)
14. F.E.Reynolds, “Coming of Age: Buddhist Studies in the United States from 1972 to 1997”, JIABS 22(2), 1999, pp.457-483.
15. L.Schmithausen, “Zur Literaturgeschiechte der alter Yogacara-schule”, Zeitschrift der deutschen Morgenlandischen Gesellschaft, Supplement I.3, 1969, pp.811-823.
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（二）研究文獻

左翼佛教(Engaged Buddhism)
1. I.Harris, “Buddhism and Politics in Asia: The Textual and Historical Roots”, in I.Harris (ed.), Buddhism and Politics in Twentieth Century Asia (London: Pinter 1999), pp.1-25.
2. K.Jones, The Social Face of Buddhism: An Approach to Political and Social Activism (WP 1989)
3. S.B.King, “Buddhist Social Activism”, in C.Queen and S.King (ed.), Engaged Buddhism (SUNY 1996), pp.401-435.
4. ----, “Transformative Nonviolence: The Social Ethics of George Fox and Thich Nhat Hanh”, BCS 18, 1998, pp.3-34.
5. -----, “They who Burned Themselves for Peace: Quaker and Buddhist Self Immolators during the Vietnam War”, BCS 20, 2000, pp.127-150.
6. -----, “Human Right in Contemporary Engaged Buddhism”, in Buddhist Theology (CP 2000), pp.293-311.
7. W.King, “Engaged Buddhism: Past, Present, Future”, EB 27(2), 1994, pp.14-29.
8. K.Kraft, “Prospects of a Socially Engaged Buddhism”, in K.Kraft (ed.), Inner Peace, World Peace: Essay on Buddhism and Nonviolence (SUNY 1992), pp.1-30.
9. -----, “New Voices in Engaged Buddhist Studies”, in C.S.Queen (ed.), Engaged Buddhism in the West (WP 2000), pp.485-511.
10. D.S.Lopez Jr., “Introduction” in D.S.Lopez Jr., (ed.), Curators of the Buddha: The Study of Buddhism under Colonialism (University of Chicago Press 1995), pp.1-29.
11. C.Queen, “The Shapes and Sources of Engaged Buddhism”, in Engaged Buddhism (SUNY 1996), pp.1-43.
12. -----, “A New Buddhism”, in Engaged Buddhism in the West (WP 2000), pp.1-26.
13. R.D.Schwartz, Circle of Protest: Political Ritual in the Tibetan Uprising (London: C.Hurst & Co. 1994)
14. E.Sperling, “The Rhetoric of Dissent: Tibetan Pamphleteers”, in R.Barnett and S.Akiner (ed.), Resistance and Reform in Tibet (London: C.Hurst & Co. Publ., 1994), pp.267-284.
15. H.Havnevik, “The Role of Nuns in Contemporary Tibet,” in Resistance and Reform in Tibet, pp.259-266.

佛學研究方法論 (Methodology of Buddhist Studies)
1.J.Bronkhorst, “On the Method of Interpreting Philosophical Sanskrit Texts”, AS/EA 67(3), 1993, pp.501-511.
2.J.I.Cabezon, “Scholarship as Interreligious Dialogue”, BCS 18, 1998, pp.89-95.
3.-----,“Buddhist Studies as a Discipline and the Role of Theory”, JIABS 18(2), 1995, pp.231-268.
4.-----, “Buddhist Theology in the Academy”, in R.Jackson and J.Makransky (ed.), Buddhist Theology: Critical Reflections by Contemporary Buddhist Scholars (CP 2000) pp.25-52.
5. -----, “Truths in Buddhist Theology”, in Buddhist Theology, pp.136-154.
6. M.Deegalle, “From Buddhology to Buddhist Theology”, in Buddhist Theology, pp.331-345.
7. M.Eckel, “The Ghost at the Table: On the Study of Buddhism and the Study of Religion”, JAAR 62(4), 1994, pp.1085-1110.
8. T.G.Foulk, “Issues in the Field of East Asian Buddhist Studies”, JIABS 16(1), 1993, pp.93-114.
9. L.O.Gomez, “Measuring the Immeasurable: Reflections on Unreasonable Reasoning”, in Buddhist Theology, pp.367-385.
10. ------,“Unspoken Paradigms: Meanderings through the Metaphors of a Field”, JIABS 18(2), 1995, pp.183-230.
11. P.Griffiths, “Buddhist Hybrid English: Some Notes on Philosophy and Hermeneutics for Buddhologists”, JIABS 4(2), 1981, pp.17-32.
12. -----, Ch.1: The Doctrinal Study of Doctrine and Ch.2: Buddhist Doctrine, in On Being Buddha: The Classical Doctrine of Buddhahood (SUNY 1994), pp.1-55.
13. R.E.Goss, “Buddhist Studies at Naropa: Sectarian or Academic? “, in D.R.Williams and C.Queen (ed.), American Buddhism: Methods and Findings in Recent Scholarship (CP 1999), pp.183-214.
14. R.M.Gross, “Buddhist Theology?” in Buddhist Theology, pp.53-60.
15. R.Hart, “Religious and Theological Studies in American Higher Education: A Pilot Study”, JAAR 59(4), 1991, pp.715-792.
16. F.J.Hoffman, “Orientalism in Buddhology”, in Pali Buddhism (CP 1999), pp.207-227.
17. C.Ives, “What Are We, Any Way? Buddhists, Buddhologists, or Buddhologians?” in BCS 18, 1998, pp.96-100.
18. R.R.Jackson, “Buddhist Theology: Its Historical Context”, in Buddhist Theology, pp.1-13.
19. J.Makransky, “Contemporary Academic Buddhist Theology: Its Emergence and Rationale”, in Buddhist Theology, pp.14-24.
20.------, “Historical Consciousness as an Offering to the Trans-Historical Buddha”, in Buddhist Theology, pp.111-135.
21. J.Nattier, “Buddhist Studies in the Post-Colonial Age”, JAAR 65(2), 1997, pp.469-485.
22. S.M.Ogden, “Theology in the University”, JAAR Thematic Studies XLVIII/1 pp.1-12.
23. R.K.Payne, Review of “On Method: Special Issue of JIABS 18(2)”, PW pp.244-249.
24. C.Prebish, “The Academic Study of Buddhism in the ffice:smarttags" />United States: A Current Analysis”, in R 24, 1994, pp.271-278.
25. -----,“The Academic Study of Buddhism in America: A Silent Sangha”, in American Buddhism, pp.183-214.
26. D.Seyfort Ruegg, “Some Observation on the Present and Future of Buddhist Studies”, JIABS 15(1), 1992, pp.104-117.
27.----,“Some Reflections on the Place of Philosophy in the Study of Buddhism”, JIABS 18(2), 1995, pp.145-181.
28. T.Tillemans, “Remark on Philology”, JIABS 18(2), 1995, pp.269-277.
29. D.Tracy, “Comparative Theology”, in M.Eliade (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Religion (New York: Macmillan Press 1987) Vol.14, pp.445-455.
30.T.Unno (海野), “Constructive Buddhist Theology: A Response”, in Buddhist Theology, pp.386-406.
31. B.A.Wallace, “Three Dimensions of Buddhist Studies”, in Buddhist Theology, pp.61-77.
32. P.Williams, “Introduction: Some Random Reflections on the Study of Tibetan Madhyamaka”, TJ 14(1), 1989, pp.1-9.

印度大乘佛學的印度哲學背景
1. A.Aklujkar, “The Word is the World: Nondualism in Indian Philosophy of Language”, PEW 51(4), 2001, pp.452-473.
2. A.N.Balslev, “The Influence of Phenomenology on J.N.Mohanty’s Understanding of ‘Consciousnes’ in Indian Philosophy”, in F.M.Kirkland and D.P.Chattopadhyaya (ed.), Phenomenology: East and West Essays in Honor of J.N.Mohanty (KAP 1993), pp.245-53.
3. N.Bandyopadhyay, “the Buddhist Theory of Relation between Prama and Pramana”, JIP 7, 1979, pp. 43-78.
4. S.Bhattacharyya, “Mohanty on Wabda Pramana”, in Phenomenology: East and West, pp.255-268.
5. P.Bilimoria, “Jbana and Prama”, JIP 13, 1985, pp. 73-101.
6.----, Sabdapramana: Word and Knowledge (KAP 1988)
7. J.Bronkhorst, The Two Traditions of Meditation in Ancient India (MBP 1993)
8. -----, “The Peacock’s Egg: Bhartrhari on Language and Reality”, PEW 51(4), 2001, pp.474-491.
9. A.Chakrabarti, “Seeing Daffodils, Seeing as Daffodils and Seeing Things Called ‘Daffodils’”, in P.Bilimoria and J.N.Mohanty (ed.), Relativism, Suffering and Beyond (Dehli: Oxford University Press 1997), pp.119-127.
10.----, “Against Immaculatr Perception: Seven Reasons for Eliminating Nirvikalpaka Perception from Nyaya”, PEW 50(1), 2000, pp.1-8.
11. M.Chinchore, “Some Indian Strands of Thought Relating to the Problem of Evil”, in Relativism, Suffering and Beyond, pp.319-335.
12. H.G.Coward, “The Reflective Word: Spirituality in the Grammarian Tradition of India”, in K, Sivaraman (ed.), Hindu Spirituality (New York: Crossroad Press 1989), pp.209-228.
13. H.F. de Wit, translated by M.L.Barid, Contemplative Psychology (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press 1987)
14. M.Eliade, Yoga: Immortality and Freedom of Indian Mysticism (London: Routledge Press 1958)
15. J.Fowler, Perspectives of Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Hinduism (Sussex Academic Press 2002)
16. J.Ganeri, Philosophy in Classical India: The Proper Work of Reason (London: Routledge Press 2001)
17. Y.Honda (本田義央, 広島大学(Hiroshima University)大学院文学研究科), “Bhartrhari on Sentence (vakya) and its Meaning (vakyartha) as Pratibha”, JIBS 46(2), 1998, pp.1044-1039.
18. Y.Honda(本田義央),“Bhartrhari's Definition of Kriya”, Asiatische Studien/Etudes Asiatiques 47-1 (1993)
19. G.Kaviraij, “The Doctrine of Pratibha in Indian Philosophy”, in Aspects of Indian Thought (University of Burdwan 1966), pp.1-44.
20. R.King, Early Advaita Vedanta and Buddhism (SUNY 1995)
21.-----, Indian Philosophy: An Introduction to Hindu and Buddhist Thought (Georgetown Press 1999)
22.B.K.Matilal, Epistemology, Logic and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis (Hague: Mouton Press 1971)
23.B.K.Matilal, Logic, Language and Reality: Indian Philosophy and Contemporary Issues (MBP 1986).
24.B.K.Matilal, Perception: An Essay on Classical Indian Theories of Knowledge (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1986)
25.B.K.Matilal, The Word and the World: Indian Contribution to the Study of Language (Oxford University Press 1990)
26. B.K.Matilal, The Character of Logic in India (SUNY 1998)
27. B.K.Matilal edited by J.Ganeri, The Collected Essays of Bimal Krishna Matilala: Ethics and Epics (Oxford University Press 2002)
28. B.K.Matilal edited by J.Ganeri, The Collected Essays of Bimal Krishna Matilala: Mind , Language and World (Oxford University Press 2002)
29. J.N.Mohanty, “Phenomenology and Existentialism: Encounter with Indian Philosophy”, InPQ 12, 1972, pp.485-511.
30. J.N.Mohanty, “Consciousness and Knowledge in Indian Philosophy”, PEW 29(1), 1979, pp.3-10.
31. J.N.Mohanty, “Pramanaya and Workability—Response to Potter”, JIP 12, 1984, pp. 329-338.
32. J.N.Mohanty,“Psychologism in Indian Logical Theory”, in B.K.Matilal and L.Shaw (ed.), Analytical Philosophical in Comparative Perspective (Hague: Reidel Publ., 1985), pp.203-211.
33. J.N.Mohanty,“Phenomenology and Indian Philosophy: The Concept of Rationality”, JBSP 19(3), 1988, pp.269-280.
34. J.N.Mohanty,“A Fragment of Indian Philosophical Tradition—Theory of Pramana”, PEW 38, 1988, pp.251-260.
35. J.N.Mohanty, Reason and Tradition in Indian Thought: An Essay on the Nature of Indian Philosophical Thinking (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1992).
36. J.N.Mohanty, Classical Indian Philosophy (Rowan & Littlefield Publishers 2000)
37. J.N.Mohanty, B.Gupta (ed.), Explorations in Philosophy: Essay by J.N.Mohanty: Vol.I Indian Philosophy (Oxford University Press 2001).
38. Hiromi NAKANE(中根 洋雅), “Bhartrhari’s Concept of sabdajati”, JIBS 45(1), 1996,pp.522-520.
39. Hiromi NAKANE(中根 洋雅),“The Theory of pratibhā in Bhart[hari's Philisophy of Language”〈バルトリハリの〈直観〉説pratibhāをめぐって〉『東洋大学大学院紀要』34　文学研究科1998-02-28
40. Hiromi NAKANE (中根 洋雅), 〈バルトリハリにおける非存在の言語表現〉 “Verbal expressions of nonexistence in Bhart[hari's philosophy” 東洋大学大学院紀要』32　文学研究科(哲学・仏教学・中国哲学) 1996-02-29
41. Hideyo OGAWA (小川 英世), Department of Indian Philosophy, Hiroshima University (広島大学), 1-2-3 Kagamiyama, Higashi-Hiroshima 739-8522, Japan), “Bhartrhari on Sakti: The Vaisesika Categories as Saktis”, JIBS 47(2), 1999, pp.1010-1003.
42. Hideyo OGAWA (小川 英世), “Bhartrhari on A.1.1.68”, JIP 29(5), 2001, pp. 531-543
43. K.Potter, “Does Indian Epistemology Concern Justified True Belief? ”, JIP 12, 1984, pp.307-327.
44.------, Presuppositions of India’s Philosophies (MBP 1991)
45. C.Sharma, A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy (MBP 1960)
46. F.Staal, “Review of Prof.Matilal’s Epistemology, Logic and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis”, IIJ 19, 1977, pp. 108-114.

大乘佛學通史
1. P.Harvery, An Introduction to Buddhism: Teaching, History and Practices (Cambridge University Press 1991)
2. D.Kalupahana, Buddhist Philosophy: A Historical Analysis
3.-----, A History of Buddhist Philosophy: Continuities and Discontinuities (UHP 1992)
4. A.K.Warder, Indian Buddhism (MBP 1965)
5.P.Williams, Mahayana Buddhism: The Doctrinal Foundation (London: Routledge Press 1989)
6.-----, Buddhist Thought: A Complete Introduction to the Indian Tradition (London: Routledge Press 2000)

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2. Alexander L. Mayer, Xuanzangs Leben und Werk. Xuanzang. Übersetzer und Heiliger (Xuanzang's Life and Work. Translator and Sacred Person; three vols, Wiesbaden, 1991, 1992, 2001; 388 p., 223p., 116p.)
3. Sally Hovey Wriggins, The Silk Road Journey With Xuanzang (Nov 2003)
4. S.Anacker, “The Meditational Theorapy of the Madhyantavibhagabhasys” in M.Kiyota (ed.), Mahayana Buddhist Meditation: Theory and Practice (UHP 1978), pp.83-113.
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6. S.Anacker, Seven Works of Vasubandhu: The Buddhist Psychological Doctor (MBP 1984).
7. Akihiko AKAMATSU(赤松 明彦),“Bhartrhari on Meaning and Form: The Second Book of the Vakyapadiya, Karikas 325-347”, Acta Asiatica: Bulletin of The Institute of Eastern Culture 90, Issue: Word and Meaning in Indian Philosophy (Tokyo : The Toho Gakkai 2006), pp.1-13.
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12. S.Boin-Webb trans., Abhidharmasamuccaya: The Compendium of the Higher Teaching (Philosophy) by Asanga (AHP 2001)
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14. A.Boquist, Trisvabhava: A Study of the Development of the Three-Nature Theory in Yogacara Buddhism (Sweden: University of Lund 1993)
15. B.E.Brown, The Buddha Nature: A Study of the Tathagatagarbha and Alayavijnana (MBP 1991)
16. J.Cabezon, Buddhism and Language: A Study of Indo-Tibetan Scholasticism (SUNY 1994).
17. John Younghan Cha (查??), A Study of the Dharmadharmatavibhaga: An Analysis of the Religious Philosophy of the Yogacara, together with an Annotated Translation of Vasubandhu's Commentary. (Ph.D. Thesis, Northwestern University, 1996. Supervisor: Isshi Yamada (山田龍城))
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20. J.Y.Cha, “The Problem of Identity and Difference in Indian Yogacara Conceptions of Reality: Emptiness According to the Madhyantavibhaga and its Indic Commentaries” (1st ISBP Conference)
21. J.Y.Cha, “Language Conceptualization and Awakening: On the Paradox of Discourse in Classical Indian Yogacara” (JCRT Vol.2, No.3, 2001)
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23. A.K.Chatterjee, The Yogacara Idealism (MBP 1962)
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25. M.R.Chinchore, Santana and Santanantara: An Analysis of the Buddhist Perspective Concerning Continuity, Transformation and Transcendence and the Basis of an Alternative Philosophical Psychology (SSP 1996)
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27. F.Cook trans., Three Texts on Consciousness Only: Demonstration of Consciousness Only (Numata Center for Buddhist Translation and Research 1999)
28. C.Cox, “On the Possibility of a Nonexistent Object of Consciousness: Sarvastivadin and Darstanika Theories”, JIABS 11(1), 1988, pp.31-87
29.----, “The Unbroken Treatise: Scripture and Argument in Early Buddhist Scholasticism” in M.Williams, C.Cox and M.Jaffee (ed.), Innovation in Religious Tradition: Essays in the Interpretation of Religious Change (Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter 1992)
30.D.Cozort, Unique Tenets of the Middle Way Consequence School (SLP 1998)
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32. Ronald M. Davidson, Buddhist Systems of Transformation: Awraya-parivrtti/pararvtti Among the Yogacara (Ph.D Dissertation: University of California, Berkeley 1985)
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34. D.Daye, “Review Article of Prof.C.Y.Chi’s Buddhist Formal Logic ”, PEW 23(4), 1973. pp. 525-534.
35. D.Daye,“Remark on Early Buddhist Proto-Formalism Logic and Mr.Tachikawa’s Translation of the Nyayapravesa”, JIP 3(3) 1975. pp. 383-398.
36. D.Daye,“Traka (inductive reasoning), as Pramana”, Proceeding of the 30th International Congress of Orientalists (Mexico City, August 1976).
37. D.Daye,“Metalogical Incompatibilities in the Formal Description of Buddhist logic (Nyaya)”, NDJFL 18(2) 1977. pp. 221-231.
38. D.Daye, “Methodological Remark on 20th Century Studies of Buddhist Inference (Nyaya), A.K.Narain(ed.), Studies in Pali and Buddhism (Dehli 1979).pp.72-82.
39. D.Daye,“Metalogical Cliches (Proto-Variables) and Their Restricted Substitution in Sixth Century Buddhist Logic”, NDJFL 20(3), 1979. pp. 549-558.
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42. D.Daye,“Metalogical Remarks on the Procrustean Translation of the Buddhist Pararth-Anumana into the Anglo-European predicate Calculus”, in B.K.Matilal and R.D.Evans (ed.), Buddhist Logic and Epistemology (Hague:Reidel Publ. 1986). pp. 117-131.
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52.----, Recognizing Reality: Dharmakirti’s Philosophy and its Tibetan Interpretations (SUNY 1996).
53.----, “Is Compassion an Emotion? A Cross-Cultural Exploration of Mental Typolgies”, in R.J.Davidson and A.Harrington (ed.), Vision of Compassion: Western Scientists and Tibetan Buddhist Examine Human Nature (New York: Oxford University Press 2002), pp.31-45.
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73.-----, “Apoha and the Nominalist Conceptist Controversy”, JIP 13, 1985. pp. 383-389.
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