瑜伽行派研究课程参考书目(英、德文

英文、德文文獻
縮寫表
期刊

AP Asian Philosophy
AS/EP Asiatische Studien/Etudes Asistiques
BCS Buddhist Christian Studies
BSOAS Bulletin of School of Oriental and African Studies
CAJ Central Asiatic Journal
EB Eastern Buddhist
IIJ Indo-Iranian Journal
InPQ International Philosophical Quarterly
IPQ Indian Philosophical Quarterly
JAAR Journal of American Academy of Religions
JAOS Journal of American Oriental Society
JBSP Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology
JBE Journal of Buddhist Ethics
JCRT Journal of Cultural and Religious Theory
JIABS Journal of International Association of Buddhist Studies
JIBS /IBK Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies
JIP Journal of Indian Philosophy
JJRS Japanese Journal of Religious Studies
JRAS Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society
JR Japanese Religions
NDJFL Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic
PW Pacific World: Journal of the Institute of Buddhist Studies
PEW Philosophy East and West
R Religion
SCEAR Studies in Central and East Asian Religions
TJ Tibetan Journal
WZKSOA Weiner Zeitschrift fur die kunde sud und ostasiens

出版機構
AHP Asian Humanities Press (California)
ATBSUW Arbeitskreis fur Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien, Universitrt Wien
CP/RCP Curzon Press/RoutledgeCurzon Press (London)
LTWA Library of Tibetan Works and Archives (Dharamsala)
MBP Motilal Banarsidass Publishers (Delhi)
RPC/KAP D.Reidel /Kluwer Academic Publishers (Dordrecht)
SLP Snow Lion Press (New York)
SSP Sri Satguru Publications (Delhi)
SUNY State University of New York
TP Tharpa Publication (London)
UHP University of Hawaii Press (Hololulu)
UMI UMI Dissertation Services
VOAW Verlag der Gstereichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Wien
WP Wisdom Publication (London and Boston)

（一）工具文獻

1. E.Conze, Buddhist Scriptures: A Bibliography (London: Garland Publ., 1982)
2. E.Franco, “Buddhist Studies in Germany and Austria 1971-1996”, JIABS 22(2),
3. 1999, pp.401-456.
4. J.Grimes, A Concise Dictionary of Indian Philosophy: New and Revised Edition (SUNY 1996)
5. K.Inada (稻田龜男), Guide to Buddhist Philosophy (Boston: Asian Philosophies and Religions Resource Guide 1988)
6. D.Lusthaus (悦家丹), “A Brief Retrospective of Western Yogacara Scholarship of the Twentieth Century”, in V.Shen (沈清松) and W.S.Wang (ed.), Chinese Philosophy Beyond the Twentieth Century (Taipei: Wu-nan 2001)
7. B.K.Matial, Chapter on “India”, in J.Burr (ed.),Handbook of World Philosophy (Greenwood Press 1980), pp.437-470
8. C.Muller (ed.), “Bibliography of Yogacara Studies”, (Yogacara Association, AAR, http://www.amuller.net/yogacara/bibliography/yogacara-bib.btml)
9.------,“Xuangzang’s Translation and Works” (Yogacara Association, AAR,http://www.human.toyogakuenu.ac. ... nkers/xuanzang-work)
10. P.Pfandt (ed.), Mahayana Texts Translated into Western Languages: A Bibliographical Guide (Religionswissenschaftliches Seminar der Universitat Bonn, Koln: Kommission bei E.J.Brill 1983)
11. K.Potter, Guide to Indian Philosophy (Boston:Asian Philosophers and Religious Resource Guide 1988)
12.-----(ed.), Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies Vol. VII : Abhidharma Buddhism to 150 A.D. (Delhi：MBP 1996)
13. J.Powers (ed.), The Yogacara School of Buddhism (American Theological Library 1991)
14. F.E.Reynolds, “Coming of Age: Buddhist Studies in the United States from 1972 to 1997”, JIABS 22(2), 1999, pp.457-483.
15. L.Schmithausen, “Zur Literaturgeschiechte der alter Yogacara-schule”, Zeitschrift der deutschen Morgenlandischen Gesellschaft, Supplement I.3, 1969, pp.811-823.
16. E.Steinkellner und M.T.Much, Texte der erkenntnistheoretischen Schule des Buddhismus, Systematische Ybersicht yber die buddhistische Sanskrit Literature II (Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht in Gottingten 1995)
17. D.R.Williams, “North American Dissertation and Thesis on Topic Related to Buddhism”, in D.R.Williams and C.S.Queen (ed.), American Buddhism (CP 1999), pp.267-311.

（二）研究文獻

左翼佛教(Engaged Buddhism)
1. I.Harris, “Buddhism and Politics in Asia: The Textual and Historical Roots”, in I.Harris (ed.), Buddhism and Politics in Twentieth Century Asia (London: Pinter 1999), pp.1-25.
2. K.Jones, The Social Face of Buddhism: An Approach to Political and Social Activism (WP 1989)
3. S.B.King, “Buddhist Social Activism”, in C.Queen and S.King (ed.), Engaged Buddhism (SUNY 1996), pp.401-435.
4. ----, “Transformative Nonviolence: The Social Ethics of George Fox and Thich Nhat Hanh”, BCS 18, 1998, pp.3-34.
5. -----, “They who Burned Themselves for Peace: Quaker and Buddhist Self Immolators during the Vietnam War”, BCS 20, 2000, pp.127-150.
6. -----, “Human Right in Contemporary Engaged Buddhism”, in Buddhist Theology (CP 2000), pp.293-311.
7. W.King, “Engaged Buddhism: Past, Present, Future”, EB 27(2), 1994, pp.14-29.
8. K.Kraft, “Prospects of a Socially Engaged Buddhism”, in K.Kraft (ed.), Inner Peace, World Peace: Essay on Buddhism and Nonviolence (SUNY 1992), pp.1-30.
9. -----, “New Voices in Engaged Buddhist Studies”, in C.S.Queen (ed.), Engaged Buddhism in the West (WP 2000), pp.485-511.
10. D.S.Lopez Jr., “Introduction” in D.S.Lopez Jr., (ed.), Curators of the Buddha: The Study of Buddhism under Colonialism (University of Chicago Press 1995), pp.1-29.
11. C.Queen, “The Shapes and Sources of Engaged Buddhism”, in Engaged Buddhism (SUNY 1996), pp.1-43.
12. -----, “A New Buddhism”, in Engaged Buddhism in the West (WP 2000), pp.1-26.
13. R.D.Schwartz, Circle of Protest: Political Ritual in the Tibetan Uprising (London: C.Hurst & Co. 1994)
14. E.Sperling, “The Rhetoric of Dissent: Tibetan Pamphleteers”, in R.Barnett and S.Akiner (ed.), Resistance and Reform in Tibet (London: C.Hurst & Co. Publ., 1994), pp.267-284.
15. H.Havnevik, “The Role of Nuns in Contemporary Tibet,” in Resistance and Reform in Tibet, pp.259-266.

佛學研究方法論 (Methodology of Buddhist Studies)
1.J.Bronkhorst, “On the Method of Interpreting Philosophical Sanskrit Texts”, AS/EA 67(3), 1993, pp.501-511.
2.J.I.Cabezon, “Scholarship as Interreligious Dialogue”, BCS 18, 1998, pp.89-95.
3.-----,“Buddhist Studies as a Discipline and the Role of Theory”, JIABS 18(2), 1995, pp.231-268.
4.-----, “Buddhist Theology in the Academy”, in R.Jackson and J.Makransky (ed.), Buddhist Theology: Critical Reflections by Contemporary Buddhist Scholars (CP 2000) pp.25-52.
5. -----, “Truths in Buddhist Theology”, in Buddhist Theology, pp.136-154.
6. M.Deegalle, “From Buddhology to Buddhist Theology”, in Buddhist Theology, pp.331-345.
7. M.Eckel, “The Ghost at the Table: On the Study of Buddhism and the Study of Religion”, JAAR 62(4), 1994, pp.1085-1110.
8. T.G.Foulk, “Issues in the Field of East Asian Buddhist Studies”, JIABS 16(1), 1993, pp.93-114.
9. L.O.Gomez, “Measuring the Immeasurable: Reflections on Unreasonable Reasoning”, in Buddhist Theology, pp.367-385.
10. ------,“Unspoken Paradigms: Meanderings through the Metaphors of a Field”, JIABS 18(2), 1995, pp.183-230.
11. P.Griffiths, “Buddhist Hybrid English: Some Notes on Philosophy and Hermeneutics for Buddhologists”, JIABS 4(2), 1981, pp.17-32.
12. -----, Ch.1: The Doctrinal Study of Doctrine and Ch.2: Buddhist Doctrine, in On Being Buddha: The Classical Doctrine of Buddhahood (SUNY 1994), pp.1-55.
13. R.E.Goss, “Buddhist Studies at Naropa: Sectarian or Academic? “, in D.R.Williams and C.Queen (ed.), American Buddhism: Methods and Findings in Recent Scholarship (CP 1999), pp.183-214.
14. R.M.Gross, “Buddhist Theology?” in Buddhist Theology, pp.53-60.
15. R.Hart, “Religious and Theological Studies in American Higher Education: A Pilot Study”, JAAR 59(4), 1991, pp.715-792.
16. F.J.Hoffman, “Orientalism in Buddhology”, in Pali Buddhism (CP 1999), pp.207-227.
17. C.Ives, “What Are We, Any Way? Buddhists, Buddhologists, or Buddhologians?” in BCS 18, 1998, pp.96-100.
18. R.R.Jackson, “Buddhist Theology: Its Historical Context”, in Buddhist Theology, pp.1-13.
19. J.Makransky, “Contemporary Academic Buddhist Theology: Its Emergence and Rationale”, in Buddhist Theology, pp.14-24.
20.------, “Historical Consciousness as an Offering to the Trans-Historical Buddha”, in Buddhist Theology, pp.111-135.
21. J.Nattier, “Buddhist Studies in the Post-Colonial Age”, JAAR 65(2), 1997, pp.469-485.
22. S.M.Ogden, “Theology in the University”, JAAR Thematic Studies XLVIII/1 pp.1-12.
23. R.K.Payne, Review of “On Method: Special Issue of JIABS 18(2)”, PW pp.244-249.
24. C.Prebish, “The Academic Study of Buddhism in the ffice:smarttags" />United States: A Current Analysis”, in R 24, 1994, pp.271-278.
25. -----,“The Academic Study of Buddhism in America: A Silent Sangha”, in American Buddhism, pp.183-214.
26. D.Seyfort Ruegg, “Some Observation on the Present and Future of Buddhist Studies”, JIABS 15(1), 1992, pp.104-117.
27.----,“Some Reflections on the Place of Philosophy in the Study of Buddhism”, JIABS 18(2), 1995, pp.145-181.
28. T.Tillemans, “Remark on Philology”, JIABS 18(2), 1995, pp.269-277.
29. D.Tracy, “Comparative Theology”, in M.Eliade (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Religion (New York: Macmillan Press 1987) Vol.14, pp.445-455.
30.T.Unno (海野), “Constructive Buddhist Theology: A Response”, in Buddhist Theology, pp.386-406.
31. B.A.Wallace, “Three Dimensions of Buddhist Studies”, in Buddhist Theology, pp.61-77.
32. P.Williams, “Introduction: Some Random Reflections on the Study of Tibetan Madhyamaka”, TJ 14(1), 1989, pp.1-9.

印度大乘佛學的印度哲學背景
1. A.Aklujkar, “The Word is the World: Nondualism in Indian Philosophy of Language”, PEW 51(4), 2001, pp.452-473.
2. A.N.Balslev, “The Influence of Phenomenology on J.N.Mohanty’s Understanding of ‘Consciousnes’ in Indian Philosophy”, in F.M.Kirkland and D.P.Chattopadhyaya (ed.), Phenomenology: East and West Essays in Honor of J.N.Mohanty (KAP 1993), pp.245-53.
3. N.Bandyopadhyay, “the Buddhist Theory of Relation between Prama and Pramana”, JIP 7, 1979, pp. 43-78.
4. S.Bhattacharyya, “Mohanty on Wabda Pramana”, in Phenomenology: East and West, pp.255-268.
5. P.Bilimoria, “Jbana and Prama”, JIP 13, 1985, pp. 73-101.
6.----, Sabdapramana: Word and Knowledge (KAP 1988)
7. J.Bronkhorst, The Two Traditions of Meditation in Ancient India (MBP 1993)
8. -----, “The Peacock’s Egg: Bhartrhari on Language and Reality”, PEW 51(4), 2001, pp.474-491.
9. A.Chakrabarti, “Seeing Daffodils, Seeing as Daffodils and Seeing Things Called ‘Daffodils’”, in P.Bilimoria and J.N.Mohanty (ed.), Relativism, Suffering and Beyond (Dehli: Oxford University Press 1997), pp.119-127.
10.----, “Against Immaculatr Perception: Seven Reasons for Eliminating Nirvikalpaka Perception from Nyaya”, PEW 50(1), 2000, pp.1-8.
11. M.Chinchore, “Some Indian Strands of Thought Relating to the Problem of Evil”, in Relativism, Suffering and Beyond, pp.319-335.
12. H.G.Coward, “The Reflective Word: Spirituality in the Grammarian Tradition of India”, in K, Sivaraman (ed.), Hindu Spirituality (New York: Crossroad Press 1989), pp.209-228.
13. H.F. de Wit, translated by M.L.Barid, Contemplative Psychology (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press 1987)
14. M.Eliade, Yoga: Immortality and Freedom of Indian Mysticism (London: Routledge Press 1958)
15. J.Fowler, Perspectives of Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Hinduism (Sussex Academic Press 2002)
16. J.Ganeri, Philosophy in Classical India: The Proper Work of Reason (London: Routledge Press 2001)
17. Y.Honda (本田義央, 広島大学(Hiroshima University)大学院文学研究科), “Bhartrhari on Sentence (vakya) and its Meaning (vakyartha) as Pratibha”, JIBS 46(2), 1998, pp.1044-1039.
18. Y.Honda(本田義央),“Bhartrhari's Definition of Kriya”, Asiatische Studien/Etudes Asiatiques 47-1 (1993)
19. G.Kaviraij, “The Doctrine of Pratibha in Indian Philosophy”, in Aspects of Indian Thought (University of Burdwan 1966), pp.1-44.
20. R.King, Early Advaita Vedanta and Buddhism (SUNY 1995)
21.-----, Indian Philosophy: An Introduction to Hindu and Buddhist Thought (Georgetown Press 1999)
22.B.K.Matilal, Epistemology, Logic and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis (Hague: Mouton Press 1971)
23.B.K.Matilal, Logic, Language and Reality: Indian Philosophy and Contemporary Issues (MBP 1986).
24.B.K.Matilal, Perception: An Essay on Classical Indian Theories of Knowledge (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1986)
25.B.K.Matilal, The Word and the World: Indian Contribution to the Study of Language (Oxford University Press 1990)
26. B.K.Matilal, The Character of Logic in India (SUNY 1998)
27. B.K.Matilal edited by J.Ganeri, The Collected Essays of Bimal Krishna Matilala: Ethics and Epics (Oxford University Press 2002)
28. B.K.Matilal edited by J.Ganeri, The Collected Essays of Bimal Krishna Matilala: Mind , Language and World (Oxford University Press 2002)
29. J.N.Mohanty, “Phenomenology and Existentialism: Encounter with Indian Philosophy”, InPQ 12, 1972, pp.485-511.
30. J.N.Mohanty, “Consciousness and Knowledge in Indian Philosophy”, PEW 29(1), 1979, pp.3-10.
31. J.N.Mohanty, “Pramanaya and Workability—Response to Potter”, JIP 12, 1984, pp. 329-338.
32. J.N.Mohanty,“Psychologism in Indian Logical Theory”, in B.K.Matilal and L.Shaw (ed.), Analytical Philosophical in Comparative Perspective (Hague: Reidel Publ., 1985), pp.203-211.
33. J.N.Mohanty,“Phenomenology and Indian Philosophy: The Concept of Rationality”, JBSP 19(3), 1988, pp.269-280.
34. J.N.Mohanty,“A Fragment of Indian Philosophical Tradition—Theory of Pramana”, PEW 38, 1988, pp.251-260.
35. J.N.Mohanty, Reason and Tradition in Indian Thought: An Essay on the Nature of Indian Philosophical Thinking (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1992).
36. J.N.Mohanty, Classical Indian Philosophy (Rowan & Littlefield Publishers 2000)
37. J.N.Mohanty, B.Gupta (ed.), Explorations in Philosophy: Essay by J.N.Mohanty: Vol.I Indian Philosophy (Oxford University Press 2001).
38. Hiromi NAKANE(中根 洋雅), “Bhartrhari’s Concept of sabdajati”, JIBS 45(1), 1996,pp.522-520.
39. Hiromi NAKANE(中根 洋雅),“The Theory of pratibhā in Bhart[hari's Philisophy of Language”〈バルトリハリの〈直観〉説pratibhāをめぐって〉『東洋大学大学院紀要』34　文学研究科1998-02-28
40. Hiromi NAKANE (中根 洋雅), 〈バルトリハリにおける非存在の言語表現〉 “Verbal expressions of nonexistence in Bhart[hari's philosophy” 東洋大学大学院紀要』32　文学研究科(哲学・仏教学・中国哲学) 1996-02-29
41. Hideyo OGAWA (小川 英世), Department of Indian Philosophy, Hiroshima University (広島大学), 1-2-3 Kagamiyama, Higashi-Hiroshima 739-8522, Japan), “Bhartrhari on Sakti: The Vaisesika Categories as Saktis”, JIBS 47(2), 1999, pp.1010-1003.
42. Hideyo OGAWA (小川 英世), “Bhartrhari on A.1.1.68”, JIP 29(5), 2001, pp. 531-543
43. K.Potter, “Does Indian Epistemology Concern Justified True Belief? ”, JIP 12, 1984, pp.307-327.
44.------, Presuppositions of India’s Philosophies (MBP 1991)
45. C.Sharma, A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy (MBP 1960)
46. F.Staal, “Review of Prof.Matilal’s Epistemology, Logic and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis”, IIJ 19, 1977, pp. 108-114.

大乘佛學通史
1. P.Harvery, An Introduction to Buddhism: Teaching, History and Practices (Cambridge University Press 1991)
2. D.Kalupahana, Buddhist Philosophy: A Historical Analysis
3.-----, A History of Buddhist Philosophy: Continuities and Discontinuities (UHP 1992)
4. A.K.Warder, Indian Buddhism (MBP 1965)
5.P.Williams, Mahayana Buddhism: The Doctrinal Foundation (London: Routledge Press 1989)
6.-----, Buddhist Thought: A Complete Introduction to the Indian Tradition (London: Routledge Press 2000)

唯識宗及阿毘達磨研究
1. D. Devahuti, The Unknown Hsuan-Tsang (New York: Oxford University Press 2001)
2. Alexander L. Mayer, Xuanzangs Leben und Werk. Xuanzang. Übersetzer und Heiliger (Xuanzang's Life and Work. Translator and Sacred Person; three vols, Wiesbaden, 1991, 1992, 2001; 388 p., 223p., 116p.)
3. Sally Hovey Wriggins, The Silk Road Journey With Xuanzang (Nov 2003)
4. S.Anacker, “The Meditational Theorapy of the Madhyantavibhagabhasys” in M.Kiyota (ed.), Mahayana Buddhist Meditation: Theory and Practice (UHP 1978), pp.83-113.
5.S.Anacker, “Vasubandhu’s Karmasiddhiprakarna and the problem of the highest meditation”, PEW 22, 1972. pp. 247-258.
6. S.Anacker, Seven Works of Vasubandhu: The Buddhist Psychological Doctor (MBP 1984).
7. Akihiko AKAMATSU(赤松 明彦),“Bhartrhari on Meaning and Form: The Second Book of the Vakyapadiya, Karikas 325-347”, Acta Asiatica: Bulletin of The Institute of Eastern Culture 90, Issue: Word and Meaning in Indian Philosophy (Tokyo : The Toho Gakkai 2006), pp.1-13.
8. N.Aramaki (荒牧 典俊), “Toward an Understanding of the Vijbaptimatrata”, in J.Silk (ed.), Wisdom, Compassion and the Search for Understanding (UHP 2000), pp.39-58.
9. Sung-Doo AHN (???), Die Lehre von den Klesas in der Yogacarabhumi (Steiner: Alt- und Neu-indische Studien, Steiner (Franz); Auflage: 1 , 2003)
10. L.Bapat, Buddhist Logic: A Fresh Study of Dharmakirti’s Philosophy (Delhi: Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan 1989).
11. S.R.Bhatt and Anu Mehrotra, Buddhist Epistemology (London: Greenwood Press 2000)
12. S.Boin-Webb trans., Abhidharmasamuccaya: The Compendium of the Higher Teaching (Philosophy) by Asanga (AHP 2001)
13. M.Boisvert, The Five Aggregates: Understanding Theravada Psychology and Soteriology (Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press 1995)
14. A.Boquist, Trisvabhava: A Study of the Development of the Three-Nature Theory in Yogacara Buddhism (Sweden: University of Lund 1993)
15. B.E.Brown, The Buddha Nature: A Study of the Tathagatagarbha and Alayavijnana (MBP 1991)
16. J.Cabezon, Buddhism and Language: A Study of Indo-Tibetan Scholasticism (SUNY 1994).
17. John Younghan Cha (查??), A Study of the Dharmadharmatavibhaga: An Analysis of the Religious Philosophy of the Yogacara, together with an Annotated Translation of Vasubandhu's Commentary. (Ph.D. Thesis, Northwestern University, 1996. Supervisor: Isshi Yamada (山田龍城))
18. J.Y.Cha, “Reflecting Reality: Critical and Foundational Aspects of Indian Yogacara Epistemology”(AAR Conference Paper)
19. J.Y.Cha, “Causality and its Cessation: The Process of Purification in Classical Indian Yogacara Though” (2nd Annual Conference of the International Society for Buddhist Studies, ISBP)
20. J.Y.Cha, “The Problem of Identity and Difference in Indian Yogacara Conceptions of Reality: Emptiness According to the Madhyantavibhaga and its Indic Commentaries” (1st ISBP Conference)
21. J.Y.Cha, “Language Conceptualization and Awakening: On the Paradox of Discourse in Classical Indian Yogacara” (JCRT Vol.2, No.3, 2001)
22. J.Y.Cha , “On the Construction of Non-Existent Objects”(http://www.human.toyogakuen-u.ac.jp/~acmuller/articles)
23. A.K.Chatterjee, The Yogacara Idealism (MBP 1962)
24. K.N.Chatterjee, Vasubandhu’s Vijbapti-matrata-siddhi with Sthiramati’s Commentary (Vani Vihar Press 1980)
25. M.R.Chinchore, Santana and Santanantara: An Analysis of the Buddhist Perspective Concerning Continuity, Transformation and Transcendence and the Basis of an Alternative Philosophical Psychology (SSP 1996)
26.Mei-Chin M. Chen (陳美琴), The Eminent Chinese Monk Hsuan-tsang: His Contribution to Buddhist Scripture Translation and to the Propagation of Buddhism in China (Ph.D Thesis, Madison: University of Wisconsin 1992, Ann Arbor, Mich.: U.M.I. 1994)
27. F.Cook trans., Three Texts on Consciousness Only: Demonstration of Consciousness Only (Numata Center for Buddhist Translation and Research 1999)
28. C.Cox, “On the Possibility of a Nonexistent Object of Consciousness: Sarvastivadin and Darstanika Theories”, JIABS 11(1), 1988, pp.31-87
29.----, “The Unbroken Treatise: Scripture and Argument in Early Buddhist Scholasticism” in M.Williams, C.Cox and M.Jaffee (ed.), Innovation in Religious Tradition: Essays in the Interpretation of Religious Change (Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter 1992)
30.D.Cozort, Unique Tenets of the Middle Way Consequence School (SLP 1998)
31.K.Crosby, “History versus Modern Myth: The Abhayagirivihara, the Vimuttimagga and Yogacara Meditation”, JIP 27(6), 1999, pp.503-550.
32. Ronald M. Davidson, Buddhist Systems of Transformation: Awraya-parivrtti/pararvtti Among the Yogacara (Ph.D Dissertation: University of California, Berkeley 1985)
33. D.Daye, Metalogical Studies in Sixth Century Buddhist Proto-metalogic from the Sanskrit and Chinese Texts of the Nyayapravesa or Unpacking Ordinary Sanakrit, Ph.D.Dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison 1972.
34. D.Daye, “Review Article of Prof.C.Y.Chi’s Buddhist Formal Logic ”, PEW 23(4), 1973. pp. 525-534.
35. D.Daye,“Remark on Early Buddhist Proto-Formalism Logic and Mr.Tachikawa’s Translation of the Nyayapravesa”, JIP 3(3) 1975. pp. 383-398.
36. D.Daye,“Traka (inductive reasoning), as Pramana”, Proceeding of the 30th International Congress of Orientalists (Mexico City, August 1976).
37. D.Daye,“Metalogical Incompatibilities in the Formal Description of Buddhist logic (Nyaya)”, NDJFL 18(2) 1977. pp. 221-231.
38. D.Daye, “Methodological Remark on 20th Century Studies of Buddhist Inference (Nyaya), A.K.Narain(ed.), Studies in Pali and Buddhism (Dehli 1979).pp.72-82.
39. D.Daye,“Metalogical Cliches (Proto-Variables) and Their Restricted Substitution in Sixth Century Buddhist Logic”, NDJFL 20(3), 1979. pp. 549-558.
40. D.Daye, “Some Systematically Misleading Expressions: Inference and Anumana, Perception and Pratyaska”, B.K.Matilal and J.L.Shaw (ed.), Analytical Philsophy in Comparative Perspective (Hague: Reidel Publ. 1985). pp. 231-251.
41. D.Daye,“On Translating the Buddhist logical Term Drstanta” PEW 38(2), 1988. pp.147-156.
42. D.Daye,“Metalogical Remarks on the Procrustean Translation of the Buddhist Pararth-Anumana into the Anglo-European predicate Calculus”, in B.K.Matilal and R.D.Evans (ed.), Buddhist Logic and Epistemology (Hague:Reidel Publ. 1986). pp. 117-131.
43. D.Daye,“On Whether the Buddhist ‘Syllogism’ (Pararth-anumana) is a Sui Generis Inference”, AP 1(2), 1991. p.175-183.
44. K.L.Dhammajoti (法光法師), Sarvastivada Abhidharma (Sri Lanka: Center for Buddhist Studies 2004)
45. K.L.Dhammajoti (法光法師), Yogacara: From Lecture 2-24 (Postgraduate Institute of Pali and Buddhist Studies, Kelaniya University 2003)
46. K.L.Dhammajoti (法光法師), Abhidharma Doctrine and Controversy on Perception (Sri Lanka: Centre for Buddhist Studies 2004)
47. Dhammapala, A Critical Study of the Doctrine of Anuwaya in Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakowa-bhasys and Sajghabhadra’s Nyayanusara (Thesis of M.Phil., University of Kelaniya: Postgraduate Institute of Pali and Buddhist Studies 2003)
48. Doboom Tulku (ed.), Mind Only School and Buddhist Logic (New Delhi: Tibet House 1990)
49. G.Dreyfus and Ch.Lindtner, “the Yogacara Philosophy of Dignaga and Dharmakirti”, SCEAR 2, 1989. pp. 27-52.
50. G.Dreyfus, “Universals in Indo-Tibetan Buddhism”, Tibetan Studies, Proceedings of the 5th Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies, Narita 1992. pp. 29-46.
51.----, “Meditation as Ethical Activity”, JBE 2, 1995, pp.28-54.
52.----, Recognizing Reality: Dharmakirti’s Philosophy and its Tibetan Interpretations (SUNY 1996).
53.----, “Is Compassion an Emotion? A Cross-Cultural Exploration of Mental Typolgies”, in R.J.Davidson and A.Harrington (ed.), Vision of Compassion: Western Scientists and Tibetan Buddhist Examine Human Nature (New York: Oxford University Press 2002), pp.31-45.
54. M.Eckel, “Bavaviveka’s Critique of Yogacara Philosophy in Ch.XXV of the Prajnapradipa”
55. P.Fenner, The Ontology of the Middle Way (KAP 1990)
56. E.Franco, “Did Dignaga Accept Four Types of Perceptions?”, JIP 21, 1993, pp.295-299.
57. -----, Perception, Knowledge and Disbelief (Delhi: MBP 1994), pp. 162-273.
58. E.Frauwallner, translated by S.F.Kidd, Studies in Abhidharma Literature and the Origins of Buddhist Philosophical Systems (SUNY 1995)
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Karunadasa Time and Space

Time and Space - The Abhidhamma perspective
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Since our idea of the void is due to the environing matter, and since all matter, from the point of view of the elemental analysis, depends on the primary elements, the space-element, too, can be said to depend on them.
In the Sarvastivada Abhidharma, too, we find its counterpart, also referred to as akasadhatu, but in this system its inclusion in matter is due to another reason: The space-element is either light (aloka) or darkness (tamas) and therefore it is included in the objective sense-field of the visible (rupayatana). In contrast, the Theravadins include it in the objective field of mental objects (dhammayatana), which means that it is not visible but can be cognized only as an object of mind-consciousness.

We find this view defended in a Kathavatthu controversy as well. In response to the view held by some Buddhist schools that space is visible because one can see the interval between two trees or two posts or the space in a keyhole or in a window, The Theravadins' reply is that in the case of an interval between two trees, for instance, what one actually sees with his eyes is only the colour of the two trees and that the interval as such is known only by the mind as an object of mind-consciousness.

Besides the space referred to above, the Sarvastivadins recognize another kind of space which is called akasa and not akasa-dhatu. It is defined not as space bound by matter but as that which provides room for the movement of matter (yatra rupasya gatih). It is omni-present (sarvagata) and eternal (nitya). Its nature is non-obstruction (anavaranasvabhava).

That is to say, it does not obstruct (avrnoti) matter, which freely exists therein; nor is it obstructed (avryate) by matter, for it cannot be dislodged by the latter. However, space is not the mere absence of obstruction (anavarana-bhava-matra), but something positively real. In view of these characteristics, in the Sarvastivada Abhidharma, space is elevated to the level of an unconditioned dharma and in this sense it is on a par with pratisamkhya- and apratisamkhya-nirodha. Thus what the Sarvastivadins call unconditioned space is the space considered as absolutely real and as serving as a receptacle for the existence and movement of material phenomena.

What could be considered as the Theravada counterpart of this kind of space is found only in one Theravada work, namely the Milindapanha. Here we find space defined as follows: In no way can it be grasped (sabbaso agayha); it inspires terror (santasaniya); it is infinite (ananta), boundless (appamana) and immeasurable (appameyya). It does not cling to anything (alagga); is not attached to anything (asatta), rests on nothing (appatittha) and is not obstructed by anything (apalibuddha). Elsewhere in the same work we are told that two things in this world are not born of karma (akammaja), or of causes (ahetuja), or of season (anutuja), namely Nibbana and space.

However, what is important to remember here is that although the Milindapanha describes space in such a way as to fall in line with its counterpart in the Sarvastivada Abhidharma, it carefully avoids the use of the term "unconditioned" (asankhata) in describing it. This is a very significant departure from its Sarvastivada version. What could have prompted the Milindapanha to take this stance is that such a description would elevate space to a level on par with Nibbana.

However, what is important to remember here is that the kind of space described in the Milindapanha is not the same as the space-element listed in the Dhammasangani. For the latter means not space in the sense of "bare geometric extension" but spaces bounded by matter. What can be considered as a parallel to the Milindapanha space is found in the Kathavatthu of the Abhidhamma Pitaka. For here too space is described more in terms of that which provides room for the existence and movement of material phenomena. However, unlike in the Milindapanha it is not described as infinite and eternal, but as something neither conditioned nor unconditioned. The commentary observes that if space is so described, this means that it is a pannatti, i.e., a nominal dhamma or a conceptual construct with no objective counterpart.

Thus in the Theravada Abhidhamma as well we find two kinds of space. What led to this idea can be traced to the early Buddhist discourses themselves. Here space is sometimes described as referring to cavities, apertures and interstices. This is what the suttas mean by akasa-dhatu (space-element), when it is counted as one of the six elements (dhatu) into which the empiric individuality is analysed. And when the Sangiti Sutta of the Dighanikaya refers to a material phenomenon that is neither visible (anidassana) nor impingent (appatigha), it is very likely that the reference is to this space element. And it is this same space-element that we find in the abhidhamma list of secondary material phenomena (upada-rupa) as the principle of material delimitation (pariccheda-rupa). Sometimes we find in the Pali suttas space described not as void region but as the ultimate basis, a sort of fulcrum or receptacle for the existence of the physical world. In the Mahaparinibbana Sutta, for instance, the Buddha is represented as saying:

"This great earth, O Ananda, rests on water, water on air, and air on space". And in the Rahulovada Sutta it is said that space for its part does not rest on anything (akaso na kattha ci patitthito). In point of fact, the Milindapanha cites this same statement in its reference to space as described there. Equal significant is an observation found in the Abhidharmakosavyakhya of Acarya Yasomitra.

It says that when the Vaibhasikas (Sarvastivadins) argue that space is real they base this argument on a sutra-passage where the Buddha declares to a Brahmin that the earth rests on the circle of water, the circle of water on air, air on space and that space for its part does not rest on anything, does not cling to anything.

It is this latter kind of space that came to be elevated in the Milindapanha almost to the level of an unconditioned dhamma. And it is also this same space that the Kathavatthu describes as neither conditioned nor unconditioned, and this, as the commentary says, means that it is a conceptual construct. In the commentaries it is sometimes introduced as infinite space (anantakasa) and boundless space (ajatakasa).

Both terms highlight its difference from the space-element in the sense of bounded space. The use of these two terms does not mean that space is regarded as something real and absolute. The use of another term, empty space (tucchakasa) does, in fact, highlight its true nature. For as noted earlier, for the Pali commentaries space in the sense of "bare geometric extension" is a mere conceptual construct. (pannatti-matta).
The reference to two kinds of space could be considered as looking at the same phenomenon from two different angles. The first, which is always introduced by the compound word, akasa-dhatu (space-element) means space as void region or as that which delimits material phenomena. The second which is introduced by the simple term, akasa (space) means space as providing room for the existence and movement of matter. It may then be asked why the former is described as conditioned (sankhata) and the latter as neither conditioned nor unconditioned (= pannatti or conceptual construct). The reason for this is that although the former is presented as one of the secondary material phenomena (upada-rupa), it is not considered as an entity distinct from the other material phenomena. It is the method followed in the Dhammasangani that in recognizing certain characteristics and modalities connected with real rupa-dhammas (elements of matter), those characteristics and modalities themselves are presented as separate and co-ordinate rupa-dhammas. It is only a pedagogic device adopted to avoid the distinction between substance and quality entering into the list of rupa-dhammas.

The Pali commentators were fully aware of this of this situation. This should explain why in the commentaries the space-element of the Dhammasangani came to be included in a category called anipphanna-rupa. What is included in this category is, strictly speaking, not a dhamma, because it has no own-nature (sabhava.) Nor is it of the nature of rupa in the sense of matter, because it does not answer to its definition. If the items included in the category of anipphanna-rupa continue to be presented as rupa-dhammas, this, as the commentators say, is done only as a matter of convention (rulhiya.)

What all this amounts to is that in the ultimate sense (nippariyayena), the space-element (akasa-dhatu) is not different from space (akasa). Both are conceptual constructs with no corresponding objective reality. This reminds us of the Sautrantika school of Buddhism where space is defined as the mere absence of the 'substance' that has the characteristic of resistance or impenetrability" (sapratighadravyabhavamatra).

Since matter is defined as that which has the characteristic of resistance or impenetrability, the above definition can be rephrased to mean that space is the mere absence of matter. This definition is intended to show that space is not something positively real but a conceptual construct having only derivative and pragmatic validity (prajnapti-sat). The addition of the word, mere (matra) is to emphasize the fact that non-existence of matter does not mean the existence of anything other than matter. Space is not the opposite of matter but the mere absence of matter. The inclusion of time and space in the category of pannattis in other words means that they are not dhammas. The dhammas, as we have already noted, are the entities that have ontological ultimacy. Hence they are often described as paramattha, that is, that which exists in a real and ultimate sense. The description of dhammas as paramattha means not only their objective existence (paramatthato vijjamanata) but also their cognizability in an ultimate sense (paramatthato upalabbhamanata).

Thus from an ontological point of view, if the dhammas represent the final limit into which the analysis of empirical existence can be pushed, from an epistemological point of view they represent the objects of higher knowledge. The pannattis, on the other hand, signify those entities that have no objective counterparts and therefore which owe their being to mind's synthetic function (kappana).

Therefore the two terms, paramattha and pannatti, could be understood as indicating two levels of reality as well: The first refers to those entities that truly exist independently of the cognitive act and the second, to those entities that owe their being to the act of cognition itself. These two categories are said to be mutually exclusive and together they provide a rational explanation for the totality of our internal and external experience. Hence it is categorically stated that apart from pannatti and paramattha a third category does not obtain (tatiya koti na vijjati). In consonance with this situation pannatti is also defined as "that which is other than the dhammas" (tato avasesa), or as "that which remains after the mental and material dhammas" (namarupa-vinimmutta).

Since time and space are two pannattis, they are definable as two asabhava-dhammas as well, that is, as two entities devoid of own-nature. Since sabhava or own-nature is not different from the dhamma, from the perspective of this definition what is qualified as asabhava amounts to an abhava, a non-existent in the ultimate sense. Hence the three salient characteristics of empirical reality, namely origination (uppada), existence (thiti), and dissolution (bhanga) are not applicable to time and space. For these three characteristics can be predicated only of those things which properly answer to the Abhidhammic definition of empirical reality. Again, unlike the real existent (= dhammas) they are not brought about by conditions (paccayatthitika). For this self same reason, both time and space can also be defined as aparinipphanna, that is, not positively produced. Aparinipphannata or positive production is true of only those things, which have their own individual essence (avenika-sabhava).

As the Abhidhamma Mulatika says, "only a dhamma that is an individual essence, with a definite beginning and a definite end in time, produced by conditions, and marked by the three salient characteristics of the conditioned existence, is positively produced". as two pannattis, another important characteristic of time and space is that they cannot be described either as sankhata (conditioned) or as asankhata (unconditioned), for to be so described they do not possess their own-nature.
Since the two terms, sankhata and asankhata, represent the totality of conditioned and unconditioned existence, the description of time and space as neither conditioned nor unconditioned is another way of referring to their non-existence as real and ultimate existents.

Again, unlike the dhammas, time and space as pannattis are not delimited by rise and fall (udayabbaya-paricchnina). Such a situation is true only of dhammas, because they come into being having been not (ahutva sambhonti) and cease to exist after having been (hutva pativenti). In contrast, time and space have no individual essence to be manifested in the three instants of arising (uppada), presence (thiti), and dissolution (bhanga). Thus, since they have no existence marked by the three instantaneous phases-the nascent, static, and cessant - temporal distinctions as past, present, and future do not apply to them. As such, both time and space are also described as kala-vimutta, that is, free from time.

Here "free from time" means that the three temporal distinctions as past, present, and future do not apply to them. That space is free from time is understandable. But how are we to understand that time is free from time, that is, free from the three temporal distinctions?

The answer to this question is that, according to the Abhidhamma, what we call the three temporal distinctions are not three phases of an absolute time but three conceptual constructs which we superimpose on the incessant flow of the dhammas. Past means the dhammas that have ceased to exist, present means the dhammas that exist, and future means the dhammas that are yet to originate.

The Abhidhamma distinguishes two kinds of pannatti. One is called nama-pannatti. It refers to names, words, signs, or symbols through which things, real or unreal, are designated: "It is the mere mode of recognizing (sannakaramatta) by way of this or that word whose significance is determined by worldly convention". It is created by worldly consent (loka-sanketa-nimmita) and established by worldly usage (lokavoharena siddha). The other, called attha-pannatti, refers to ideas, notions or concepts corresponding to the names, words, signs, or symbols.

It is produced by the interpretative function of the mind (kappana) and is based on the various forms or appearances presented by the real elements (dhammas) when they are in particular situations or positions (avattha-visesa). Both nama-pannatti and attha-pannatti thus have a psychological origin and as such both are devoid of objective reality.

Nama-pannatti is often defined as that which makes known (pannapanato pannatti) and attha-pannatti as that which is made known (pannapiyata pannatti). The former is an instance of agency-definition (kattu-sadhana) and the latter of object-definition (kammasadhana). What both attempt to show is that nama-pannatti which makes attha-pannatti known, and attha-pannatti which is made known by nama-pannatti, are mutually inter-dependent and therefore logically inseparable.

This explains the significance of another definition, which states that nama-pannnatti is the term's relationship with the ideas (saddassa atthehi sambandho). These two pairs of definition show that the two processes of conceptualization and verbalization through the symbolic medium of language are but two separate aspects of the same phenomenon. It is for the convenience of definition that what really amounts to a single phenomenon is treated from two different angles, which represent two ways of looking at the same thing.

The difference is established by defining the same word, pannatti, in two different ways. When it is defined as subject it is nama-pannatti - the concept as name. When it is defined as object it is attha-pannatti - the concept as meaning. If the former is that which expresses (vacaka), the latter is that which is expressible (vacaniya). In this same sense, if the former is abhidhana or designation, the latter is abhidheya or that which is designated. Since attha-pannatti stands for the process of conceptualization it represents more the subjective and dynamic aspect, and since nama-pannatti stands for the process of verbalization it represents more the objective and static aspect. For the assignment of a term to what is constructed in thought - in other words - its expression through the symbolic medium of language - invests it with some kind of relative permanence and objectivity. It is, so to say, crystallized into an entity.

Since time and space are two instances of pannatti, the foregoing observations on the two kinds of pannatti apply to them equally.

Professor Y. Karunadasa Former Director, Postgraduate Institute of Pali and Buddhist Studies, Lanka daily News, Aug 10, 2003
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