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Friday, 9 March 2012

Mrs. Rhys Davids' Dialogue with Psychology (1893-1924)

By Teresina Rowell Havens
Philosophy East & West
V. 14 (1964)
pp. 51-58
Copyright 1964 by University of Hawaii Press 

p.51

"THE BUDDHIST CONCEPTION Of consciousness is, I venture to think, better understood as a mental electrification of the organism than in terms of any other natural force." [1]

This was written forty years ago, before electroencephalograms had been heard of. The author, Mrs. Caroline Rhys Davids, was both a student of psychology and a pioneer translator of early Buddhist texts from Paali into English. The passage quoted above illustrates two characteristics of her early scholarly work: (1) her concern to find the most precise available equivalent in the scientific thought of her own time to convey various aspects of the Paali Buddhist view of how the mind works; and (2) the extent to which she was ahead of her time.

It often happens that a scholar's work will be ignored for many years and then suddenly become relevant to the concerns of a much later epoch. It is the thesis of the present article that this has been true of Mrs. Rhys Davids, and that the time has now come when her earlier work can enter into a fruitful dialogue with the thought of our age.

 
WHY HER WORK HAS BEEN IGNORED

The cultural time-gap was complicated in her case by personal problems. For one thing, her time failed to provide a community of scholars--Orientalists or others--interested in psychology who might have taken her hypotheses seriously enough to undertake to disprove or to modify them in scholarly debate. For another, her most creative period was over before many Western psychologists and psychotherapists had come to be interested in what they could learn from Buddhist approaches to mental and emotional processes. Unfortunately, or so it appears from our present perspective, Mrs.
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Rhys Davids herself moved during the 20s from her early interest in the psychological to a preoccupation with the psychic, inspired by the death of her only son in the First World War, This interest led her to stress texts dealing with clairvoyance, clairaudience, and communication with "other worlds" to a degree unacceptable to the predominant Western academic frame of reference, at the time she was writing and now, (We need not speak of circles interested in ESP and psychical research, since they did not and do not impinge heavily on the academic world.) Her interest in these directions took such an increasingly predominant place in her later books that scholars could no longer take her conclusions seriously. This led to the ignoring also of her earlier, more scholarly studies in Buddhist psychology.
 
HER EARLY INTEREST IN PSYCHOLOGY

Since most of this early solid work was as editor and translator of Paali texts, it is chiefly in Introductions and footnotes that her ideas may be found, Regarding the early awakening of her psychological interest, the following note appears in the Introduction to A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics:

Even a superficial inspection of the Manual should yield great promise to anyone interested in the history of psychology. When... my attention was first drawn to it... by Professor Rhys Davids, I was at once attracted by the amount of psychological material embedded in its pages.[2]

In a series of long introductory essays in each successive volume of Kindred Sayings[3] and Gradual Sayings,[4] she relates her detailed study of technical Paali terms to her broad interests in the workings of the human mind, Western as well as Eastern. This feeling for wider implications is reflected in the following query from her Introduction to Buddhist Psychology:[5] "How far does the greater richness of Buddhist intellectual nomenclature correspond to a greater manifold in modes of knowing or of knowledge?" In other
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words, does a distinction of terms for which we have no equivalents indicate potential levels of inner experience of which we are unaware? Could a Westerner experience these subtleties if he pursued Buddhist training? Supposing that he did experience distinctions of psychic reality corresponding to the terms in question, how could he translate them into English or communicate them verbally to a person whose culture has no words for them? One of the best examples of this kind of problem is the still-vexing term jhaana, which has suffered through a series of mistranslation such as "trance," "ecstasy," "musing," etc. The difficulty lies deeper than the merely verbal. Is it possible that no adequate English term has been found because we have no precisely equivalent discipline in Western religious tradition?

These are the kinds of questions which interdisciplinary research today could begin to answer by combining the resources of Western psychology, anthropology, and linguistics with both Paali expertness and living Buddhist experience. This collaboration seems more feasible, now that subjective data are becoming recognized by some scientific psychologists in the West as proper material for investigation.

Although her times were not ripe for this sort of dialogue, Mrs. Rhys Davids realized in her work of translation that technical psychological terms--on the English as well as on the Paali side--are part of a system with certain assumptions about the nature of mind. Therefore, if the translator is to communicate with Western readers, she must know, not only what a given technical term means in Paali, but also the technical connotation of its English equivalent in current psychological systems. Hence, Mrs. Rhys Davids dug into British psychological works to ascertain as far as possible the exact connotations of such terms as "cognition," "sensation," "feeling," "perception," and "faculties."[6] Many footnotes and entire articles were concerned with working out the closest equivalents for such terms as "vi~n~naana," "indriya," "aayatana," "upaadaana," and the like. At the same time, she was extremely careful to avoid premature parallels. For example, in discussing the technical meaning of ruupa^m she notes:

Ruupa.m would ... appear at first sight to be a name for the external world or for the extended universe, as contrasted with the unextended, mental, psychical or subjective universe. Personally I do not find, so far, that the Eastern and Western concepts can be so easily made to coincide. It will be better before, and indeed without as yet, arriving at any such conclusive judgment, to inquire into the application made of the term in the Manual generally.[7]
p.54

She explored the backgrounds of psychological inquiry in ancient Greece as well as in pre-Buddhist India in order to evaluate the significance of the Buddhist discoveries. For example, she considers the Dhamma-sanga.ni's analysis of types of sensation to be "... the first academic formulation of a theory of sense which ancient India has hitherto produced for us. There is no such analysis of sensation ... put forward in any Indian book of an equally early date."[8]

She quotes from Siebeck's Geschichte der Psychologie[9] concerning Empedokles' theory of sensation or sense-cognition, and observes that Demokritus regarded all sensation as either bare touch or development of touch--a view which, she notes, "is borne out to a great extent by modern biological research." [10]
 
"PSYCHOLOGIZING WITHOUT A PSYCHE"

As she dug deeper into both the technical Buddhist analysis of states of mind and the over-all system behind it, she was struck by the paradoxical truth that Buddhism stresses conscious will, attention, feeling, choice--"just those mental activities ...which seem most to imply a subject, or subjective unity who attends, feels, wills and chooses. And yet this same philosophy is emphatically one that attempts to 'extrude the ego.' "[11]

It is this psychologizing without a psyche that impressed me from the first, and seemed to bring the work, for all its remoteness in other respects, nearer to our own Experiential school of and since Locke, than anything we find in Greek traditions.[12]

And if there was one thing which moved the Master to quit his wonted serenity and wield the lash of scorn and upbraiding, it was just the reading into this convenient generalization of mind or personality that "metaphysical concept of a soul, mind-atom, or mind-stuff," which is put aside by the modern psychologist.[13]

This vehement, almost violent anti-substantialism of early Buddhism stimulated her to look into Aristotle's De Anima in order to contrast his notions of "soul" and "substance" with the Buddhist. Her subsequent reflections, as set down in the Introductory Essay prefacing Buddhist Psychological

p.55

Ethics,[14] can only be summarized here. (The Buddhist Manual was probably written during Aristotle's childhood.)

Aristotle, in applying his theory of mind as a potential "form" which energizes the body, went far "to resolve mind into phenomenal processes."[15] "But he did not, or would not, wrench himself radically out of the primitive soil...as the Buddhist dared to do."[16] Hence, Greek thought remained "saturated with substantialist methods"[17a] and passed them on to the medieval world strengthened by the "animistic standpoint" of the Patristic Christian philosophy.

Modern science, however, has been gradually training the popular mind to a phenomenalistic point of view, and joining hands in psychology with the anti-substantialist tradition of Hume.[17b]

Mrs. Rhys Davids then proceeds to consider a deeply-ingrained tendency of the human mind which lends support to the "philosophical elaboration of soul-theory into Substantialism," namely, the tendency to subsume the particular under the general:

That is to say, this perceiving and judging, by way of generalizing and unifying, is the only way by which we are able to master the infinite diversities and approximate uniformities of phenomena ...Knowledge groups all phenomena under a few aspects of all but supreme generality....

But, after all, this is only the ideal method and economy of intellect. The stenographer's ideal is to compress recorded matter into the fewest symbols by which he can reproduce faithfully.... Psychology teaches us to distinguish our fetches of abstraction and generalization for what they are psychologically-i.e. for effective mental shorthand.... The philosophical concept of the One is pregnant with powerful associations. To what extent is it simply ... a mathematical symbol in a hypothetical cosmos of carefully selected data, whence the infinite concrete is eliminated lest it "should flow in over us" and overwhelm us?[18]

Here Mrs. Rhys Davids has anticipated the approach of several contemporary Western writers to an understanding of the functional anti-conceptualism of Zen. How many obscure scholars may have received stimulation from her introduction to the Dhamma-sanga.ni it is impossible to guess, but it did not enter into a stream of dialogue, partly because neither the philosophy of process nor phenomenological psychology (i.e., concerned with the
p.56

subject's own experience as starting point) had yet come into prominence. Had she been writing today, she might have found a parallel to the Buddhist approach in Harry Stack Sullivan's and other contemporary psychologists' protests against what they consider the out-dated notion of an inner psyche. For Sullivan, "personality" or "individuality" is a hypothetical entity postulated to account for dynamic interpersonal processes and relationships.[19] Mrs. Rhys Davids called attention to this problem---common to Buddhism and to nineteenth- and twentieth-century psychology--of distinguishing between a metaphysical concept of the soul and a functional phenomenological one. She noted that Ward had revived the concept of an Ego or Subject- of mental states, and that all psychologists, even Hume, find it necessary to assume some sort of a mind or conscious subject as a psychological but not a metaphysical concept. In much the same way, she pointed out, Buddhists use the following terms as convenient fictions:[20]

attabhaavo---selfhood or personality, for which Buddhaghosa himself half apologizes;
ajjhatika^m---belonging to the self, subject;
citta^m, mano, and ui~n~n~aanam---"the mind" or "thinking."

In order to avoid the use of "attaa" (Paali for "aatman," which carried the implication of a permanent, static entity outside of causal relations), they were careful, especially in the nominative case, to use the expression "svaya^m" (this one). In oblique cases, "attaa" was usually retained, as she herself noted in a footnote.[21] This fact becomes of significance for Mrs. Rhys Davids' later reversal of position. In her later works,[22] she picked out a number of references to "attaa" in the accusative or other oblique cases and re-translated it as "The Self," "Soul," or "God Within," whereas she or other translators had previously rendered it as a simple reflexive. How did this change in her emphasis come about?

 
RECOVERY OF "BECOMING"

We have seen with what open eyes the youthful scholar confronted the full contradiction or paradox involved in the Buddhist position. As she grew older, however, this dialectical "psychologizing without a psyche" no longer

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seemed to her to do justice to the positive side of the Buddhist path. Confronted at once by the negative anti-becoming formulae of later Singhalese monk-editors and by the impressions of Schopenhauer and other Western thinkers that the Buddha taught "negation of the will to live," Mrs. Rhys Davids felt a mission to publicize the great emphasis which she discovered in early Buddhist texts on spiritual growth, stirring up energy, "making-become" a desired state of mind, etc.

Her favorite tool in this connection was the unearthing of what she called "left-ins": fragments which betray an orientation clearly distinguishable from that of the later monastic editors, and which therefore may be presumed to be remnants of an "original gospel." This is a legitimate device, if properly used, familiar in the "quest of the historical Jesus." With its help, Mrs. Rhys Davids unearthed considerable evidence that the term "becoming" (bhava), later "blacklisted through the growing vogue of monkdom," had originally had a positive connotation. She adduced such terms as

bhabba -- "bound to become" (=Sanskrit bhavya) ... somewhat parallel to the English-Christian idiom of a man who is "saved";
bhavasuddhi -- "salvation in (or of, or by) becoming."[23]

These "left-ins" carry weight because they are not merely isolated fragments, but can be correlated with such key parables as the Hen and the Chicks which stress the disciples' potential for spiritual breakthrough. Mrs. Rhys Davids' labors up to this point provided basic foundations for the recognition that, for Gotama, the self was a process. Even T.R.V. Murti, although he disagrees with Mrs. Rhys Davids' later revival of a Great Self, should acknowledge the debt to her pioneer efforts implicit in his conclusion: "The Real, for Buddhism, is Becoming."[24]

But "becoming" without someone who becomes did not satisfy her for long. Increasingly, as the one-time pioneer grew older, she felt that Gotama's stress on "will" (albeit without a word for it) seemed to call for a "willer," which she then proceeded to find in the Paali texts by uncritically retranslating fragments out of context, translating reflexives as "The Self," and other arbitrary procedures. As this phase of her work has been demolished many 

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times, it is not necessary to deal with it further here, except to stress the fact that the one-sided conclusions of her later years by no means invalidate the "left-in" method of "higher criticism" nor the importance of continuing to seek further light on her question: "What did Gotama really teach?" Rich treasures still await a more scholarly and careful examination of early strata of the documents, especially if combined with the kind of dialogue between Oriental studies and contemporary psychology in which Mrs. Rhys Davids pioneered.
 
NOTES

1. Mrs. C.A.F. Rhys Davids, Buddhist Psychology: An Inquiry into the Analysis and Theory of Mind in Pali Literature (2nd ed., London: Luzac and Co., 1924),p. 16.

2. Caroline A. F. Rhys Davids, ed., A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics of the Fourth Century B.C., being A Translation, now made for the First Time, from the Original Pali, of the First Book in the Abhidhamma Pi.taka entitled Dhamma-Sanga.ni (Compendium of States or Phenomena) (1st ed., London: Royal Asiatic Society. Oriental Translation Fund. New Series. Vol. XII. 1900), p. xvi.

3. Mrs. Rhys Davids, ed., The Book of the Kindred Sayings (Sa^myutta-Nikaaya),5 vols. Vols. I and II translated by Mrs. Rhys Davids; Vols. III, IV, and V translated by F. L. Woodward (London: Pali Text Society, 1917, 1922, 1925, 1927, 1930).

4. Mrs. Rhys Davids, ed., The Book of the Gradual sayings (Anguttara-Nikaaya). 5 vols. Vols. I, II, and V translated by F. L.Woodward; Vols. III and IV translated by E. M. Hare (London: Pali Text Society, 1932, 1933, 1934, 1935, 1936).

5. Mrs. Rhys Davids, Buddhist Psychology, p. 120.

6. Parallel research in the 1960s would find it necessary to re-examine such translations as "illusion," "repressionist," and other terms which have come to have a particular technical meaning in the Freudian system today.

7. Mrs. Rhys, Davids, Introduction to A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics, p. xlii.

8. Ibid., p. li. (Author's italics.)

9. Hermann Siebeck, Geschichte der Psychologie (Gotha: F. A. Perthes, 1880), Vol. I, p. 107.

10. A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics, p. lvi.

11. Ibid., p. lxx. (Author's italics.)

12. Ibid., p. lxxiii.

13. Ibid., p. lxxi. (Quotation marks in text.)

14. Ibid., pp. xv-xcv.

15. Ibid., p. xxxviii, referring to Aristotle, De Anima, III, chaps. vii, viii.

16. Ibid., p. xxxviii.

17. Ibid., (two references.)

18. Ibid., p. xl. (Author's italics.) She quotes the phrase "should flow in over us" from page 351 of the text following her introduction.

19. Patrick Mullahy, The Contributions of Harry Stack Sullivan (New York: Hermitage House, 1952), pp. 16--22.

20. A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics, p. lxxi.

21. Ibid., note 3.

22. See especially Mrs. Rhys Davids, Buddhism, Its Birth and Dispersal, Home University Library (London: Thornton Butterworth Ltd., 1934), pp. 70--82.

23. Ibid., pp. 89-107. On pp. 99-100 she cites "bound to become" from Majjhima-nikaaya, i.104, translated in Lord Chalmers, Further Dialogued of the Buddha (London: Humphrey Milford, 1926), Vol. I, p. 73, p. 257, etc. Bhava-shudhi she cites on p. 100 from six of the A`sokan Edicts, references which she discusses in her Sakya; or Buddhist Origins (London: Kegan Paul. 1931), chap. XXIII.

24. T. R. V. Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1955), p. 26. I am indebted to Miss I. B. Horner of the Pali Text Society, London, for calling my attention to this quotation.

Tuesday, 21 February 2012

瑜伽行派研究课程参考书目(英、德文

英文、德文文獻
縮寫表
期刊

AP Asian Philosophy
AS/EP Asiatische Studien/Etudes Asistiques
BCS Buddhist Christian Studies
BSOAS Bulletin of School of Oriental and African Studies
CAJ Central Asiatic Journal
EB Eastern Buddhist
IIJ Indo-Iranian Journal
InPQ International Philosophical Quarterly
IPQ Indian Philosophical Quarterly
JAAR Journal of American Academy of Religions
JAOS Journal of American Oriental Society
JBSP Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology
JBE Journal of Buddhist Ethics
JCRT Journal of Cultural and Religious Theory
JIABS Journal of International Association of Buddhist Studies
JIBS /IBK Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies
JIP Journal of Indian Philosophy
JJRS Japanese Journal of Religious Studies
JRAS Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society
JR Japanese Religions
NDJFL Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic
PW Pacific World: Journal of the Institute of Buddhist Studies
PEW Philosophy East and West
R Religion
SCEAR Studies in Central and East Asian Religions
TJ Tibetan Journal
WZKSOA Weiner Zeitschrift fur die kunde sud und ostasiens

出版機構
AHP Asian Humanities Press (California)
ATBSUW Arbeitskreis fur Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien, Universitrt Wien
CP/RCP Curzon Press/RoutledgeCurzon Press (London)
LTWA Library of Tibetan Works and Archives (Dharamsala)
MBP Motilal Banarsidass Publishers (Delhi)
RPC/KAP D.Reidel /Kluwer Academic Publishers (Dordrecht)
SLP Snow Lion Press (New York)
SSP Sri Satguru Publications (Delhi)
SUNY State University of New York
TP Tharpa Publication (London)
UHP University of Hawaii Press (Hololulu)
UMI UMI Dissertation Services
VOAW Verlag der Gstereichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Wien
WP Wisdom Publication (London and Boston)

(一)工具文獻

1. E.Conze, Buddhist Scriptures: A Bibliography (London: Garland Publ., 1982)
2. E.Franco, “Buddhist Studies in Germany and Austria 1971-1996”, JIABS 22(2),
3. 1999, pp.401-456.
4. J.Grimes, A Concise Dictionary of Indian Philosophy: New and Revised Edition (SUNY 1996)
5. K.Inada (稻田龜男), Guide to Buddhist Philosophy (Boston: Asian Philosophies and Religions Resource Guide 1988)
6. D.Lusthaus (悦家丹), “A Brief Retrospective of Western Yogacara Scholarship of the Twentieth Century”, in V.Shen (沈清松) and W.S.Wang (ed.), Chinese Philosophy Beyond the Twentieth Century (Taipei: Wu-nan 2001)
7. B.K.Matial, Chapter on “India”, in J.Burr (ed.),Handbook of World Philosophy (Greenwood Press 1980), pp.437-470
8. C.Muller (ed.), “Bibliography of Yogacara Studies”, (Yogacara Association, AAR, http://www.amuller.net/yogacara/bibliography/yogacara-bib.btml)
9.------,“Xuangzang’s Translation and Works” (Yogacara Association, AAR,http://www.human.toyogakuenu.ac. ... nkers/xuanzang-work)
10. P.Pfandt (ed.), Mahayana Texts Translated into Western Languages: A Bibliographical Guide (Religionswissenschaftliches Seminar der Universitat Bonn, Koln: Kommission bei E.J.Brill 1983)
11. K.Potter, Guide to Indian Philosophy (Boston:Asian Philosophers and Religious Resource Guide 1988)
12.-----(ed.), Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies Vol. VII : Abhidharma Buddhism to 150 A.D. (Delhi:MBP 1996)
13. J.Powers (ed.), The Yogacara School of Buddhism (American Theological Library 1991)
14. F.E.Reynolds, “Coming of Age: Buddhist Studies in the United States from 1972 to 1997”, JIABS 22(2), 1999, pp.457-483.
15. L.Schmithausen, “Zur Literaturgeschiechte der alter Yogacara-schule”, Zeitschrift der deutschen Morgenlandischen Gesellschaft, Supplement I.3, 1969, pp.811-823.
16. E.Steinkellner und M.T.Much, Texte der erkenntnistheoretischen Schule des Buddhismus, Systematische Ybersicht yber die buddhistische Sanskrit Literature II (Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht in Gottingten 1995)
17. D.R.Williams, “North American Dissertation and Thesis on Topic Related to Buddhism”, in D.R.Williams and C.S.Queen (ed.), American Buddhism (CP 1999), pp.267-311.

(二)研究文獻

左翼佛教(Engaged Buddhism)
1. I.Harris, “Buddhism and Politics in Asia: The Textual and Historical Roots”, in I.Harris (ed.), Buddhism and Politics in Twentieth Century Asia (London: Pinter 1999), pp.1-25.
2. K.Jones, The Social Face of Buddhism: An Approach to Political and Social Activism (WP 1989)
3. S.B.King, “Buddhist Social Activism”, in C.Queen and S.King (ed.), Engaged Buddhism (SUNY 1996), pp.401-435.
4. ----, “Transformative Nonviolence: The Social Ethics of George Fox and Thich Nhat Hanh”, BCS 18, 1998, pp.3-34.
5. -----, “They who Burned Themselves for Peace: Quaker and Buddhist Self Immolators during the Vietnam War”, BCS 20, 2000, pp.127-150.
6. -----, “Human Right in Contemporary Engaged Buddhism”, in Buddhist Theology (CP 2000), pp.293-311.
7. W.King, “Engaged Buddhism: Past, Present, Future”, EB 27(2), 1994, pp.14-29.
8. K.Kraft, “Prospects of a Socially Engaged Buddhism”, in K.Kraft (ed.), Inner Peace, World Peace: Essay on Buddhism and Nonviolence (SUNY 1992), pp.1-30.
9. -----, “New Voices in Engaged Buddhist Studies”, in C.S.Queen (ed.), Engaged Buddhism in the West (WP 2000), pp.485-511.
10. D.S.Lopez Jr., “Introduction” in D.S.Lopez Jr., (ed.), Curators of the Buddha: The Study of Buddhism under Colonialism (University of Chicago Press 1995), pp.1-29.
11. C.Queen, “The Shapes and Sources of Engaged Buddhism”, in Engaged Buddhism (SUNY 1996), pp.1-43.
12. -----, “A New Buddhism”, in Engaged Buddhism in the West (WP 2000), pp.1-26.
13. R.D.Schwartz, Circle of Protest: Political Ritual in the Tibetan Uprising (London: C.Hurst & Co. 1994)
14. E.Sperling, “The Rhetoric of Dissent: Tibetan Pamphleteers”, in R.Barnett and S.Akiner (ed.), Resistance and Reform in Tibet (London: C.Hurst & Co. Publ., 1994), pp.267-284.
15. H.Havnevik, “The Role of Nuns in Contemporary Tibet,” in Resistance and Reform in Tibet, pp.259-266.

佛學研究方法論 (Methodology of Buddhist Studies)
1.J.Bronkhorst, “On the Method of Interpreting Philosophical Sanskrit Texts”, AS/EA 67(3), 1993, pp.501-511.
2.J.I.Cabezon, “Scholarship as Interreligious Dialogue”, BCS 18, 1998, pp.89-95.
3.-----,“Buddhist Studies as a Discipline and the Role of Theory”, JIABS 18(2), 1995, pp.231-268.
4.-----, “Buddhist Theology in the Academy”, in R.Jackson and J.Makransky (ed.), Buddhist Theology: Critical Reflections by Contemporary Buddhist Scholars (CP 2000) pp.25-52.
5. -----, “Truths in Buddhist Theology”, in Buddhist Theology, pp.136-154.
6. M.Deegalle, “From Buddhology to Buddhist Theology”, in Buddhist Theology, pp.331-345.
7. M.Eckel, “The Ghost at the Table: On the Study of Buddhism and the Study of Religion”, JAAR 62(4), 1994, pp.1085-1110.
8. T.G.Foulk, “Issues in the Field of East Asian Buddhist Studies”, JIABS 16(1), 1993, pp.93-114.
9. L.O.Gomez, “Measuring the Immeasurable: Reflections on Unreasonable Reasoning”, in Buddhist Theology, pp.367-385.
10. ------,“Unspoken Paradigms: Meanderings through the Metaphors of a Field”, JIABS 18(2), 1995, pp.183-230.
11. P.Griffiths, “Buddhist Hybrid English: Some Notes on Philosophy and Hermeneutics for Buddhologists”, JIABS 4(2), 1981, pp.17-32.
12. -----, Ch.1: The Doctrinal Study of Doctrine and Ch.2: Buddhist Doctrine, in On Being Buddha: The Classical Doctrine of Buddhahood (SUNY 1994), pp.1-55.
13. R.E.Goss, “Buddhist Studies at Naropa: Sectarian or Academic? “, in D.R.Williams and C.Queen (ed.), American Buddhism: Methods and Findings in Recent Scholarship (CP 1999), pp.183-214.
14. R.M.Gross, “Buddhist Theology?” in Buddhist Theology, pp.53-60.
15. R.Hart, “Religious and Theological Studies in American Higher Education: A Pilot Study”, JAAR 59(4), 1991, pp.715-792.
16. F.J.Hoffman, “Orientalism in Buddhology”, in Pali Buddhism (CP 1999), pp.207-227.
17. C.Ives, “What Are We, Any Way? Buddhists, Buddhologists, or Buddhologians?” in BCS 18, 1998, pp.96-100.
18. R.R.Jackson, “Buddhist Theology: Its Historical Context”, in Buddhist Theology, pp.1-13.
19. J.Makransky, “Contemporary Academic Buddhist Theology: Its Emergence and Rationale”, in Buddhist Theology, pp.14-24.
20.------, “Historical Consciousness as an Offering to the Trans-Historical Buddha”, in Buddhist Theology, pp.111-135.
21. J.Nattier, “Buddhist Studies in the Post-Colonial Age”, JAAR 65(2), 1997, pp.469-485.
22. S.M.Ogden, “Theology in the University”, JAAR Thematic Studies XLVIII/1 pp.1-12.
23. R.K.Payne, Review of “On Method: Special Issue of JIABS 18(2)”, PW pp.244-249.
24. C.Prebish, “The Academic Study of Buddhism in the ffice:smarttags" />United States: A Current Analysis”, in R 24, 1994, pp.271-278.
25. -----,“The Academic Study of Buddhism in America: A Silent Sangha”, in American Buddhism, pp.183-214.
26. D.Seyfort Ruegg, “Some Observation on the Present and Future of Buddhist Studies”, JIABS 15(1), 1992, pp.104-117.
27.----,“Some Reflections on the Place of Philosophy in the Study of Buddhism”, JIABS 18(2), 1995, pp.145-181.
28. T.Tillemans, “Remark on Philology”, JIABS 18(2), 1995, pp.269-277.
29. D.Tracy, “Comparative Theology”, in M.Eliade (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Religion (New York: Macmillan Press 1987) Vol.14, pp.445-455.
30.T.Unno (海野), “Constructive Buddhist Theology: A Response”, in Buddhist Theology, pp.386-406.
31. B.A.Wallace, “Three Dimensions of Buddhist Studies”, in Buddhist Theology, pp.61-77.
32. P.Williams, “Introduction: Some Random Reflections on the Study of Tibetan Madhyamaka”, TJ 14(1), 1989, pp.1-9.

印度大乘佛學的印度哲學背景
1. A.Aklujkar, “The Word is the World: Nondualism in Indian Philosophy of Language”, PEW 51(4), 2001, pp.452-473.
2. A.N.Balslev, “The Influence of Phenomenology on J.N.Mohanty’s Understanding of ‘Consciousnes’ in Indian Philosophy”, in F.M.Kirkland and D.P.Chattopadhyaya (ed.), Phenomenology: East and West Essays in Honor of J.N.Mohanty (KAP 1993), pp.245-53.
3. N.Bandyopadhyay, “the Buddhist Theory of Relation between Prama and Pramana”, JIP 7, 1979, pp. 43-78.
4. S.Bhattacharyya, “Mohanty on Wabda Pramana”, in Phenomenology: East and West, pp.255-268.
5. P.Bilimoria, “Jbana and Prama”, JIP 13, 1985, pp. 73-101.
6.----, Sabdapramana: Word and Knowledge (KAP 1988)
7. J.Bronkhorst, The Two Traditions of Meditation in Ancient India (MBP 1993)
8. -----, “The Peacock’s Egg: Bhartrhari on Language and Reality”, PEW 51(4), 2001, pp.474-491.
9. A.Chakrabarti, “Seeing Daffodils, Seeing as Daffodils and Seeing Things Called ‘Daffodils’”, in P.Bilimoria and J.N.Mohanty (ed.), Relativism, Suffering and Beyond (Dehli: Oxford University Press 1997), pp.119-127.
10.----, “Against Immaculatr Perception: Seven Reasons for Eliminating Nirvikalpaka Perception from Nyaya”, PEW 50(1), 2000, pp.1-8.
11. M.Chinchore, “Some Indian Strands of Thought Relating to the Problem of Evil”, in Relativism, Suffering and Beyond, pp.319-335.
12. H.G.Coward, “The Reflective Word: Spirituality in the Grammarian Tradition of India”, in K, Sivaraman (ed.), Hindu Spirituality (New York: Crossroad Press 1989), pp.209-228.
13. H.F. de Wit, translated by M.L.Barid, Contemplative Psychology (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press 1987)
14. M.Eliade, Yoga: Immortality and Freedom of Indian Mysticism (London: Routledge Press 1958)
15. J.Fowler, Perspectives of Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Hinduism (Sussex Academic Press 2002)
16. J.Ganeri, Philosophy in Classical India: The Proper Work of Reason (London: Routledge Press 2001)
17. Y.Honda (本田義央, 広島大学(Hiroshima University)大学院文学研究科), “Bhartrhari on Sentence (vakya) and its Meaning (vakyartha) as Pratibha”, JIBS 46(2), 1998, pp.1044-1039.
18. Y.Honda(本田義央),“Bhartrhari's Definition of Kriya”, Asiatische Studien/Etudes Asiatiques 47-1 (1993)
19. G.Kaviraij, “The Doctrine of Pratibha in Indian Philosophy”, in Aspects of Indian Thought (University of Burdwan 1966), pp.1-44.
20. R.King, Early Advaita Vedanta and Buddhism (SUNY 1995)
21.-----, Indian Philosophy: An Introduction to Hindu and Buddhist Thought (Georgetown Press 1999)
22.B.K.Matilal, Epistemology, Logic and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis (Hague: Mouton Press 1971)
23.B.K.Matilal, Logic, Language and Reality: Indian Philosophy and Contemporary Issues (MBP 1986).
24.B.K.Matilal, Perception: An Essay on Classical Indian Theories of Knowledge (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1986)
25.B.K.Matilal, The Word and the World: Indian Contribution to the Study of Language (Oxford University Press 1990)
26. B.K.Matilal, The Character of Logic in India (SUNY 1998)
27. B.K.Matilal edited by J.Ganeri, The Collected Essays of Bimal Krishna Matilala: Ethics and Epics (Oxford University Press 2002)
28. B.K.Matilal edited by J.Ganeri, The Collected Essays of Bimal Krishna Matilala: Mind , Language and World (Oxford University Press 2002)
29. J.N.Mohanty, “Phenomenology and Existentialism: Encounter with Indian Philosophy”, InPQ 12, 1972, pp.485-511.
30. J.N.Mohanty, “Consciousness and Knowledge in Indian Philosophy”, PEW 29(1), 1979, pp.3-10.
31. J.N.Mohanty, “Pramanaya and Workability—Response to Potter”, JIP 12, 1984, pp. 329-338.
32. J.N.Mohanty,“Psychologism in Indian Logical Theory”, in B.K.Matilal and L.Shaw (ed.), Analytical Philosophical in Comparative Perspective (Hague: Reidel Publ., 1985), pp.203-211.
33. J.N.Mohanty,“Phenomenology and Indian Philosophy: The Concept of Rationality”, JBSP 19(3), 1988, pp.269-280.
34. J.N.Mohanty,“A Fragment of Indian Philosophical Tradition—Theory of Pramana”, PEW 38, 1988, pp.251-260.
35. J.N.Mohanty, Reason and Tradition in Indian Thought: An Essay on the Nature of Indian Philosophical Thinking (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1992).
36. J.N.Mohanty, Classical Indian Philosophy (Rowan & Littlefield Publishers 2000)
37. J.N.Mohanty, B.Gupta (ed.), Explorations in Philosophy: Essay by J.N.Mohanty: Vol.I Indian Philosophy (Oxford University Press 2001).
38. Hiromi NAKANE(中根 洋雅), “Bhartrhari’s Concept of sabdajati”, JIBS 45(1), 1996,pp.522-520.
39. Hiromi NAKANE(中根 洋雅),“The Theory of pratibhā in Bhart[hari's Philisophy of Language”〈バルトリハリの〈直観〉説pratibhāをめぐって〉『東洋大学大学院紀要』34 文学研究科1998-02-28
40. Hiromi NAKANE (中根 洋雅), 〈バルトリハリにおける非存在の言語表現〉 “Verbal expressions of nonexistence in Bhart[hari's philosophy” 東洋大学大学院紀要』32 文学研究科(哲学・仏教学・中国哲学) 1996-02-29
41. Hideyo OGAWA (小川 英世), Department of Indian Philosophy, Hiroshima University (広島大学), 1-2-3 Kagamiyama, Higashi-Hiroshima 739-8522, Japan), “Bhartrhari on Sakti: The Vaisesika Categories as Saktis”, JIBS 47(2), 1999, pp.1010-1003.
42. Hideyo OGAWA (小川 英世), “Bhartrhari on A.1.1.68”, JIP 29(5), 2001, pp. 531-543
43. K.Potter, “Does Indian Epistemology Concern Justified True Belief? ”, JIP 12, 1984, pp.307-327.
44.------, Presuppositions of India’s Philosophies (MBP 1991)
45. C.Sharma, A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy (MBP 1960)
46. F.Staal, “Review of Prof.Matilal’s Epistemology, Logic and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis”, IIJ 19, 1977, pp. 108-114.

大乘佛學通史
1. P.Harvery, An Introduction to Buddhism: Teaching, History and Practices (Cambridge University Press 1991)
2. D.Kalupahana, Buddhist Philosophy: A Historical Analysis
3.-----, A History of Buddhist Philosophy: Continuities and Discontinuities (UHP 1992)
4. A.K.Warder, Indian Buddhism (MBP 1965)
5.P.Williams, Mahayana Buddhism: The Doctrinal Foundation (London: Routledge Press 1989)
6.-----, Buddhist Thought: A Complete Introduction to the Indian Tradition (London: Routledge Press 2000)

唯識宗及阿毘達磨研究
1. D. Devahuti, The Unknown Hsuan-Tsang (New York: Oxford University Press 2001)
2. Alexander L. Mayer, Xuanzangs Leben und Werk. Xuanzang. Übersetzer und Heiliger (Xuanzang's Life and Work. Translator and Sacred Person; three vols, Wiesbaden, 1991, 1992, 2001; 388 p., 223p., 116p.)
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6. S.Anacker, Seven Works of Vasubandhu: The Buddhist Psychological Doctor (MBP 1984).
7. Akihiko AKAMATSU(赤松 明彦),“Bhartrhari on Meaning and Form: The Second Book of the Vakyapadiya, Karikas 325-347”, Acta Asiatica: Bulletin of The Institute of Eastern Culture 90, Issue: Word and Meaning in Indian Philosophy (Tokyo : The Toho Gakkai 2006), pp.1-13.
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11. S.R.Bhatt and Anu Mehrotra, Buddhist Epistemology (London: Greenwood Press 2000)
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14. A.Boquist, Trisvabhava: A Study of the Development of the Three-Nature Theory in Yogacara Buddhism (Sweden: University of Lund 1993)
15. B.E.Brown, The Buddha Nature: A Study of the Tathagatagarbha and Alayavijnana (MBP 1991)
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17. John Younghan Cha (查??), A Study of the Dharmadharmatavibhaga: An Analysis of the Religious Philosophy of the Yogacara, together with an Annotated Translation of Vasubandhu's Commentary. (Ph.D. Thesis, Northwestern University, 1996. Supervisor: Isshi Yamada (山田龍城))
18. J.Y.Cha, “Reflecting Reality: Critical and Foundational Aspects of Indian Yogacara Epistemology”(AAR Conference Paper)
19. J.Y.Cha, “Causality and its Cessation: The Process of Purification in Classical Indian Yogacara Though” (2nd Annual Conference of the International Society for Buddhist Studies, ISBP)
20. J.Y.Cha, “The Problem of Identity and Difference in Indian Yogacara Conceptions of Reality: Emptiness According to the Madhyantavibhaga and its Indic Commentaries” (1st ISBP Conference)
21. J.Y.Cha, “Language Conceptualization and Awakening: On the Paradox of Discourse in Classical Indian Yogacara” (JCRT Vol.2, No.3, 2001)
22. J.Y.Cha , “On the Construction of Non-Existent Objects”(http://www.human.toyogakuen-u.ac.jp/~acmuller/articles)
23. A.K.Chatterjee, The Yogacara Idealism (MBP 1962)
24. K.N.Chatterjee, Vasubandhu’s Vijbapti-matrata-siddhi with Sthiramati’s Commentary (Vani Vihar Press 1980)
25. M.R.Chinchore, Santana and Santanantara: An Analysis of the Buddhist Perspective Concerning Continuity, Transformation and Transcendence and the Basis of an Alternative Philosophical Psychology (SSP 1996)
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27. F.Cook trans., Three Texts on Consciousness Only: Demonstration of Consciousness Only (Numata Center for Buddhist Translation and Research 1999)
28. C.Cox, “On the Possibility of a Nonexistent Object of Consciousness: Sarvastivadin and Darstanika Theories”, JIABS 11(1), 1988, pp.31-87
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30.D.Cozort, Unique Tenets of the Middle Way Consequence School (SLP 1998)
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32. Ronald M. Davidson, Buddhist Systems of Transformation: Awraya-parivrtti/pararvtti Among the Yogacara (Ph.D Dissertation: University of California, Berkeley 1985)
33. D.Daye, Metalogical Studies in Sixth Century Buddhist Proto-metalogic from the Sanskrit and Chinese Texts of the Nyayapravesa or Unpacking Ordinary Sanakrit, Ph.D.Dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison 1972.
34. D.Daye, “Review Article of Prof.C.Y.Chi’s Buddhist Formal Logic ”, PEW 23(4), 1973. pp. 525-534.
35. D.Daye,“Remark on Early Buddhist Proto-Formalism Logic and Mr.Tachikawa’s Translation of the Nyayapravesa”, JIP 3(3) 1975. pp. 383-398.
36. D.Daye,“Traka (inductive reasoning), as Pramana”, Proceeding of the 30th International Congress of Orientalists (Mexico City, August 1976).
37. D.Daye,“Metalogical Incompatibilities in the Formal Description of Buddhist logic (Nyaya)”, NDJFL 18(2) 1977. pp. 221-231.
38. D.Daye, “Methodological Remark on 20th Century Studies of Buddhist Inference (Nyaya), A.K.Narain(ed.), Studies in Pali and Buddhism (Dehli 1979).pp.72-82.
39. D.Daye,“Metalogical Cliches (Proto-Variables) and Their Restricted Substitution in Sixth Century Buddhist Logic”, NDJFL 20(3), 1979. pp. 549-558.
40. D.Daye, “Some Systematically Misleading Expressions: Inference and Anumana, Perception and Pratyaska”, B.K.Matilal and J.L.Shaw (ed.), Analytical Philsophy in Comparative Perspective (Hague: Reidel Publ. 1985). pp. 231-251.
41. D.Daye,“On Translating the Buddhist logical Term Drstanta” PEW 38(2), 1988. pp.147-156.
42. D.Daye,“Metalogical Remarks on the Procrustean Translation of the Buddhist Pararth-Anumana into the Anglo-European predicate Calculus”, in B.K.Matilal and R.D.Evans (ed.), Buddhist Logic and Epistemology (Hague:Reidel Publ. 1986). pp. 117-131.
43. D.Daye,“On Whether the Buddhist ‘Syllogism’ (Pararth-anumana) is a Sui Generis Inference”, AP 1(2), 1991. p.175-183.
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52.----, Recognizing Reality: Dharmakirti’s Philosophy and its Tibetan Interpretations (SUNY 1996).
53.----, “Is Compassion an Emotion? A Cross-Cultural Exploration of Mental Typolgies”, in R.J.Davidson and A.Harrington (ed.), Vision of Compassion: Western Scientists and Tibetan Buddhist Examine Human Nature (New York: Oxford University Press 2002), pp.31-45.
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65. Geshe Rabten, The Mind and its Functions (Switzerland: Rabten Choeling 1992)
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68. P.J.Griffiths, On Being Mindless: Buddhist Meditation and the Mind-Body Problem (Open Court Press 1986)
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71. ----, Philosophy and Psychology in the Abhidharma (MBP 1974)
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73.-----, “Apoha and the Nominalist Conceptist Controversy”, JIP 13, 1985. pp. 383-389.
74. J.Gyatso (ed.), In the Mirror of Memory (SUNY 1992)
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78. S.Hamilton, “The External World: Its Status and Relevance in the Pali Nikayas”, R 29, 1999, pp.73-90
79.-----, Early Buddhism: A New Approach—The I of the Beholder (CP 2000)
80. I.C.Harris, The Continuity of Madhyamika and Yogacara in Indian Mahayana Buddhism (E.J.Brill Press 1991)
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83. Masaaki HATTORI (服部正明), “Two Types of Non-qualificative Perception”, WZKSO 12-13, 1968. pp. 161-169.
84. Masaaki HATTORI (服部正明), “The Sautrantika Background of the Apoha Theory”, Buddhist Thought and Asian Civilization: Essay in Honour of H.Guenther on his Sixieth Birthday (CA: Dharma Press 1977).
85. Masaaki HATTORI (服部正明), “Realism and the Philosophy of Consciousness-Only”, EB XXI, No.1.
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92. R.Hayes, Dignaga on Interpretation of Sign, (Kluwer Academic Publ. 1988).
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94. R.Hayes and B.Gillon, “Introduction to Dharmikirti’s Theory of Inference as Presented in Pramanavarittika svopajnavrtti 1-10”, JIP 19, 1991. pp. 1-73
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Sunday, 19 February 2012

Karunadasa Time and Space

Time and Space - The Abhidhamma perspective
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Since our idea of the void is due to the environing matter, and since all matter, from the point of view of the elemental analysis, depends on the primary elements, the space-element, too, can be said to depend on them.
In the Sarvastivada Abhidharma, too, we find its counterpart, also referred to as akasadhatu, but in this system its inclusion in matter is due to another reason: The space-element is either light (aloka) or darkness (tamas) and therefore it is included in the objective sense-field of the visible (rupayatana). In contrast, the Theravadins include it in the objective field of mental objects (dhammayatana), which means that it is not visible but can be cognized only as an object of mind-consciousness.

We find this view defended in a Kathavatthu controversy as well. In response to the view held by some Buddhist schools that space is visible because one can see the interval between two trees or two posts or the space in a keyhole or in a window, The Theravadins' reply is that in the case of an interval between two trees, for instance, what one actually sees with his eyes is only the colour of the two trees and that the interval as such is known only by the mind as an object of mind-consciousness.

Besides the space referred to above, the Sarvastivadins recognize another kind of space which is called akasa and not akasa-dhatu. It is defined not as space bound by matter but as that which provides room for the movement of matter (yatra rupasya gatih). It is omni-present (sarvagata) and eternal (nitya). Its nature is non-obstruction (anavaranasvabhava).

That is to say, it does not obstruct (avrnoti) matter, which freely exists therein; nor is it obstructed (avryate) by matter, for it cannot be dislodged by the latter. However, space is not the mere absence of obstruction (anavarana-bhava-matra), but something positively real. In view of these characteristics, in the Sarvastivada Abhidharma, space is elevated to the level of an unconditioned dharma and in this sense it is on a par with pratisamkhya- and apratisamkhya-nirodha. Thus what the Sarvastivadins call unconditioned space is the space considered as absolutely real and as serving as a receptacle for the existence and movement of material phenomena.

What could be considered as the Theravada counterpart of this kind of space is found only in one Theravada work, namely the Milindapanha. Here we find space defined as follows: In no way can it be grasped (sabbaso agayha); it inspires terror (santasaniya); it is infinite (ananta), boundless (appamana) and immeasurable (appameyya). It does not cling to anything (alagga); is not attached to anything (asatta), rests on nothing (appatittha) and is not obstructed by anything (apalibuddha). Elsewhere in the same work we are told that two things in this world are not born of karma (akammaja), or of causes (ahetuja), or of season (anutuja), namely Nibbana and space.

However, what is important to remember here is that although the Milindapanha describes space in such a way as to fall in line with its counterpart in the Sarvastivada Abhidharma, it carefully avoids the use of the term "unconditioned" (asankhata) in describing it. This is a very significant departure from its Sarvastivada version. What could have prompted the Milindapanha to take this stance is that such a description would elevate space to a level on par with Nibbana.

However, what is important to remember here is that the kind of space described in the Milindapanha is not the same as the space-element listed in the Dhammasangani. For the latter means not space in the sense of "bare geometric extension" but spaces bounded by matter. What can be considered as a parallel to the Milindapanha space is found in the Kathavatthu of the Abhidhamma Pitaka. For here too space is described more in terms of that which provides room for the existence and movement of material phenomena. However, unlike in the Milindapanha it is not described as infinite and eternal, but as something neither conditioned nor unconditioned. The commentary observes that if space is so described, this means that it is a pannatti, i.e., a nominal dhamma or a conceptual construct with no objective counterpart.

Thus in the Theravada Abhidhamma as well we find two kinds of space. What led to this idea can be traced to the early Buddhist discourses themselves. Here space is sometimes described as referring to cavities, apertures and interstices. This is what the suttas mean by akasa-dhatu (space-element), when it is counted as one of the six elements (dhatu) into which the empiric individuality is analysed. And when the Sangiti Sutta of the Dighanikaya refers to a material phenomenon that is neither visible (anidassana) nor impingent (appatigha), it is very likely that the reference is to this space element. And it is this same space-element that we find in the abhidhamma list of secondary material phenomena (upada-rupa) as the principle of material delimitation (pariccheda-rupa). Sometimes we find in the Pali suttas space described not as void region but as the ultimate basis, a sort of fulcrum or receptacle for the existence of the physical world. In the Mahaparinibbana Sutta, for instance, the Buddha is represented as saying:

"This great earth, O Ananda, rests on water, water on air, and air on space". And in the Rahulovada Sutta it is said that space for its part does not rest on anything (akaso na kattha ci patitthito). In point of fact, the Milindapanha cites this same statement in its reference to space as described there. Equal significant is an observation found in the Abhidharmakosavyakhya of Acarya Yasomitra.

It says that when the Vaibhasikas (Sarvastivadins) argue that space is real they base this argument on a sutra-passage where the Buddha declares to a Brahmin that the earth rests on the circle of water, the circle of water on air, air on space and that space for its part does not rest on anything, does not cling to anything.

It is this latter kind of space that came to be elevated in the Milindapanha almost to the level of an unconditioned dhamma. And it is also this same space that the Kathavatthu describes as neither conditioned nor unconditioned, and this, as the commentary says, means that it is a conceptual construct. In the commentaries it is sometimes introduced as infinite space (anantakasa) and boundless space (ajatakasa).

Both terms highlight its difference from the space-element in the sense of bounded space. The use of these two terms does not mean that space is regarded as something real and absolute. The use of another term, empty space (tucchakasa) does, in fact, highlight its true nature. For as noted earlier, for the Pali commentaries space in the sense of "bare geometric extension" is a mere conceptual construct. (pannatti-matta).
The reference to two kinds of space could be considered as looking at the same phenomenon from two different angles. The first, which is always introduced by the compound word, akasa-dhatu (space-element) means space as void region or as that which delimits material phenomena. The second which is introduced by the simple term, akasa (space) means space as providing room for the existence and movement of matter. It may then be asked why the former is described as conditioned (sankhata) and the latter as neither conditioned nor unconditioned (= pannatti or conceptual construct). The reason for this is that although the former is presented as one of the secondary material phenomena (upada-rupa), it is not considered as an entity distinct from the other material phenomena. It is the method followed in the Dhammasangani that in recognizing certain characteristics and modalities connected with real rupa-dhammas (elements of matter), those characteristics and modalities themselves are presented as separate and co-ordinate rupa-dhammas. It is only a pedagogic device adopted to avoid the distinction between substance and quality entering into the list of rupa-dhammas.

The Pali commentators were fully aware of this of this situation. This should explain why in the commentaries the space-element of the Dhammasangani came to be included in a category called anipphanna-rupa. What is included in this category is, strictly speaking, not a dhamma, because it has no own-nature (sabhava.) Nor is it of the nature of rupa in the sense of matter, because it does not answer to its definition. If the items included in the category of anipphanna-rupa continue to be presented as rupa-dhammas, this, as the commentators say, is done only as a matter of convention (rulhiya.)

What all this amounts to is that in the ultimate sense (nippariyayena), the space-element (akasa-dhatu) is not different from space (akasa). Both are conceptual constructs with no corresponding objective reality. This reminds us of the Sautrantika school of Buddhism where space is defined as the mere absence of the 'substance' that has the characteristic of resistance or impenetrability" (sapratighadravyabhavamatra).

Since matter is defined as that which has the characteristic of resistance or impenetrability, the above definition can be rephrased to mean that space is the mere absence of matter. This definition is intended to show that space is not something positively real but a conceptual construct having only derivative and pragmatic validity (prajnapti-sat). The addition of the word, mere (matra) is to emphasize the fact that non-existence of matter does not mean the existence of anything other than matter. Space is not the opposite of matter but the mere absence of matter. The inclusion of time and space in the category of pannattis in other words means that they are not dhammas. The dhammas, as we have already noted, are the entities that have ontological ultimacy. Hence they are often described as paramattha, that is, that which exists in a real and ultimate sense. The description of dhammas as paramattha means not only their objective existence (paramatthato vijjamanata) but also their cognizability in an ultimate sense (paramatthato upalabbhamanata).

Thus from an ontological point of view, if the dhammas represent the final limit into which the analysis of empirical existence can be pushed, from an epistemological point of view they represent the objects of higher knowledge. The pannattis, on the other hand, signify those entities that have no objective counterparts and therefore which owe their being to mind's synthetic function (kappana).

Therefore the two terms, paramattha and pannatti, could be understood as indicating two levels of reality as well: The first refers to those entities that truly exist independently of the cognitive act and the second, to those entities that owe their being to the act of cognition itself. These two categories are said to be mutually exclusive and together they provide a rational explanation for the totality of our internal and external experience. Hence it is categorically stated that apart from pannatti and paramattha a third category does not obtain (tatiya koti na vijjati). In consonance with this situation pannatti is also defined as "that which is other than the dhammas" (tato avasesa), or as "that which remains after the mental and material dhammas" (namarupa-vinimmutta).

Since time and space are two pannattis, they are definable as two asabhava-dhammas as well, that is, as two entities devoid of own-nature. Since sabhava or own-nature is not different from the dhamma, from the perspective of this definition what is qualified as asabhava amounts to an abhava, a non-existent in the ultimate sense. Hence the three salient characteristics of empirical reality, namely origination (uppada), existence (thiti), and dissolution (bhanga) are not applicable to time and space. For these three characteristics can be predicated only of those things which properly answer to the Abhidhammic definition of empirical reality. Again, unlike the real existent (= dhammas) they are not brought about by conditions (paccayatthitika). For this self same reason, both time and space can also be defined as aparinipphanna, that is, not positively produced. Aparinipphannata or positive production is true of only those things, which have their own individual essence (avenika-sabhava).

As the Abhidhamma Mulatika says, "only a dhamma that is an individual essence, with a definite beginning and a definite end in time, produced by conditions, and marked by the three salient characteristics of the conditioned existence, is positively produced". as two pannattis, another important characteristic of time and space is that they cannot be described either as sankhata (conditioned) or as asankhata (unconditioned), for to be so described they do not possess their own-nature.
Since the two terms, sankhata and asankhata, represent the totality of conditioned and unconditioned existence, the description of time and space as neither conditioned nor unconditioned is another way of referring to their non-existence as real and ultimate existents.

Again, unlike the dhammas, time and space as pannattis are not delimited by rise and fall (udayabbaya-paricchnina). Such a situation is true only of dhammas, because they come into being having been not (ahutva sambhonti) and cease to exist after having been (hutva pativenti). In contrast, time and space have no individual essence to be manifested in the three instants of arising (uppada), presence (thiti), and dissolution (bhanga). Thus, since they have no existence marked by the three instantaneous phases-the nascent, static, and cessant - temporal distinctions as past, present, and future do not apply to them. As such, both time and space are also described as kala-vimutta, that is, free from time.

Here "free from time" means that the three temporal distinctions as past, present, and future do not apply to them. That space is free from time is understandable. But how are we to understand that time is free from time, that is, free from the three temporal distinctions?

The answer to this question is that, according to the Abhidhamma, what we call the three temporal distinctions are not three phases of an absolute time but three conceptual constructs which we superimpose on the incessant flow of the dhammas. Past means the dhammas that have ceased to exist, present means the dhammas that exist, and future means the dhammas that are yet to originate.

The Abhidhamma distinguishes two kinds of pannatti. One is called nama-pannatti. It refers to names, words, signs, or symbols through which things, real or unreal, are designated: "It is the mere mode of recognizing (sannakaramatta) by way of this or that word whose significance is determined by worldly convention". It is created by worldly consent (loka-sanketa-nimmita) and established by worldly usage (lokavoharena siddha). The other, called attha-pannatti, refers to ideas, notions or concepts corresponding to the names, words, signs, or symbols.

It is produced by the interpretative function of the mind (kappana) and is based on the various forms or appearances presented by the real elements (dhammas) when they are in particular situations or positions (avattha-visesa). Both nama-pannatti and attha-pannatti thus have a psychological origin and as such both are devoid of objective reality.

Nama-pannatti is often defined as that which makes known (pannapanato pannatti) and attha-pannatti as that which is made known (pannapiyata pannatti). The former is an instance of agency-definition (kattu-sadhana) and the latter of object-definition (kammasadhana). What both attempt to show is that nama-pannatti which makes attha-pannatti known, and attha-pannatti which is made known by nama-pannatti, are mutually inter-dependent and therefore logically inseparable.

This explains the significance of another definition, which states that nama-pannnatti is the term's relationship with the ideas (saddassa atthehi sambandho). These two pairs of definition show that the two processes of conceptualization and verbalization through the symbolic medium of language are but two separate aspects of the same phenomenon. It is for the convenience of definition that what really amounts to a single phenomenon is treated from two different angles, which represent two ways of looking at the same thing.

The difference is established by defining the same word, pannatti, in two different ways. When it is defined as subject it is nama-pannatti - the concept as name. When it is defined as object it is attha-pannatti - the concept as meaning. If the former is that which expresses (vacaka), the latter is that which is expressible (vacaniya). In this same sense, if the former is abhidhana or designation, the latter is abhidheya or that which is designated. Since attha-pannatti stands for the process of conceptualization it represents more the subjective and dynamic aspect, and since nama-pannatti stands for the process of verbalization it represents more the objective and static aspect. For the assignment of a term to what is constructed in thought - in other words - its expression through the symbolic medium of language - invests it with some kind of relative permanence and objectivity. It is, so to say, crystallized into an entity.

Since time and space are two instances of pannatti, the foregoing observations on the two kinds of pannatti apply to them equally.

Professor Y. Karunadasa Former Director, Postgraduate Institute of Pali and Buddhist Studies, Lanka daily News, Aug 10, 2003
___________________________________

Source: http://www.buddhistnews.tv

Tuesday, 31 January 2012

Theravada Resources

巴利三藏

巴利经藏五部 CHM格式完整版 元亨寺汉译
http://www.zxff.cn/downloads/0702-Sutta.rar

巴利经藏五部 PDF格式完整版 元亨寺汉译
http://www.zxff.cn/downloads/0804_Sutta_Pitaka.rar

《巴利律藏三部》 PDF格式完整版 元亨寺汉译
http://www.zxff.cn/downloads/0804_Vinaya_Pitaka.rar

汉译巴利大藏经-论藏-台湾元亨寺译本 完整版 PDF 格式
http://www.zxff.cn/downloads/0810_Abhidhamma_Pitaka.rar

中文念诵

《觉悟之路》
http://www.zxff.cn/mp3/juewuzhilu-MP3.rar

《大念住经》
http://www.zxff.cn/mp3/Mahasatipatthana.mp3

《大念住经》
http://www.zxff.cn/mp3/Mahasatipatthana%20Sutta.

《上座部经藏小部经典》
http://www.zxff.cn/mp3/Khuddaka-nikaya%20ke%20song.rar

《南传法句经》
http://www.zxff.cn/mp3/Dhamma%20Pada%20ke%20song.rar

线上阅读

《大念住经》
http://sss2002.51.net/books/ysfj/mahasatipatthana_Sutta.htm

《长部-大般涅槃经》
http://sss2002.51.net/books/NCDBNPJ/ncdbnpj-001.htm

《沙门果经及注疏》
http://sss2002.51.net/books/ysfj/saamannaphala_sutta.htm

《摄阿毗达摩义论》 〖阿耨楼陀 尊者著〗
http://sss2002.51.net/books/sabdmyl/sbdngyyl-001.htm

《阿毗达摩概要精解》 〖寻法尊者 译〗
http://sss2002.51.net/books/abdmgyjj/abdngyjj-001.htm

《清净道论》 〖觉音尊者 著〗
http://sss2002.51.net/books/qjdl/qjdl-001.htm

佛陀与圣弟子的故事

《亲近释迦牟尼佛-从巴利藏经看佛陀的一生》髻智比库(Bhikkhu Nanamoli)
http://www.zxff.cn/downloads/0712-the_life_of_the_buddha.rar

《佛陀的圣弟子传1:舍利弗-目犍连》 斯里兰卡 向智尊者
http://www.zxff.cn/downloads/0706_Great_Disciples_of_Bhddha_1.rar

《佛陀的圣弟子传2:大迦叶-阿难》 向智尊者
http://www.zxff.cn/downloads/0706_Great_Disciples_of_Bhddha_2.rar

《佛陀的圣弟子传3:阿那律&迦旃延&央掘摩罗&质多比库》
http://www.zxff.cn/downloads/0707_Great_Disciples_of_Bhddha_3.rar

《佛陀的圣弟子传4:女弟子&在家弟子》 向智尊者
http://www.zxff.cn/downloads/0708_Great_Disciples_of_Bhddha_4.rar

缅甸帕奥禅林

《帕奥禅林资讯》
http://www.zxff.cn/media/pa-auk-info.rar

《帕奥禅林影集》 508 M
http://www.zxff.cn/media/pa-auk-pic.rar

《帕奥禅林介绍VCD(英文)》
http://www.zxff.cn/media/pa-auk_vcd.rar

缅甸帕奥禅师开示

大念处经
http://www.visuddha-m-c.org/vmc%20sg/files/Dhamma%20Audio/Pa%20Auk%20Sayadaw/Chinese/dncj_c_chi.html

阿毗达磨
http://www.visuddha-m-c.org/vmc%20sg/files/Dhamma%20Audio/Pa%20Auk%20Sayadaw/Chinese/abhi_c_chi.html

《显正法藏》 开示录音(中译) 255 M
http://www.zxff.cn/media/pa-auk-xianzhengfacang.rar

《正念之道》 开示录音(中译) 954 M
http://www.zxff.cn/media/pa-auk-zhengnianzhidao.rar

《如实知见》 开示录音(中译)75 M
http://www.zxff.cn/media/pa-auk-rushizhijian.rar.rar

《菩提资粮》 开示录音(中译) 616 M
http://www.zxff.cn/media/pa-auk-putiziliang.rar

《去尘除垢》 开示录音(中译)300 M
http://www.zxff.cn/media/pa-auk-quchenchugou.rar

《缅甸帕奥禅师巴利经文课诵》(共31个文件) 590 M
http://www.zxff.cn/mp3/Pa-auk-Pali-Chanting.rar

《帕奥禅师2005年在新加坡的开示》 449 M
http://www.zxff.cn/media/pa-auk-2005-Singapo.rar

《帕奥禅师 开示(含中文翻译)》
http://www.zxff.cn/mp3/Pa-auk-MP3.rar

《帕奥禅师2008禅修开示》(中译) 118 M
http://www.zxff.cn/mp3/Pa-auk-Discourse2008.rar

《帕奥禅师关于五蕴(Five Aggregates)的开示》 20 M
http://www.zxff.cn/mp3/Pa-auk-Five%20Aggregates.mp3

《帕奥禅师2008马来西亚开示答疑》(巩固佛法知见之道) 150 M
http://www.zxff.cn/mp3/200812-Ven.Pa_auk_Teaching.rar

《帕奥禅师开示》(中译,四大、八敬法、提婆达多、禅修) 128 M
http://www.zxff.cn/mp3/Pa-auk-Sida+bajingfa.rar

《缅甸 帕奥 禅师 文集》 (CHM 电子书)
http://www.zxff.cn/downloads/0901-Ven_Pa_auk_Books.rar


玛欣德尊者开示

2006年《禅修开示》讲于帕奥禅林 254 M
http://www.zxff.cn/mp3/mahinda/2006-Ven.Mahinda-Meditation.rar

2007年《戒律讲要》开示 89 M
http://www.zxff.cn/mp3/mahinda/2007-Ven.Mahinda-Sila.rar

2007年《伍波萨他经》开示讲于新加坡 220 M
http://www.zxff.cn/mp3/mahinda/2008_Singapore_Ven.Mahinda.rar

2008年(1、您认识佛陀吗?2、如何提升自己 3、学佛释疑)讲于新加坡 124M
http://www.zxff.cn/mp3/mahinda/2008_Singapore_Ven.Mahinda.rar

2008年11月《如何使功德更加坚固》 讲于新加坡 44 M
http://www.zxff.cn/mp3/mahinda/2008_Singapore_Ven.Mahinda_4.rar

2008年《应作慈爱经》 讲于新加坡 450 M
http://www.zxff.cn/mp3/mahinda/2008_Singapore_Ven.Mahinda_5.rar

2008年《算术师摩嘎蓝经》 开示 296 M
http://www.zxff.cn/mp3/mahinda/2008_Singapore_Ven.Mahinda_2.rar

2009年《盐块经》(盐喻经、一把盐经)开示 190 M
http://www.zxff.cn/mp3/mahinda/2009_Singapore_Ven.Mahinda.rar

2009年02月《请勿轻视福德资粮》讲于帕奥禅林 10 M
http://www.zxff.cn/mp3/mahinda/2009_Singapore_Ven.Mahinda_2.rar

2009年02月《八城经》开示 130 M
http://online-dhamma.net/anicca/mp3/mahinda/0903-Mahinda%20Bhikkhu%2020090220-0301.rar

2008年12月 《给医学系师生的开示》 讲于新加坡 55 M
http://www.zxff.cn/mp3/mahinda/2008_Singapore_Ven.Mahinda_3.rar

2007年《清净道论 戒学》讲于江西佛学院宝峰禅寺 434 M
http://www.zxff.cn/mp3/mahinda/2007-Jiangxi-Baofengsi-Ven.Mahinda-Sila.rar

2008年02月《阿毗达摩讲要》第一期(上篇)开示讲于新加坡 650 M
http://www.zxff.cn/mp3/mahinda/Abhidhamma%20(1)%20Feb%202008%20Mahinda.rar

2008年11月《阿毗达摩讲要》第二期(中篇)开示讲于新加坡 400 M
http://www.zxff.cn/mp3/mahinda/Abhidhamma%20(2)%20Nov%202008%20Mahinda.rar

2009年02月《阿毗达摩讲要》第三期(下篇)开示讲于新加坡 400 M
http://www.zxff.cn/mp3/mahinda/Abhidhamma%20(3)%20Feb%202009%20Mahinda.rar

2007年《止观禅修营录音(1-3期)》讲于江西佛学院宝峰禅寺 357 M
http://www.zxff.cn/mp3/mahinda/2007-Jiangxi-Baofengsi-Ven.Mahinda-Mediation(1-3).rar

2008年《止观禅修营录音(1-4期)》讲于江西佛学院宝峰禅寺 1080 M
http://www.zxff.cn/mp3/mahinda/2008-Jiangxi-Baofengsi-Ven.Mahinda-Mediation(1-4).rar

2008年《止观禅修营录音(5-8期)》讲于江西佛学院宝峰禅寺 1090 M
http://www.zxff.cn/mp3/mahinda/2008-Jiangxi-Baofengsi-Ven.Mahinda-Mediation(5-8).rar

《阿毗达摩讲要 开示 文字录音录像》
http://sss2002.51.net/books/mahinda/mxd-Abhidhamma_discourse_index.html

《2009宝峰禅寺止观禅修营说戒、授戒、传授禅修业处》
http://sss2002.51.net/books/mahinda/mxd-sila-annapana_index.html

更多的玛欣德尊者著作、开示、课诵等信息和文件下载阅读
http://www.buddha-spath.com/forumdisplay.php?fid=86

2008年02月Mahinda Abhidhamma-1 (Singapore)开示
http://buddha-spath.com/viewthread.php?tid=21837&extra=page%3D1

2008年11月Mahinda Abhidhamma-2(Singapore)开示
http://buddha-spath.com/viewthread.php?tid=24235&extra=page%3D1

2009年02月Mahinda Abhidhamma-3(Singapore)开示
http://buddha-spath.com/viewthread.php?tid=24747&extra=page%3D1

2009年6月新加坡PAMC禅修营开示—大吉祥经
http://buddha-spath.com/viewthread.php?tid=30400&extra=page%3D1

2009年6月新加坡开示—如何在日常生活中修行
http://buddha-spath.com/viewthread.php?tid=30401&extra=page%3D1

Meditation Talks by Sayalay Dipankara and Ven U Mahinda
http://buddha-spath.com/viewthread.php?tid=30009&extra=page%3D1

2009年江西佛学院止观禅修营开示录音
http://buddha-spath.com/viewthread.php?tid=26287&extra=page%3D1

笑迎死亡—在新加坡给医生们的开示
http://buddha-spath.com/viewthread.php?tid=26699&extra=page%3D1

2009年6月新加坡PAMC开示—缘起与如实修观
http://buddha-spath.com/viewthread.php?tid=26700&extra=page%3D1

Abhidhamma (in Pa-Auk)
http://buddha-spath.com/viewthread.php?tid=20945&extra=page%3

2008年《在帕奥禅林的教诫》
http://buddha-spath.com/viewthread.php?tid=26282&extra=page%3D1

2008年江西佛学院止观禅修营开示
http://buddha-spath.com/viewthread.php?tid=21686&extra=page%3D1

2009年2月26日帕奥禅林开示《请勿轻视福德资粮》
http://buddha-spath.com/viewthread.php?tid=24843&extra=page%3D1

2009年2月新加坡PAMC禅修营—盐块经开示
http://buddha-spath.com/viewthread.php?tid=24762&extra=page%3D1

2007年《戒律講要》
http://buddha-spath.com/viewthread.php?tid=22997&extra=page%3D1

2008年新加坡《给医学系师生的开示》
http://buddha-spath.com/viewthread.php?tid=24416&extra=page%3D1

2008年11月新加坡2008 PAMC Retreat——算术师摩嘎蓝经 开示
http://buddha-spath.com/viewthread.php?tid=24335&extra=page%3D1

2008年11月新加坡开示《如何使功德更坚固》
http://buddha-spath.com/viewthread.php?tid=24334&extra=page%3D1

2006年禪修開示(講於帕奧禪林)
http://buddha-spath.com/viewthread.php?tid=23033&extra=page%3D1

2007年江西佛学院止观禅修营开示
http://buddha-spath.com/viewthread.php?tid=19070&extra=page%3D1

2008 Palelai Retreat-应作慈爱经 开示
http://buddha-spath.com/viewthread.php?tid=22199&extra=page%3D1

2007年新加坡-伍波萨他经 开示
http://buddha-spath.com/viewthread.php?tid=22194&extra=page%3D1

2008年新加坡三个专题《您认识佛陀吗?》《如何提升自己》《学佛释疑》开示
http://buddha-spath.com/viewthread.php?tid=21838&extra=page%3D1

2007年清凈道論-戒學(講於江西佛學院)
http://buddha-spath.com/viewthread.php?tid=19068&extra=page%3D1

上座部佛教FTP下载区
ftp://666777:666777@218.63.105.86
ftp://ttbc.no-ip.org

ftp的下载方法有二:若浏览器出现乱码时,请于使用”检视>编码>Unitcode(UTF-8)”
若使用IE浏览器,而未出现资料夹的视窗时,可用”检视>在winxows档案总管中开启”
若以浏览器不能下载时,请安装各种续传软体,效果会好很多!
建议下载安装Filezilla,进行档案

Friday, 6 January 2012

梵文、巴利文、藏文学习培训

鱼跃苦海
2011-03-11 15:55:36 来自: 鱼跃苦海(语言是人的精神原子!)


招生启事

一、招生背景
北京华夏贝叶国学研究中心,是北京质量管理学院与北京华夏贝叶信息技术研究院(原梵贝书院)联合组建的一个中国传统文化研究与交流机构。我们致力于打造一家以国学研究为基础,以梵文元典的搜集、整理、研究、翻译(包括首译)、出版为主要任务的非盈利性传统文化学术研究和推广机构。

二、办班目的
传承和弘扬中华国学传统文化;培养梵文、巴利文、藏文人才。
为适时申办梵文本科、本硕连读班打下基础。

三、教学模式
1.坚持选聘精英教师,由北京大学、中国社科院、藏学研究中心、五明佛学院等机构的老师及学者,以及泰国、缅甸等国家的梵文教授、僧侣担当教师。
2.坚持作业、考试、评分和出勤考勤制度。

四、学制
1.梵文周末班、网络函授班,分初级、中级、高级三个等级,每个等级两年。今年开设初级班。
网络函授班,采用老师讲课的网络视频与资料光盘寄发、作业寄回批改、老师答疑、期末面授相结合的模式。
2.藏文周末班、网络函授班,分初级、中级、高级三个等级,每个等级一年。今年开设初级班。
3.巴利文周末班、网络函授班,只开设初级班,一年制。
4.梵文经咒唱诵班,一个月。

五、招生对象
1.从事专业研究者。
2.传统文化爱好者。

六、课程介绍
1.梵文周末班、网络函授班:结合常用的梵文经咒,学习梵字,讲解梵文初级文法、进阶文法,进而达到初步阅读梵文元典的能力。
2.藏文周末班、网络函授班:借用五明佛学院的藏文教材,以及相关教学方法,学习藏文生字、短语、常用文法、藏文元典,达到熟练地运用藏文听、说、读、写的能力。
3.巴利文周末班、网络函授班:讲习基本的巴利文语法;重点在南传佛教寺院的早晚课诵经咒的讲解诵读。
4.梵文经咒唱诵班:学习《心经》《金刚经》《楞严咒》《大悲咒》等常用经咒的梵文唱诵。

七、收费标准
本培训班属于半公益性质,坚持适当收费以平衡办公教学支出这一原则。我们根据目前报名情况(截止3月3日),制定收费标准如下:
1.梵文周末班、网络函授班:2400元/学年。
2.藏文周末班、网络函授班:2800元/学年。
3.巴利文周末班、网络函授班:2000元/学年。
以上三门课,报一门,原价;报两门,减1000元;报三门,减2000元。
4.梵文经咒唱诵班:2800元。

八、开学时间
1.梵文周末班、网络函授班:3月27日,上午8—12点。
2.藏文周末班、网络函授班:3月26日,上午8—12点。
3.巴利文周末班、网络函授班:3月27日,下午2—5点。
4.梵文经咒唱诵班:6月30日。

九、报名截止时间
1.梵文、藏文、巴利文之周末班和网络函授班:截止于3月20日。
2.梵文经咒唱诵班:截至于6月15日。
十、上课地点
北京市西城区交大东路31号,北京质量管理学院。

十一、基本教材
教材由老师决定。
十二、研究中心联系方式
电话:010-51514725
联系人:悲心居士,手机:13263370238
秦磊,手机:13021982823
邮箱: l_zm@yahoo.cn
QQ群:梵文贝叶经,47382229;2号群,139685890。

北京质量管理学院
北京华夏贝叶信息技术研究院
2011年2月19日