PERCEPCIÓN

http://www.thebuddhistsociety.org.uk/abhidhamma.htm

The Abhidhamma Version of the Theory of Perception
by Y Karunadasa
(volume 75:4 p. 211) February 2001

The Abhidhamma theory of perception is the subject of a study made by E R Sarathchandra in his Buddhist Psychology of Perception . In this article we shall refer to it where necessary while making our own observations. Besides, we propose to refer to the theory of perception, developed by the Vaibhasikas and the Sautrantikas, wherever it helps to provide a better understanding of the Theravada version of the theory.

What could be considered as the earliest Buddhist teaching pertaining to sense-perception is found in the Madhupindika Sutta of the Majjhima Nikaya. As far as the Theravada is concerned, its subsequent version in its most developed form is found in the post-canonical commentaries and Abhidhamma compendiums. Although the two versions differ in some important aspects, there is one feature that is common to both. This is the fact that an act of complete perception does not arise as an immediate result of the contact between the organ and the sense-object. Perception is regarded as involving a process of thought that begins as a simple sensation and ends up with the complete apprehension of the object.

For background to our subject, let us first examine briefly the earlier version of the theory. According to this, a process of perception consists of six stages. The first stage is (for example) visual consciousness ( cakkhuvinnana ), which arises with the visual organ and a visible object as its conditions. Here the context demands that we understand visual consciousness not as an act of complete perception but as some kind of bare sensation that occurs before the object is fully apprehended. In the Abhidhamma version too the term is understood in the same sense. The second stage of the process is sensory impression ( phassa ). It is defined as the co-ordination among the sense-organ, the sense-object and sense-consciousness ( tinnam sangati phasso ). The third stage is vedana or feeling. It refers to the hedonic tone or the emotional value of the experience so obtained. The fourth stage is sanna or perception. The fact that sanna occurs after vinnana (bare sensation) shows that the former represents a more complex form of awareness. If, as mentioned above, vinnana refers to mere sensory awareness, sanna seems to suggest a state of awareness obtained by introducing distinctions to the earlier stage of bare awareness. The fifth stage of the process is vitakka , which is usually translated as 'the initial application of thought'. This seems to suggest a stage where the object of perception becomes an object of interpretation. The sixth and last stage of the process is called papanca , which may be explained as 'expansion' or 'diffusion' of thought. Bhikkhu Nanananda in his Concept and Reality observes that papanca here means 'prolificity in ideation' and that it 'hints at the tendency of the individual's imagination to break loose'. We may, therefore, interpret papanca as a very complex level of experience that is tainted by the individual's own desires and prejudices.

Now one important question that arises here is this: of the six stages described above, which stage should be considered as the final stage of sense-perception? Sarathchandra and also Bhikkhu Nanananda believe that it is the stage called papanca that should be considered the final one. However, it seems more reasonable to consider sanna , which in the above process is the fourth stage, as the final stage of sense-perception. What follows after sanna could be understood not as a process of sense-perception but as a purely ideational process set up by a process of perception. In point of fact, both Sarathchandra and Bhikkhu Nanananda explain the stages subsequent to sanna as a process of interpretation and judgement.

As generally understood, the Buddhist term for perception is sanna , not papanca . This is also suggested by the fact that in the Pali suttas the unenlightened ordinary person is said to cognize things by way of sanna ( sanjanati ). In contrast, the enlightened person cognizes things by way of abhinna ( abhijanati ) and parinna ( parijanati ). The contrast between sanna , on the one hand, and abhinna and parinna , on the other, refers to two levels of knowledge corresponding to the ordinary worldling and to the enlightened person. Our suggestion that sanna represents what early Buddhism means by sense-perception has direct relevance to a proper understanding of the Abhidhamma version of the theory of perception.

The Abhidhamma version of the theory of perception differs from the previous one in that it is based on two new developments. One is the theory of moments, which we have discussed previously. The other is the theory of bhavanga or the unconscious. As this latter theory is intimately connected with our subject of discussion, we propose to examine it here briefly.

The theory of bhavanga is an Abhidhammic development that, as Sarathchandra observes, seeks to provide an answer to a problem left unexplained in early Buddhist psychology. In early Buddhism consciousness is described as a mental phenomenon that can never arise without the appropriate conditions. It is not regarded as a permanent entity residing within the human body and manifesting itself in mental activity. It is not something that lies dormant when mental activities do not operate. Then the question arises as to the position of consciousness on such occasions as when perceptual activities are apparently completely still, such as in deep, dreamless sleep. What would explain the uninterrupted continuity of the life process? Hence it is very likely that, as Sarathchandra observes, it was as a solution to this problem that the theory of bhavanga came to be developed.

To this we may add another reason. This has reference to the Buddhist teaching on sannavedayita-nirodha . This is the attainment of the highest level of concentration, when all sense-activity comes to a complete end. In such a situation what happens to the mind? If nirodha-samapatti means the suspension of all mental activities, how could one who has attained it emerge from it? This was a problem that confronted the various schools of Buddhist thought, and it was as an answer to this that the Sautrantikas posited a suksma-citta , a subtle consciousness that persists during the nirodha-samapatti . That the theory of bhavanga was intended as a solution to both is clear from the Milindapanha. Here, in an answer to a question raised by King Milinda, Nagasena says that on two occasions the mind does not function in the body ( sarire cittam appavattam hoti ), i.e. during deep sleep and during nirodha-samapatti . It is therefore maintained that when a man is in deep sleep his mind has 'gone into bhavanga ' ( cittam bhavangagatam ). This implies that the same is true of nirodha-sampatti .

What is called bhavanga , then, means the unconscious, a kind of anoetic consciousness. The fact that it is described as bhavanga-sota , the stream of the unconscious, shows that, like the normal, surface consciousness, it too operates as a series of momentary events. The theory of bhavanga is resorted to for explaining not only occasions when surface mental activity ceases but also the Buddhist teaching on rebirth. Hence it is maintained that the last moment before death and the first moment at rebirth are also two varieties of bhavanga consciousness.

What is the relevance of the theory of bhavanga to the theory of sense-perception? If bhavanga means the unconscious process, it does not continue to persist when a conscious thought-process operates. This means that the former does not function as an undercurrent when we are conscious. The two processes alternate in the sense that when one ceases, the other begins to operate. They alternate continually in such a manner that every act of sense-perception is immediately preceded and succeeded by the bhavanga consciousness. The series of the bhavanga consciousness flows on undisturbed as long as there is no conscious thought to interfere with it. A stream of surface consciousness, which is a process of perception, is called citta-vithi. Therefore, the unconscious when it remains undisturbed is called vithi-mutta , i.e. free from a perceptual process.

Now let us examine how bhavanga and the theory of moments become a basis for the Abhidhamma theory of perception. As we have already mentioned, both according to early Buddhism and the Abhidhamma a series of mental events is necessary in order to culminate in complete perception. In the Abhidhamma such a thought process is called cittavithi and is said to consist of 17 thought-moments. Before we examine why the number is fixed at 17, let us see how the process begins.

When a visual object, for instance, comes within the range of the eye, it makes an impact on the sensitive portion of the eye. By the force of that impact there is set up a vibration in the unconscious. This vibration in the unconscious occurs during two moments. During the first moment, which is called bhavanga-calana , the unconscious stream gets disturbed. During the second moment, called bhavangupaccheda , the unconscious stream gets interrupted. The disturbance and the subsequent interruption are both due to the force exerted by the material object before it comes to be fully cognized. With the immediate interruption of the unconscious, a stream of surface consciousness arises, which has seven stages.

The first stage is called avajjana or attention. It is at this stage that the conscious mind turns its attention to the material object. This focusing of attention is a passive reaction on the part of the individual to the impact of the external stimulus. The second stage is called cakkhu-vinnana or visual consciousness. This is not full cognition but bare awareness. It is defined as dassana-matta , the mere awareness of the presence of the object. It does not produce any kind of knowledge ( pancahi vinnanehi na kan ci dhammam pativijanati ). The third stage is sampaticchana , i.e. receiving or welcoming the object. It is at this stage that the mind assimilates it. The fourth stage is santirana or investigation. The object that has been assimilated now begins to be investigated. The fifth stage is votthapana , when the object begins to be determined. The sixth stage is javana , which is the Abhidhamma term for full perception or cognition. It is at this stage that the mind experiences ( anubhavati ) the object. It is on javana, therefore, that the process of perception culminates. The last stage, which is called tadarammana , refers to the act of registering the object.

This process of perception, which begins with the vibration in the unconscious and ends with the registration of the object, is a process of thought-moments, which arise and perish in rapid succession. Therefore, to each of its different phases an appropriate number of moments are assigned: the first seven phases are each assigned one moment. Of the last two phases, javana is said to occur during seven moments, i.e. it vibrates seven times. The last, which is tadarammana , is assigned two moments. Thus we have in all 16 thought-moments. This number is made up to 17 by adding one moment of thought at the very beginning of the perceptual process.

The additional thought-moment is said to occur immediately before the material object makes an impression on the sense-organ. It is introduced by the technical term atita-bhavanga . Its recognition seems to be due to two reasons. A moment of matter, unlike a moment of thought, is said to exert its influence not at the time of its origination but at the time of its duration. It thus follows that when a material object impinges on a sense-organ, it does so during its moment of duration. Therefore, its time of origination has to be considered as a time of preparation to exert its impact. A second reason for the recognition of the additional moment can be seen in light of the statement that there is always a momentary gap between two thought-processes. This gap is represented by bhavanga , the unconscious. This means, in other words, that bhavanga intervenes between two thought-processes. Quite probably it is in order to recognize this situation that another moment was added to the very beginning of the perceptual process.

Continued in The Middle Way February 2001 p. 215 (volume 75: 4)