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Sunday, 22 November 2020

Mahāyāna-śatadharma-prakāśamukha-śāstra 大乘百法明门论


世亲菩萨造

   如世尊言:“ 一切法无我.”
   何等一切法? 云何为无我?

   一切法者, 略有五种: 一者心法, 二者心所有法, 三者色法, 四者心不相应行法, 五者无为法。 一切最胜故, 与此相应故, 二所现影故, 三位差别故, 四所显示故, 如是次第。

   第一心法, 略有八种: 一眼识, 二耳识,三鼻识, 四舌识, 五身识, 六意识, 七末那识, 八阿赖耶识。

   第二心所有法, 略有五十一种, 分为六位: 一遍行有五, 二别境有五, 三善有十一, 四烦恼有六, 五随烦恼有二十, 六不定有四。
   一遍行五者: 一作意, 二触, 三受, 四想, 五思。
   二别境五者: 一欲, 二胜解, 三念, 四定, 五慧。
   三善十一者: 一信, 二精进, 三惭, 四愧, 五无贪, 六无嗔, 七无痴, 八轻安, 九不放逸, 十行舍, 十一不害。
   四烦恼六者: 一贪, 二嗔, 三慢, 四无明, 五疑, 六不正见。
   五随烦恼二十者: 一忿, 二恨, 三恼, 四覆, 五诳, 六谄, 七骄, 八害, 九嫉, 十悭, 十一无惭, 十二无愧, 十三不信, 十四懈怠, 十五放逸, 十六昏沉, 十七掉举, 十八失念, 十九不正知, 二十散乱。
   六不定四者: 一睡眠, 二恶作, 三寻, 四伺。   第三色法, 略有十一种: 一眼, 二耳, 三鼻, 四舌, 五身, 六色, 七声, 八香, 九味, 十触, 十一法处所摄色。

    (第三色法,略去)

   第四心不相应行法, 略有二十四种: 一得, 二命根, 三众同分, 四异生性, 五无想定, 六灭尽定, 七无想报, 八名身, 九句身, 十文身, 十一生, 十二住, 十三老, 十四无常, 十五流转, 十六定异, 十七相应, 十八势速, 十九次第, 二十时, 二十一方, 二十二数, 二十三和合性, 二十四不和合性。

   第五无为法者, 略有六种: 一虚空无为, 二择灭无为, 三非择灭无为, 四不动灭无为, 五想受灭无为, 六真如无为。
   言无我者, 略有二种: 一补特伽罗无我, 二法无我。
这个论,是总论,好比一个书目,具体里面的内容很细,而且一般人是看不懂的。 唯识是什么? 就是把五感六识甚至,末那识,阿赖耶识,阿摩罗识,拆开来 师父让我学百法明门论我一直觉得没法学,他说这个论很好,把人的心都讲碎了 因为他把我们平常人混在一起的视觉听觉包括心理感受都肢解开了 但这个论也不是那么好学的,世俗的人没有超自然的感官是学不懂的,最起码一般人是不能把大脑和视觉神经传递来的信号分离出来的,这些信号是直接到达大脑的,而一个有观察能力的人,他有一个不动的位置,可以站在这个位置观察视觉传递的信息,知道这些是影像,就好像一个人坐在电影院里,去分辨屏幕上的景象。 难就难在这是圣学,非凡学。
有猫道长菜鸡子
有猫道长菜鸡子(请饶了我吧!真的只是一只菜鸡啊)
注圣义谛的解释 圣义谛慧:通达人、法二种无我真实的智慧。既是要以此智慧觉悟这个世间“人无我”、“法无我”。所谓的“人无我”既是无作者、受者之众生;“法无我”既是一切法空无自性。修行者觉悟到人、法二无我之智慧,称为圣义谛慧。此智慧是世间最究竟、最优胜的道理,它既是佛陀所说的无我、无常、苦、空,也就是一切万法无自性空。觉悟此智慧者就是能够解脱,故唯有佛陀与阿罗汉等解脱者能觉悟的智慧,并不是世俗人所能完成的。 圣义谛分两种,圣生圣义和世间流传圣义。 事实上圣生圣义是无法用我们的思维和语言来分支和分析的,可是为了让更多的众生间接的了解圣义、感悟圣义,我们不得不用方便法对圣义讲述和分析。这样就会产生很多方式,比如十八空性、雍仲九空界,还有以天空、虚空等做的无数譬喻;在般若部和经部等经文中也产生了很多对圣义的介绍。这一切是针对众生心的承载能力而有针对性讲述的,犹如医生对病人开的药方一般。 圣义谛以三种方式来讲述,第一是无定者定义,第二怎样说明它的圣义,第三不以去世俗方式成立圣义。 首先无定者定义,或者叫无成于成立者。圣义是无法定义的,因为它不是定义的对境,因为它是本性自然空,是如来以及圣贤的境界。《经部》里讲到,“圣义,性空、如来境界、见涅槃”。就这样我们以“圣义无法定义、无法阐述”的表述来定义圣义,因为圣义本身就是不可说,因此我们没有办法把它说成是对境,也没有办法以某一种思维方式去阐述它,而使它成为阐述的对境直接讲述。它不能成为一个对境来阐述,因为圣义是如来的境界、圣贤的境界,因为它是自然本性空。 第二,何为阐述圣义。一切世俗用意识观察,没有找到任何实有,这种状况把它命名为圣义空性的成立。《九镜环经》里讲到:“断除一切戏论,成立圣义谛”,这里面以一种方法来解释或者成立圣义谛,成为一种引导。它针对想了解或者想感悟圣义谛的众生,可以借助这种方式了解圣义。 第三不以去世俗方式成立圣义,讲授人无我和法无我。这两者是遍知如来讲给主要弟子益杰切琼与诸菩萨的,《堪杰》经文里讲到,“益杰切琼、诸菩萨谛听,诸轮回涅槃法无始无相,要感悟本初空性无我”。这两种无我感知二谛和内外一切法,了悟空性者才会明白,很多经文里讲到,了悟内外一切皆空就会产生圣义。
有猫道长菜鸡子
有猫道长菜鸡子(请饶了我吧!真的只是一只菜鸡啊)
一切外相执取和内相对境的无实有性。虽然我们讲述了相的空性,无长久性,无独立性,无实有智慧的认识方法,但单一的看成空性无法达到圆满觉悟,会成为独觉那样不具备大慈悲,全然专注于涅槃;如果离于智慧的方便又成为了非正道的歪邪的缠绕。正确的方式是智慧与方便双运,智慧的力量使我们不入轮回,方便的力量使我们不入涅槃,完全圆满自他,具备二身境界的因。《六识教法》也讲到,“不具备智慧无法方便到彼岸,智慧方便双运修行可达到究竟彼岸”。要达到智便双运,要断除法实有执着和人实有执着,需念住远离于实相与空性,住于远离有无显空、有无性空的平等称为观空。《六识教法》里讲到,“去除执取与境像,亦无空性专注修”,就这样我们不去除相,不在相中执取,不取空,不用思维分析。一方面是不去除相,不把相当成问题,第二方面对相不执取,第三方面我们也不需要去执取空,不要把相去除然后说观空,不要建立起一个空。为什么呢?因为我们不需要用思维去分析、去执取,去相取空等于进入了用思维操作的状况、执取的状况。那我们应该怎样呢?用无执取、无分别思维、无造作的平等住,住于空相的本性。

圣义果

这种本性修行的果是什么呢?进入地道的次第和终极的结果。前面讲述了空性智慧能达到一定去除烦恼、解开内心的作用,可是单纯的空性见解还真不能完全的成为大乘菩萨的境界,为什么呢?这只是借助空性而让自己独自去除一些烦恼,不受干扰罢了。也可以这种空性的境界再高,也并不是什么奇特的成就,也不能超过声闻独觉乘,因为没有具备大悲心。然后,如果没有具备对空性的认识,仅仅讲慈悲也不能产生绝对的作用,又变成对慈悲的执着,一切相又变成了绑缚,修行又变成了和轮回一样,无间断的往复,所以这里讲到特殊的讲法,智便双运。 第一,次第的结果。这种修行的结果是怎样的次第呢?它以平等住的空性和后得智的慈悲进入了布施等资粮道的修行。福报资粮使众生具备产生大乘发心的基础,这时候就有能力进入小资粮道。以观修具体的方法来讲,资粮道分大、中、小三资粮道,每个资粮道又可以细分为四种,这样产生了十二种资粮道。《次第发愿文》里讲述,“四念住、四竟断、四神足等修行资粮道。” 这一切资粮道次第的观修产生功德后,达到无分别智的四加行道,每个加行道再分为大、中、小三境象,共有十二加行。十二加行道是什么呢?暖顶五观修、忍与圣法、五力静虑修行。《次第发愿文》里讲到,“五力静虑、暖顶五观、忍辱、圣法加行道”。 三种资粮道与四加行道称为世间道,具备世间道的一切功德后,才能见超世间的、远离一切戏论的智慧,才能见纯净本性的见解,因此达见道。在这时候就达到了雍仲教法的精华,达到了远离染污,达到了空性与慈悲双运,了悟第一地的法性。《次第发愿文》讲到,“直了顿悟空明无二本性义”。这时候并不是和八地菩萨一样达到如实本性,因为只是达到了自己的顶端,还有见道的应断烦恼,还有修道的应断烦恼的障碍。就这样,见道的一百一十二应断烦恼要用它的对治来去除。 修道分大、中、小,每一见道再分大、中、小,共九修道。从小之小的无垢地,到大之大的不变雍仲地,中间的修道要以静虑的力量对治、去除八十二烦恼,消除八十二烦恼的能量,陆续具备了十地之内一切的功德。 具备观修圆满功德达到十地,前面的微细所知障瞬间由无碍道来去除,达雍仲静虑。微细所知障去除的第二刹那,达到了完全解脱之道,即如来第十一普光法界道。《库门》里讲到,“十一普光地究竟断证,圆满三身”。 第二,究竟的结果。首先讲述成为究竟结果的因,和来自因的结果。因当中直接的因是我们曾经的一切修行。进取因有四种:第一是因缘,菩提发心是道的助缘;第二增上缘,是修平等、后得二智双运的增上缘;第三对镜缘,是二元空性的对镜缘;第四及时瞬间缘,在十地相续的最后刹那作为及时瞬间缘而产生了终极的结果。这就是用四种因缘讲述终极觉悟。
有猫道长菜鸡子
有猫道长菜鸡子(请饶了我吧!真的只是一只菜鸡啊)
法相宗认为构成吾人认识作用之心识有四个分位,亦即心、心所法之认识作用共有四种分类。即: (一)相分,又作所取分。相,即相状;所缘之义。为认识之对象(客体);亦即被主体之心所认识之客体形相。可分为影像相分、本质相分二种。 (二)见分,又作能取分。见,即见照;能缘之义。为认识之主体(诸识之能缘作用);亦即认识、照知相分之主体作用。 (三)自证分,又作自体分。自,自体之义;证,证知之义。即自体上证知见分之作用;亦即自体能证知自己之认识活动(见分缘相分之作用)。 (四)证自证分,即证知自证分之认识作用;亦即自证分之再证知。于八识中皆各具有此四分,为人类行认识作用时所必备者,例如度量一事物,应有“能量”(见分)作为尺度,亦应有“所量”(相分)作为对象,更应该有“量果”(自证分)以得知大小、长短等,而将自证分之“量果”再加以证知,则为证自证分。 第八阿赖耶识能含藏一切善恶种子,具有下列四分之义,即: (一)相分,相,即形相。相分有三种:(1)境相名相,谓第八识能与六识相缘而为境界。(2)相状名相,谓世间有为之法皆有相状,均为第八识所变现。(3)义相名相,谓能诠教下所诠义理之相,亦皆为第八识所变现。  (二)见分,见,即照了之义。见分有五种,即:证见名见、照烛名见、能缘名见、念解名见、推度名见。  (三)自证分,自证,即自证所具之法。谓第八识能持见分、相分,而能亲证自见分缘于相分之不谬。  (四)证自证分,证,即能证之体;自证,即所具之法。谓第八识能持自证分、见分、相分为其本体,而亲证自证分缘于见分之不谬。
有猫道长菜鸡子
有猫道长菜鸡子(请饶了我吧!真的只是一只菜鸡啊)
补特伽罗为梵语 pudgala,的音译,意译为数取趣、人、众生,指轮回转生的主体而言。数取趣,意为数度往返五趣轮回者。乃外道十六知见之一。即“我”的异名。佛教主张无我说,故不承认有生死主体的真实补特伽罗(胜义之补特伽罗),但为解说方便起见,而将人假名为补特伽罗(世俗的补特伽罗)。 补特伽罗无我,即为,“人”无我。
有猫道长菜鸡子
有猫道长菜鸡子(请饶了我吧!真的只是一只菜鸡啊)
自性空与他性空,在大乘佛教中长久有着争议。自性空与他性空,原来是空性见解中的一种,大乘佛教般若学初期,提出十八空,之后归结为四空:有性空、无性空、自性空、他性空[1]。 但是空性见解在部派佛教时期早已出现。如在《中阿含经》(中部)有〈小空经〉,采用他空见,也被称为彼彼空,即是他性空[2]。《楞伽经》中指出虚妄想像自性执著者常惰于自性空与彼彼空等七种空的妄想中[3]。 龙树以世间所生诸法皆自性空立宗,他的门徒随后形成中观派,又称空宗。主张他性空的学派,如唯识学派与如来藏学派,通常被称为有宗[

有猫道长菜鸡子(请饶了我吧!真的只是一只菜鸡啊)
他空并非由藏传佛教觉囊派所独创,在许多佛经中已多处提到他空之名相,如《光赞经》卷第六有说到蕴处界五阴十八界者都有生住异灭的现象,都无自性,暂有,最后都毕竟空,不论佛出不出现,唯有本住法常住,祂寂灭故无本,无本就是本际,又为他故空,名为他空,是菩萨摩诃萨所应修行的大乘法门[5]。 又《光赞经》卷第三摩诃般若波罗蜜了空品第七也提到他空[6]。于《正法念处经》卷第四生死品之二又说:若修行人能以无常,自空,他空,无我来修禅便是上上根有智慧的人,那么此人离到达涅槃彼岸就不远了[7]。《大宝积经》卷第六 第二无边庄严会出离陀罗尼品第二,更有提到自空与他空[8]。 在《大般涅槃经》(卷第二十七师子吼菩萨品第十一之一)说,声闻缘觉只见一切空,却见不到不空。于蕴处界见一切都无我,却不见真我。因此之故,说声闻缘觉不得第一义空。因不得第一义空的缘故,说声闻缘觉不行中道。无中道的缘故,他们见不到成佛之性[9]。又说,唯有有智慧的菩萨才能见到空与不空,才能见到常与无常、苦之与乐、我与无我,这些修行人才是真正行于中道。那些不见空与不空的凡愚众生也就见不到成佛之性,这都是因为他们的智慧被无明所覆盖故[10]。
有猫道长菜鸡子
有猫道长菜鸡子(请饶了我吧!真的只是一只菜鸡啊)
在西藏众多学派中唯有觉囊派独持他空见,印度的佛典中虽有他空名相但极少流通,故他空并非觉囊派独创的佛学新名词,觉囊派承认有情都有真如本性。认为万法都是暂有的,只有觉明或觉性才真正存在。 觉囊派认为世俗诸法是因缘所生,所以无自性,是自空。而胜义谛“则非缘和之无为法”,是他空,属实有。自空是西藏诸多中观学派的主要见解。自空认为世界上的一切事物现象,是假借的概念和名相,本身并没有独立的实体性。但觉囊派认为胜义或如来藏不是自空,而是他空。其他西藏教派有主张成佛是证空性,把胜义、世俗一起空掉,把胜义如来藏说成是缘起性空。觉囊派认为这样世俗万物就失去依托,认为:“说毕竟空者,认为一切都是空的,他们忽略了如来藏的秘奥和自觉之妙智。”认为佛性若自空,求出离三界解脱,契证佛果等都成为毫无意义的事。[11][12]
有猫道长菜鸡子
有猫道长菜鸡子(请饶了我吧!真的只是一只菜鸡啊)

在藏传佛教史上,一些学者把如来藏佛性论称为“他空见”,般若中观义叫作“自空见”。 

世俗补特伽罗 说一切有部立‘假名我’──世俗补特伽罗(sam!vr!ti-pudgala)。有部以为︰在世俗法中,一一有情(sattva)营为不同的事业,作不同的业,受不同的果报,这是世间的事实。由于有情执取当前的身心为自己,所以成为一独立的有情,一直流转不已。有情是依‘有执受’的五蕴而假立的,虽然有世俗的补特伽罗,却没有实体的我可得。原来,说一切有部以为︰一一法(色蕴等)‘恒住自性’,法性是如如恒住的。依于因缘,安住未来的法,刹那起用,入现在位;作用又刹那灭,入过去位。有三世不同,而一一法性却始终恒住自性,没有变异。这可说‘法性恒住,作用随缘’。依法的体性与作用来说,都没有什么是从前世到后世的,也就没有移转可说。但刹那起用时,不但有同时的‘俱有’、‘相应’,又能引发后后的‘相续’;依五蕴的和合、相续,假名为补特伽罗,也就依假名补特伽罗,可说有生死相续,从前生到后世了。说一切有部的解说,是站在体(法性)用(作用)差别的见地;不过体与用的关系,虽不一而还是不异(没有别法)的。了解说一切有部所说,说转部的见解,就容易明白了。如《异部宗轮论》说(大正49·17b)︰‘其经量部本宗同义︰谓说诸蕴有从前世转至后世,立说转名。(中略)有根边蕴,有一味蕴。(中略)执有胜义补特伽罗。余所执多同说一切有部。

觉囊派在藏传佛教中可算是异军突起,独树一帜。觉囊派持他空见:承认有真如本体,与藏中宁玛派的大圆满,噶举派的大手印,萨迦派的轮涅无别均承认有明空本性,颇为相似,不过各派

觉囊派 又各有说法不同,但均属于“胜义有”类。觉囊派与藏中持应成派中观见的格鲁派主张一切皆空的“毕竟空”类,则全完对立。因此被视为异端而受到排挤。从历史的观点来看,觉囊的见地仍来源于印度的中观派见。本来印度的中观派,在派内就有各种争论,后裂为若干小派。但各自都承认自己是佛语旨意的正确解释者,觉囊派也说他们的见地是遵循佛教释迦牟尼在印三转法轮中的末转法轮的意旨,是究竟了义中观之教。 觉囊派不同意末转法轮仅为唯识教,而且主要是大乘中观了义教。 《觉囊派教法源流》说:“导师释迦牟尼佛为顺应众生根机,转了三次法轮:初为小乘转四谛法轮,其经典有《缘起经》等等,此为因时因势而说之教,后成为争论之由,属不了义教;中转远离戏论无相法轮,有《广、中、略般若经》等等,亦是因时因势所说,后成为争论之由,属半了义教,末转分辩胜义法轮,有《如来藏经》等等。这不是因时因势而说,而是宣说究竟真理,真如法性,光明如来藏,众生本具之佛智等,为完全是不可退转之了义教,所以全无所诤之处。 觉囊派 觉囊派不承认只是唯识,认为无着世亲是解释佛的末次法轮,提出如来藏和自觉智,属于大中观的了义教。他们就是随行无着所倡导的胜义有即他空见的中观学说。西藏的学者们对无着产生误解,主要是他们没有把唯识和唯觉明(不二智)分开的原因。因此他们独尊龙树认为是中观正宗,贬低无着认为只是唯识而 不是中观派。(《知识总汇》。觉囊派的看法认为这些学者对中观的理解还不全面。多罗那他把中观分为四个层次:一、共通中观;二、大中观;三、中观不共义;四、秘密义。(一)共通中观只承认缘起性空,胜义世俗皆无自性空,佛护、清辩、解脱军、静命皆属这一观点,他们说中转法轮后宣说之《般若经》等为了义经。龙树为解释经义著《中观理聚》等论成为中观派的最大权威。末转法轮各经都是不了义经。共通中观唯主“空”义,后来发展成为应成派则主张诸法自性皆空,唯名言安立而有,胜义世俗一切皆空的“毕竟空”论。 觉囊派总的教义,即其因、道、果三者之建立。一、关于因,认为众生欲求佛果,众生因地本具光明如来藏之佛果,佛与众生所具无二无别,此则所谓因地果地无别之见。肯定众生因位本具有佛性,但众生由于忽尔垢障虚妄分别,障复真性而不显了。故需离戏无分别智,破除分别实执,分别实执犹如垢衣,光明如来藏本觉妙智犹如宝珠,除去垢衣则珠光之自然本有智慧觉性显露闪耀。二、关于道即除障之法,总有两种对治法门,一依显教道:破人法二种无我,清除烦恼及所知二障,通过加行道等五道十地修行,至九、十地时始能初证离戏光明法性,悟清净如来藏。但此须历劫修行,不能园证佛果。第二则依密乘道之殊胜方便和上师密决,束气归脉,彻底清净障复如来藏上无始以来所积业及烦恼和无明种子习气,故制心而外还须制气,本性犹如虚空,分别实执犹如云雾,云雾去后虚空仍旧,悟此本元心性,一切现成但须保任,无修无治任运自然,密乘即入无有分别离戏大智大手印三摩地、即所谓空色大手印之双运三摩地。三、关于果,若此内界中因地果地无别之本有妙色光明智慧获得现证,则法身本具一切身智德相尽皆显露,本具身智无增无减,此胜义自然智,果因无别,果因一体。笃补巴说:众生因位之如来藏与佛毫无差异。此则果因无别之见也。 编辑本段 宗教特点 觉囊派承认“胜义”有,即承认有真常本性,这一点与宁玛、噶举、萨迦相同,但宁玛、噶举承认是真本性,无相寂灭非空非有,则既不可说空,也不可说有,非断非常,不断亦不常之意,更无有自空他空的词语,但觉派则认为胜义有,说得太实,可能就有问题。他们与格鲁应成派主张胜义、世俗皆是缘起性空,“毕竟空”成为针锋相对之教敌。这是空有之争在藏传佛教中的继续。 觉囊派 宁玛、噶举,萨迦承认真常本性其体但有空明,至于本性德能,则属体的相用之事,相用就是佛的智慧德相,妄用则为三有轮涅,用可随缘,但体即是一而不动。相用所化虽有,如幻,非实有。觉囊派认为佛的智慧德相属本具,亦是胜义实有(《他空精义》,乃至推到密乘的本尊,坛城,印契,种子字等皆属本具实有,那胜义有成为有形有实物,有定处的了。这点颇引起各派争议。宁玛、噶举均认为除空明外均为幻化,非究竟真实。笃补巴说: “法身功德是本具,非缘生法,是无为”。格鲁派不承认如来藏,更不承认什么本具功德,应成派认为从色法乃至一切种智(佛)均是假名安立。佛的一切智德均是由培积资粮缘起所生,他们认为本体就是绝对的空,承认胜义有就是涅 实有论。觉囊派批判这种空是把一切有为无为皆空,空无所有的顽空,是无遮断空,世俗空,是真性绝灭论。法身本具一切功德,属智慧观照之境,非凡情可以测度。 二谛是一法的两面,他们的世俗自空论,是把胜义和世俗完全分开,二谛应当是同源,宁玛派认为是真妄是体用元成的关系,噶举认为妄念为法身波是俱生的关系,都是真妄同源论,觉囊派虽说如来藏是万有依托之根,但世俗自空,使真妄隔绝了,这就是他们与他宗不同之处。还有,觉囊派是从唯识发展起来成为一派自称为大中观派。他们和唯识不同之处是唯识承认外境是无,内心实有。觉囊认为否认外境可以破小乘微尘无分的实有论,立识有作为万法所依之根,可以破中观的一切皆空论。但“识”亦是世俗心,世俗假有无实,是自空,执世俗有实属常见。又说一般中观立缘起假名,无自性是毕竟空则全无所依之根,执胜义空,属断见。他们认为世俗空后必有所依之总根,此根则最初法界,本元光明之如来藏为胜义有,此根不可能断。“世俗空可以除常见,胜义有可以除断见”故无论中观唯识皆未能离断常二边,本派才是远离二边之了义大中观,作为本派的不共之特点。 《土观宗派源流》代表应成派批判觉囊派“如来藏遍一切情器,恒常坚固”说这同外道梵声论的梵我相似。其实觉囊所说如来藏光明觉性,重在证悟自心本性,并非求证外道之神我。如来藏虽为万法所依托处,但它是无为法,并不安排主宰世间一切万有,不同于梵神。该书又说觉囊说解脱世俗自空唯余胜义,为神我独存,类似外道数论派。详细研究起来数论所说之神我系一种未离业识之世俗我相,这样的精神实体,如何能与解脱了的无我的真如本性相比。而且觉囊派说的解脱是“断去业烦恼不令新生,旧有者皆令其从速现行,如此三界轮回之苦尽后觉性无垢清净,此则名为解脱”。似乎与土观所说神我独存并不相同。 觉囊派在建立宗见理论上,似有偏颇之处,故引起非议,但他们说胜义有也非全属理论,而是通过实践证验的。宇宙内包罗有色心二法(精神和物质),二法必有一个最高的依托处,色心万法,生灭变化无常,此依托处必是真常不变的。说依托处是什么?觉囊派属心宗,必然认定是心,此心指真心。他们的《时轮》内、外、密三世界,都包含在密世界的心中,这心就是清净的如来藏。因此如来藏成为了万有的本体了。认为有个本体即等同于梵论的外道,觉囊派对世俗一切法承认是缘起,不承认有什么创世主,如来藏的提法或者与梵论派相似,相似不等于即是。不能就某一部份相似就指为是什么,那么小乘同于胜论,唯识与密宗同于数论,中观应成派同于遍入天派,中观自续派同于自在天派。

Friday, 25 September 2020

Thomé H. Fang and Whitehead -- Twin Pillars of Process Thought East and West

 Thomé H. Fang and Whitehead

 

-- Twin Pillars of Process Thought East and West

 

 

 

Suncrates

 

President

 

Thomé H. Fang Institute, Inc.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Presented to

 

Section of Chinese Cultural Tradition

 

The 6th International Whitehead Conference

 

Salzburg University

 

SalzburgAustria

 

July 3-6, 2006

 

www.thomehfang.com

 

 

 

 

***************************

 

 

 

 

“The wondrous Way of Heaven as embodied

                        in Chinese philosophy has already been

incorporated into my own works.”

     

                   --A. N. Whitehead (1861-1947)

 

“When there arises sage from the East Sea,

he shares with us the same mind, the same reason;

when there arises sage from the West Sea,

he share with us the same mind, the same reason..”

 

                           -- Lu Xiangshan (1139-1192)

 

Introductory

 

In this short paper I wish to bring home to you an intriguing case-study in comparative philosophy, by focusing on Thomé H. Fang and Whitehead as the twin pillars of process thought East and West. Realizing the presentation time limitation, I must adopt the strategy of treating a grand topic in the most compact way (da ti xiao zuo), i.e., by cutting a long story short.

 

My presentation consists of the following six sections:

 

Section I, a historical survey of the Chinese-Whiteheadian affinity case as settled at one stroke, so to speak. It is not a matter of mere coincidence; but of impact.

 

Section II, a synoptic comparative review of these two towering figures, with especial reference to Fang’s most ingenious formulation and insightful hermeneutic interpretation of Chinese metaphysics in terms of the Whiteheadian language as a linguistic upaya (expedient device) with a view to attaining to the optimal

effects of communication, ranging from the philosophy of creativism as embodied in The Book of Creativity to the cosmic organissm and universal co-prehensionism as developed by the Hua Yan School of the Mahayana Buddhism in the 7th to the 11th century China.  

 

Section III, a contrast of East vs. West epitomized as a contrast of rule vs. exception with regard to the process perspective;

 

Section IV, a call for “Farewell to the modern age of stupidism” by reference to Fang and Whitehead as two great pre-existent Postmodernists of the last 20th century, on the basis of the whole bunch of fallacies which we have so unknowingly committed and Whitehead has so skillfully formulated and warned against.

 

Section V, a brief survey of Fang’s formulation and hermeneutic interpretation of Chinese metaphysic (creativism) and Hua Yan Buddhism in Whiteheadian terms;

 

Section VI, Conclusion: the lessons from a comparative study of Thomé Fang, Hua Yan, and Whitehead.

 

 


Why Thomé H. Fang? Naturally one wonders. As one of the greatest minds of contemporary China, Fang proves most congenial to the Whiteheadian way in doing philosophy and in living an authentic human life as well: For both are inspired by an organismic vision of the Whole; both are lured for perfection; both are creativity-intoxicated; both are motivated by the will to unification: both are value-oriented; both are dedicated to adventure as “search for perfections”; both are great lovers of poetry. Fang is himself a great poet leaving posterity with a treasure of approximately one thousand consummate exquisite poems as the gem of Chinese poetry. The late sharp critic Qian Zhongshu is afraid that Master Fang may be the last of the great classical poets who are going to be irretrievably lost, gone forever. We hope Qian is wrong in his predication.

 

Endowed with a precocious mind, Fang is a prodigal talent, a wonder child who could learn by heart the entire Book of Odes at the age of three (a Mozart in philosophy, if you like); he was born of one of the intellectually most distinguished families that has produced a galaxy of eminent scholars, thinkers, and literati in the last five hundred years during the Ming and Qing Dynasties. Having been taught in his early development by several great American teachers, such as Clarence Hamilton, John Dewey, Evander Bradeley McGilvary, and E. A. Leighton, he is solidly grounded in scholarship and learning, covering four great cultural traditions of ancient Greece, modern EuropeChina, and India, and combining four fields of discipline in science, philosophy, art, and religion. With such a calibre in mind, we are convinced that, for our present comparative purpose, Fang proves one of the most eligible candidates. Whitehead must feel quite surprised to learn that, though he has taught several (four, as we know) Chinese graduate students at Harvard, yet it is Fang, a young Ph. D. in Philosophy graduated from Wisconsin in (1924) at the age of 25, one he has never taught nor met in his life time, who has eventually proved himself the best Whitehead apostle in the East: He has brought the great Whiteheadian philosophico-religious insights and visions across the Pacific and spread them via his lectures and writings to the tender minds of the younger generation Chinese scholars (my humble self included); moreover, by employing the elegance, precision, and vivid expression of the Whiteheadian language, he has succeeded in rendering a great service to the West and, on that matter, to the whole world as well, by rendering highly intelligible the essentials of Chinese metaphysical ingenuity and its achievements and contributions. Standing upon the shoulders of his predecessors, Fang is thus enabled to serve as really a bridge-builder since the mid-50s linking the East and the West as a Whole.

 

In Lucien Price’s celebrated Dialogues with Alfred North Whitehead, we learn that Whitehead has once humorously (and ironically) remarked of John Dewey and Confucius: “If you want to understand Confucius, read John Dewey. If you want to understand John Dewey, read Confucius.” Analogously, we may say of our subjects, in a completely positive sense: “If you want to understand Whitehead, read Thomé Fang. If you want to understand Thomé Fang, read Whitehead.”

 

Without Fang, the Westerner’s appreciation of Chinese metaphysical wisdom, I am afraid, would have to be delayed for an indefinite period of time! Now the karma is surely ripe. As the Buddha might put it, when the karmas are not ready, nothing would happen; when they are, nothing could stop them from happening, and happening in the way they do.

 

May this tribute of mine serve to celebrate such great creative minds as Mozart, Whitehead, and Thomé Fang in world civilization for the last three hundred years.

 

 

 

I.          Whitehead and His Relation with Chinese Thought

 

For students of comparative philosophy the case study of Whitehead and the Chinese views proves so intriguing that one seems to have hit upon a gold-mine. All the more intriguing is the finding when one asks: How far has Whitehead gone in his adventure of Oriental ideas in general, and of Chinese thoughts in particular? Surely, not quite far. How much do we know about his acquaintance with us, the “Chinaman” (an unfriendly term for “Chinese” prevalent in his days) and the Chinese civilization? On this subject our knowledge about him is no less meager than his about us.

 

But, frankly, the impression of my first reading Process and Reality in my graduate days is dramatic -- to myself at least: It seems as if I were listening to a great Chinese mind speaking perfect Victorian English, characterized by elegance, precision and “vivid expression? If any of my Western friends complains about Whitehead as hard reading, my joking but natural response is: “My good friend, you need to read Whitehead with a Chinese eye, a Chinese heart-mind (soul), or to get yourself a pair of Chinese eyeglasses!”

 

The following information data, meager as they may sound to be, would help highlight the few sample points for our present discussion:

 

(a) “The more we know of Chinese art, of Chinese literature, and of the Chinese philosophy of life, the more we admire the heights to which that civilization attained. Having regard to the span of time, and to the population concerned, China forms the largest volume of civilization which the world has seen.”[1]

 

Comment: Great modesty combined with great perspicuity. A self-revelatory confession about one's own limitation of knowledge concerned: Obviously he wishes to know more of China and her civilization.

 

(b) “In this [ultimate] general position the philosophy of organism seems to approximate more to some strains of Indian, or Chinese, thought, than to western Asiatic, or European thought. One side makes process ultimate; the other side makes fact ultimate.”[2]

 

Comment: A Manifesto of Process Thought in a Global Perspective.

 

 (c) Of such supreme masters of thought as Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Locke, Hume, Kant, etc, Whitehead remarks that “Ultimately nothing rests on authority; the final court of appeal is intrinsic reasonableness.”[3]

 

Comment: What an unforgivable and unreasonable oversight if this “final court of appeal” is found missing in the Index of Process and Reality?

 

(d) Towards the end of World War II,  at a NewYork hospital, Whitehead received the visit of Zhang Junmai (1887-1969), a student of Henri Bergson and Rudolf Eucken, an active political figure as Chairman of the Chinese Democratic Socialist Party, commissioned with the task of drawing the Constitution of the Republic of China, finally a leading voice of Neo-Confucianism in contemporary China. China, very good! ... Very reasonable!” thus stammered Whitehead amiably and feebly.[4]

 

Comment: Can there be any higher tribute to China than this one uttered from the lips of Whitehead (of course not lip-sevice)! How many modern Chinese have the same perspicuity?

(e) According to Joseph Needham, “Whitehead’s philosophy of organism may be traced back to Taoist Zhuangzi--through Leibniz’s Monadologyderiving from Leibniz’s study of the first Latin translation of Taoist literature.”[5]           .

 

Comment: An ingenious inference based on reasonable belief! .

 

(f) On the Chinese classic tradition, according to He Lin (formerly Chairman of Philosophy Department, Beijing University), Whitehead openly declares: “The wondrous way of Heaven as embodied in Chinese philosophy has already been incorporated into my own works.”[6]

 

Comment: Thus the issue at hand is settled at one stroke, so to speak!

 

Of all the citations listed above, we find He Lin’s testimony the most convincing. Whitehead’s affinity with Chinese thought has proved to be not a matter of mere coincidence. No less deeply impressed was He Lin with Whitehead’s sound view towards history and tradition:

 

To the question he raised on the study of histories of philosophy, Whitehead replied: “For a student of philosophy, the study of histories of philosophy is indispensable. I myself often talk about Plato and Kant, and I often read their works. But, mind you, under no circumstances shall we be bound by tradition, so as to allow our own thinking today be dominated by the old sayings of those ancients, ages ago.”[7]

 

Further, as we have learned from Thomé H. Fang, during Whitehead’s ten years tenure as professor of mathematical physics at London University, for approximately a period of ten years until his departure for Harvard in 1924-25, he had purchased a large number of classic works on religions of China and Indian, and read them voraciously.[8]  As the proverb goes, we can tell a person by the friends he keeps, as by the books he reads; moreover, as Fang adds, by the way he uses his money. Whitehead is likened to Sudhana (“a character of all-around capabilities”) in the Avatamsaka S­­utra, of whom Fang speaks highly as typical of what we term “value-orientation” and “value­-realization”  For both have exemplified the true spirit of adventure as “search for perfections”­ by visiting and consulting 53 men of great learning in various worlds for Sudhana; and by crossing various fields from mathematics, to logic, science, arts, philosophy, and religion, and calling for integration of all isolated systems of thought into a consummate unification under the Vision of the Whole for Whitehead.

            ­

 

II.        Thomé H. Fang and Whitehead: Twin Pillars of Process Thought East and West

 

Whitehead has taught only a handful of Chinese students at Harvard in the 30s: such as Xie YouweiShen Youding, He Lin, Wing-tsit Chan; Fang was not one among them; for he had returned from US back to China in 1924 -­subsequently after he had graduated from University of Wisconsin at Madison -- just before Whitehead’s arrival at Harvard in 1925. Paradoxically, it is this brilliant young Ph. D. at the age of 25, one whom Whitehead had never taught nor met in his life time, yet who, as one of his sincere admirers and appreciators in the East, is able to stand upon his shoulders, by demonstrating a splendid grasp of the great Whiteheadian philosophico-religious insights and visions and applying the elegance and precision of the Whiteheadian language to accomplish a Herculean task:  Early in 1939, at Chung King -- the war time capital of China -- Fang received the formal visit by Dr. Servapelli Radharkrishnan, heading the Indian Delegation of Culture and Education, and accepted the latter’s most friendly challengeand invitation as well, to play the same role for China as he did for India: by serving as spokesman for the philosophical and cultural heritage of their nation, respectively.

 

In his Preface to The Chinese View of Life (echoing The Hindu View of Life of Radharkrishnan and The Greek of Life of Lowes Dickinson), Fang explicitly acknowledges:

 

“In some places I have intentionally adopted a language which sound somewhat like that of H. Bergson, Lloyd Morgan and A. N. Whitehead who, if coming into closer contact with ‘that large volume of civilization’ in China, might breathe creative life into the same utterance.”[9]

 

            ”Philosophy’ is an attempt to express the infinity of the universe in terms of the limitations of language.”[10]  So deeply and proudly sighs Whitehead. “The real difference between languages,” remarks emphatically Ernst Cassirer, “is not a difference of sounds or signs but one of ‘world perspectives’ (Weltansichten)[11]

 

For philosophical expression the choice of language is of decisive importance. Fang’s intentional adoption of a Whiteheadian language, both for adequate expression of Chinese and Buddhist views as well, is a wise choice well grounded on such an awareness: The Chinese-Whiteheadian affinity, if thought through, is more an affinity in world perspectives than one in “sounds or signs.”

 

As shown in Fang’s first book Science, Philosophy ‘and the Significance of Life (1927, 1936), he seems to have fully endorsed to Whitehead’s broad conception of philosophy: “Philosophy is not one among the sciences with its own little scheme of abstraction which it works away by perfecting and improving. It is the survey of sciences, with the special object of their harmony and of their completion.”[12]

 

To treat the present subject within the allowed span of time, we shall be content with being able to highlight, however sketchily, the meta-level considerations on the grounds that make possible such a unique phenomenon of the Whiteheadian-Fangian feast, a thought gourmet, a tour de force in 20th century comparative philosophy.

 

While criticizing John Dewey’s metaphysical position in A History of Western Philosophy, Bertrand Russell becomes better aware of his own position, so much so that he admits, with perfect candor, that the difference between philosophers is fundamentally a matter of temperance towards analysis or synthesis. Russell is analysis-oriented whereas Dewey is synthesis-oriented. As far as his general position is concerned, Fang belongs to the same grand camp as Dewey, Bergson, and Whitehead, surely not without a Neo-Hegelian tincture and tonality. Generally, the distinguishing marks for the synthetic type of minds are (1) the organismic vision of the Whole and (2) the will to unification.[13] But to be added specifically for our present case are (3) the search for Perfection, (4) the drive towards Harmony (“Apratihata” in Sanskrit), and (5) the lure for Beauty, etc. All these can be said to have been derived from a “value-centric outlook” in general, hence a commitment to a value-centric philosophy of Nature (as natura naturans). For Whitehead, “if something exists, it possesses value.”[14] His epigrammatic formula “Good matters because of Beauty” is often cited as the ground to pronounce (inadvisedly) the whole system of his philosophy of organism an aestheticism, mainly because ‘Beauty’ is taken in a too narrow sense. So is the case with Cassirer’s whole system of philosophy of culture being titled “comprehensive aesthetics.” So is the case with Fang with whom some leading contemporary Neo-Confucianists are fond of taking issues on the priority of ethical or aesthetical value, except the late Professor Tang Junyi, one of Fang’s early students, who calls for the consummate state of all values integrated.

 

III. Process Perspective -- an exception in Western philosophy --proves a rule in Oriental philosophy

 

In Fang’s 1969 East-West Philosophers’ Conference paper “The Alienation of Man in Religion, Philosophy and Philosophical Anthropology,” he pays such a high tribute to Whitehead as to hail him as an “exception in Western philosophy.” For it is typical of Western philosophers that whenever they speak of Being, they “usually deposit it as something given beforehand”; “There is no genuine becoming in any being which has been laid out beforehand.” Thus, Fang continues:

 

“The reason for this is that Western ontology has been grounded on a formal logic fixed in formulas of static identity. Plato in later dialogues, especially in The Sophists, Bergson in Creative Evolution, Whitehead in Process and Reality, and Heidegger in Being and Time are exceptions. These exceptions, however, prove the rule which always applies in Oriental philosophy.”[15]

 

This being the case, there is little wonder that the wondrous way of Heaven as taught in Chinese philosophy finds its parallels in Whitehead’s works, especially Process and Reality, beginning with his process view of Reality, and culminating in his dipolar theory of God as both Primordial and Consequent. Much of his treatment of God and the world, as found in the concluding chapter of Process and Reality, echoes the Confucian Commentary to the Appendices to the Book of Creativity. Since it is a topic which has already been covered in my early work, there is no need to go into any details here.[16]

 

IV.       Fang and Whitehead: Towering Pre-Existent Postmodernists

 

The most valuable Whiteheadian legacy is to be found in his formulation of the fallacies committed in Western tradition, some persistent since the time of ancient Greece, some prominent in the last three hundred years: to mention a few: faI1acies of vicious bifurcation of nature, of misplaced concreteness, of axiological neutrality, of simple location, of isolated system, of perfect dictionary, or perfect definition, etc.

In his Preface to Process and Reality Whitehead has listed nine technical fallacies prevalent in 19th century philosophy. They are:(i) distrust of speculative philosophy; (ii) trust in language as adequate expression of proposition; (iii) the mode of philosophical thought which implies, and is implied by, the faculty-psychology; (iv) the subject-predicate form of expression; (v) the sensationalist doctrine of perception; (vi) the doctrine of vacuous actuality; (vii) the Kantian doctrine of the objective world as a theoretical construct from purely subjective experience; (viii) arbitrary deductions in ex absurdo arguments; (ix) belief that logical inconsistencies can indicate anything else than some antecedent errors.

 

For our present purpose, we wish to point out that Fang has, in the main, endorsed himself almost entirely to the refutation of all these fallacies, of which some prove still dominant in the intellectual climate of our times; nay, some are deeply rooted in our mindsets! The price for certain fallacies is to be paid with human tears and blood, e.g., the fallacy of vicious bifurcation in the form of Arian or non-Arian as a form of racialism so viciously committed under the Nazi rule and Hitler!

 

Process philosophers of the world, united!

Just as the Vijñ­ana-Vadian Buddhists call for “the successful transformation of consciousness into wisdom,” similarly process philosophers like Fang and Whitehead call for “the successful transcendence beyond fallacies towards wisdom.” The end-results of fallacies spells stupidism par excellence; conjoint efforts are needed to initialize human awareness so as to create a New .Philosophy Towards Wisdom. It is long overdue to declare: “Farewell to Stupidism!”

Of all the fore-mentioned fallacies, it is the one of vicious bifurcation that has impressed Fang most, and of which he has made the most frequent use while criticizing some undesirable portions of Western philosophy. For Fang, another fascinating point of departure for construction of a philosophy proper is Whitehead’s critical refutation of isolated systems, calling for their integration, unification, and completion. Whitehead is heard to have sighed deeply but nobly: “Human beings as we are, we are doomed to play the role of God, as co-worker with the Divine!” To this grand view the Chinese mind is not foreign; for it is found in the Primordial Confucian doctrine of cosmic identification and cosmic participation (參贊化育), the Heavenly work must be done via the human hand instead; we are the junior agents of Heaven (手代天工).

 

V.         Fang’s Creative Hermeneutics of Chinese Metaphysic and Mahayana Buddhism in Whiteheadian Terms

 

In the Whiteheadian terminologies Fang seems to have located a sort of linguistic upaya (expedient device) which he has successfully applied to accomplish two Herculean tasks in the world of comparative philosophy. One is his ingenious formulation and interpretation of the metaphysical principles as embodied in The Book of Creativity; the other, his insightful elucidation of the essentials of the Hua Yan (Avatamsaka) philosophy.

 

All great synthetic minds of the modern time, from Bergson to Dewey and Whitehead, aim to construct an adequate metaphysics. But the point is: what is the adequacy criterion? and even what is metaphysics? For Whitehead. metaphysics (or speculative philosophy, as he calls it) “is the endeavour to frame a coherent, logical, and necessary system of general ideas in terms of which every element of our experience can be interpreted.” “Metaphysics is the method productive of important knowledge.”[17]

 

His critic Stephen C. Pepper comments on the requirement for the “logical” as not free from the logician’s bias; but, likewise, he sees in metaphysics an “art of interpretation.” They may differ in their interpretation of “interpretation”! A hint, however, can be found in Whitehead’s view of cosmology as the foundation of religion.  Analogically, metaphysic can be viewed as the foundation of the ways of authentic living as well as of being human. Or, with Husserl, the phenomenological method is meant for conversion and transformation of personality! Instead of “the style is the person,” let us claim “metaphysics is the person.”  By “interpretation” is meant “interpretation in deeds, not merely in words”-- that is, by effecting an actual occasion out of significance.

 

Next, we consider the adequacy criterion for construction of metaphysics. Modern logicians like Alfred Tarski have laid down a threefold requirement: “coherent, independent, and complete,” The last one was abandoned as a result of the Gödel Theory of Incompleteness. The second is found reflective of a certain atomistic mentality. Comparing and contrasting these relevant views, we may advance a revised definition as follows: “Metaphysics is the endeavor to frame a coherent, interdependent, and open system of general ideas in terms o[which every element of our experience can be interpreted.” This revised modified version proves less controversial, nevertheless. So much for metaphysical and methodologically considerations.

 

            As.a metaphysics in this revised sense, Fang’s early .formulation in the Whiteheadian language the Chinese position in terms of six principles can be viewed as adequate. They are: (1) Principle of Life; (2) Principle of Love; (3) Principle of Creative Advance; (4) Principle of Primordial Unity; (6) Principle of Equilibrium and Harmony; and (6) Principle of Extensive Connection. Each is further elucidated with a set of explanatory categories.[18]  His later formation is much simpler: ( 1) Principle of Life; (2) Principle of Creative Advance; (3) Principle of Extensive Connection; and (4) Principle of Creative Life as Process of Value-Realization.[19]

 

The same adequacy criteron applies to Dewey’s metaphysical position. According to Professor Joseph S. Wu, it comprises the following six principles: (1) Principle of Quality; (2) Principle of Continuity; (3) Principle of Interaction; (4) Principle of Relational Outlook; (5) Principle of Genetic Function; and (6) Principle of Emergence of Novelty.

 

Another great American process philosopher Stephen C. Pepper, founder of contextualism, who aims to refine Dewey and revise Whitehead, applies the Occam’s razor strategy to the formulation of essential principles of contextualism as a world hypothesis in terms of (1) Principle of Change and Novelty; and (2) Principle of Quality and Context! Even just the principle of Quality and Context would do. That is all! For Pepper, the simpler the better!

 

VI.       Fang, Hua Yan, and Whitehead -- Enlightening Lessons

 

The first thing a student of comparative philosophy should always bear in mind is that comparison itself is aimed as a method of discovery, and comparative study is not a matter of parallels hunting, as playing the majiang-games. Metaphysics should be best approached not as a set of doctrines of this or that form of isms, rather it should be pursued as a method and, as Whitehead recommends emphatically, “a method productive of important knowledge.” This being the case with metaphysics, how much more so with comparative metaphysics? In comparative studies of any field, due recognition of similarities is not as important as due appreciation of differences. Difference provides contrasts,  and contrasts are indispensable as the “mode of synthesis.” Thus observes Whitehead - rightly.

 

Take for example the sinicization of Mahayana Buddhism in China. Apart from the Chan tradition, D. T. Suzuki has spoken highly of Zhi Yi and Fa Zang, founders of the Tian Tai and Hua Yan Schools:

 

Zhi Yi was a great Buddhist philosopher, and Fa Zang was still a greater one. The latter marks the climax of Buddhist thought as it developed in ChinaFa Zang’s systematization of ideas expounded in the Buddhist Sutra-group known as the Gandavyuha or Avatamsaka (Kegon in Japanese and Hua Yan in Chinese) is one of the wonderful intellectual achievements performed by the Chinese mind and is of the highest importance to the history of world thought. …

 

Zhi Yi and Fa Zang are minds of the highest order, not only in China but in the whole world.”[20]

 

This passage justifies perfectly the claim that, were Buddhism to be put on equal par with the philosophical affinity between the Chinese and Western process positions, it must be made Chinese enough. The phenomenon of the very existence of the Hua Yan and Tian Tai Schools bears the most eloquent witness to the case in question. Even in the words of J. Takakusu, another great Buddhist scholar of Japan, the Hua Yan School is “indeed a glory of the learned achievement of Chinese Buddhism.”[21]

In concluding this section we may add that, by thus sinicizing Buddhism, the Chinese genius has rendered the Mahayana Buddhism all the more Mahayanaic and the Hua Yan School (literally, the “‘Flowery Splendor”) all the more hua yan (splendid), in the sense that it is made closer to the original teachings of the Buddha himself. The Chinese genius of synthesis or creative appropriation has helped consummate Buddhism and has charted out a route to the goal of a world philosophical synthesis at the same time. Perhaps Suzuki may not be fully aware of how right his judgement was when he said that Zhi Yi and Fa Zang were minds of the highest order not only in China but in the whole world. Indeed, they are. Their achievements are of the highest importance to the history of world thought, because they have essentially anticipated by more than a millenium such a great mind in the West as Whitehead, “the culminating unification of the entire Western tradition.”[22] (as hailed by the late professor Albert William Levi.)

 

The sinicization of Buddhism in China takes a long course of several hundred years, beginning with Hui Yuan of the 6th century, going through Du Shun, and culminating in Zhi Yan, Cheng Guan and Fa Zang of the Tang Dynasty in the 7th to the 11 th century.  Hui Yuan’s epoch-making contribution consists in his advancement of the doctrine of Universal Relational Origination, which Du Shun calls doctrine of Infinite Relational Origination (“wujin yuan i” in Chinese). Du Shun’s crucial importance consists in his great synoptic vision whereby he has succeeded not only in appropriate relegation of the Hua Yan doctrines according to various phases undergone through; but, more significantly, in his being able to sum up the entire Hua Yan philosophy under a few grand principles, particularly, the doctrine of Three Grand Views of (1) the True Void; of (2) the inter-penetration of Reason and Events: and of (3) universal co­-prehension.

 

The following citation from my early works serves for the purpose of sampling:

 

This new “doctrine of infinite co-prehension” is the Chinese philosophy of infinitude, originating in I-Ching: the Book of Creativity and developed by Zhuangzi, in Buddhist dress. Du Shun is such a great philosophical mind with synoptic vision that he is able to stand on the shoulders of his precedessors, particularly Hui Yuan. The great significance of his contribution to Chinese Buddhism lies in (a) relegation in proper order of the essentials of various doctrines into a well organized comprehensive system and (b) three grand views of the dharma-dhatu. As regards the former program of proper relegation of.Buddhist doctrines through critical classification, we need only mention that ten tenets are subsumed in a masterful fasion under five principles:24 (1) the existence of dharmas (events) and the non-existence of atman (substantive self-nature), c_rresponding to the teaching of the Hinayana School (which includes six tenets) ; (2) samsara as nTrvanai. e. , samskrita as asamskrita (process as reality), correspQnding to the fundamental teachings of the Mahayana Schoo_ (3) interpenetrativeness of reason and dharmas (events), corresponding to the consummatory teachings of the’ Mahayana School; (4) transcendence beyond words and contemplation, corresponding to the abrupt teachings of the Chan (Zen) Sect of the Mahayaana School; (5) the Hua Yan samadhi (meditation on the coalescence of subject and object as the consummate_wisdom), corresponding to the round (perfect) teachings of the Mahayana School. Thus it is seen that on the basis of these five categorical principles Du Shun has re legated into proper order all the essentials of Buddhism, both of the Hinayana and the Mahayana Schools, and that the Hua Yan position is characterized by all those “fundamental, abrupt, consummatory, and round, i. e. , perfect” phases of Mahayana Buddhism. In sum, the Hua Yan School represents theoretically the culminating unification of the entire Buddhist tradition.

 

The true greatness of Du Shun as a chorismatic founder of a new sect in Buddhism lies not so much in his establishment of the Hua Yan School in China that opened up a new path in philosophy and religion as in his being able to formulate synoptically his far reaching insight and great vision into a few key-premises whereby the entire course of the subsequent movement of this school is charted out and its central themes defined accordingly. As J. Takakusu well observed, “The foundation-stone of the Kegon (Hua Yan) doctrine was laid down once for all by the famous Du Shun.”[23] This very foundation-stone is none other than the “three grand views of dharma-dhatu”as Reality­in-hself: namely, (1) the true void as the ultimate reality-in-itself; (2L the interpenetrativeness of reason and events and (3) the dovetailing of all events in theform of comprehensive co-inherence and universal co-prehensions. The subsequent progress of the Hua Yan School consists of further elucidation and elaboration of the insights implied in Du Shun’s three grand views, particularly by his immediate successors, Zhi YanFa Zang, Cheng Guan, and Zong Mi. It is therefore no exaggerating to say that the entire tradition of the Hua Yan system consists of but a series of footnotes to Du Shun, its progenitor, whose towering stature in the world of speculative philosophy remains unsurpassed. As regards the theoretical scheme of the Hua Yan philosophy, such as the doctrine of the fourfold realm of dharmas (events), doctrine of perfect harmony of sixfold characteristics of all events, and the ten tenets on profound mystery (as the subdivisions of the five principles mentioned above), no detailed account will be attempted here. To illustrate the striking similarity between Whitehead and the Hua Yan system, one may take as an example the doctrine of the fourfold realm of dharmas. The whole universe, according to this doctrine, is a fourfold rea.1m of events by virtue of co-inherence and co-­prehension: It involves (a) the differential realm of events; (b) the intergrative realm of reason; (c) the interpenetrative realm of reason and events; and (d) the interlacing realm.

 

So much for sampling the flavor of Whitehead and the Hua Yan sentiment of life!

 

VI.              Conclusion & Suggestion

 

No comparative study on any topic is complete without certain critical reflections. In spite of our great admiration for Whitehead as prophet-type of philosophical mind, he is not free from the critical acumen of his contemporaries. To mention a few: (1) Charles Hartshorne, as he told me in 1978, feels not happy with the platonic ghosts still lingering on Whitehead’s thought in the shape of Eternal Forms; (3) Stephen C. Pepper finds “logical,” as ‘a requirement for any adequate metaphysics, is typical of Whitehead’s logician’s bias (Cf. Pepper, Concept and Quality): (4) Lewis E. Hahn my Dissertation Advisor at SIUC, sharing the same sort of complaints with me, finds Process and Reality “unnecessarily complicated” as a book; and (5) Thomé Fang’s over-all evaluation of the Whitehead phenomenon is expressed not without a touch of regret.         .

 

Fang recommends the comparative studies on Whitehead and Hua Yan as the most challenging and fruitful. His words sound at once inspiring, methodical, and sagacious:

 

“Let me suggest you one more subject for studies that will enable you to arrive at important end-results in your future research project. In order to be fruitful, I think, it is the philosophy of organism as developed by Whitehead in the modern times. Make a comparative study of it with the Hua yan Philosophy as developed in China -- in regard to their ontologies, their methodologies, their schemes of general ideas, their categories of thought, and finally their entire systems as a whole. If you can really attain to such end­-results, surely yon can cut yourself a great figure in philosophy.”[24]

 

Finally, Fang pays his high tribute not without a touch of regret for Whitehead:

 

“For instance, Whitehead, the best philosophical mind in our modern philosophy, in Process and     Reality, attempts to fully develop the same great vision of “Apratihata” as developed in Hua Yan. Unfortunately Whitehead is unable to read Chinese. Were he able to, and favored with the opportunity to study The Hua Yan S­utra (Avatamsaka), The Hua Yan Grand Views of the Dhamadtu, The Hua Yan Profound Mirror of Reality (Dhamadatu)Searches for the Profundities of the Hua Yan Sutra, Elucidations on the Profundities of the Hua Yan Sutra, Collected Major Commentaries to the Hua Yan Sutra, certainly he would all the more admire the comprehensivity and ultimate wondrous profundities of the Hua Yan perspective. He would of course understand the golden age of the Hua yan Philosophy in China, dating from the 6th century onwards until the 11th century, as anticipating much of the formation of his own philosophical thought by several hundred years, in terms of thoroughness and height.  So amazing that it is simply inconceivable for our modern Westerners.”[25]

 

But, on the other hand, Fang says, what if Whitehead had mastered Hua Yan, especially Du Shun’s “Three Grand Views of the Dhamadatu,” his Process and Reality would have been cut at least by ha1f!”[26]

 



Notes

 

[1] Alfred North Whitehead, -- Science and the Modern World (New York: The Free Press 1967), p. 7.

 

[2] A N. Whitehead, Process and Reality, Critical Edition by David  RGriffin and Donald W. Sherborne (New York: The Free Press, 1978), p. 7.

 

[3] Ibid., p. 39.

 

[4] Cf. Mou ZongsanThe Learning of Authentic Living: Collected Papers (Taipei: San Min Books Co., 1971), p. 47.

 

[5] Joseph Needham, Science and Civilization in China (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1969), VoL IIpp. 291-303. Needham is also quite impressed with the philosophy of organicism as developed by Zhuxi (1130-1200) in 12th century China.

 

[6] Cf. He Lin, Lectures on Contemporary Western Philosophy, p. 104, cited in Wang Sijun and Li sudongHe Lin: A Critical Biography (NanchangJiangxiBai Hua Zhou Press, 1995), p. 20-21.  He Lin studied with Whitehead at Harvard in 1929; and often attended the Saturday evening receptions held at the Whitehead’s. Once, he and two other Chinese graduate students, Xie Youwei and Shen Youding, visited their revered mentor.  As he recalls, Whitehead expressed his concern with the situation of philosophy in China then in the late 20s; and his disapproval of men like Hu Shih, the great John Dewey disciple in China, for his uncritically negative attitude towards the Chinese classical tradition:

 

“Whitehead asked them about the situation in the Chinese philosophical circles, referring to a young scholar (by name ‘Hu Shih’) who came for a visit, not long ago. He found Hu had gone too far in his attitude -- one of wholesale abandonment -- towards the Chinese traditional culture. He was wondering if the Chinese people now are still reading the works of Laozi, and Kongzi (Confucius). For him, as culture has continuity, the establishment of any new culture can not be done by breaking away from the classic tradition.  Moreover, Whitehead told them, the wondrous way of Heaven as embodied in Chinese philosophy has already been incorporated into his own works.”

 

[7] Ibid.

 

            [8] Thomé H Fang, Lectures on the Hua Yan Philosophy (Taipei: The Liming Cultural Enterprises, Co., Ltd, revised edition, 2005), Part I, p. 71; old edition, pp. 30-31.

 

            [9] Thomé H Fang, The Chinese View if Life: The Philosophy if Comprehensive Harmony (Taipei: Linking Publishing Co. Ltd., 1986). P. iii.

 

[10] Paul A Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy if Alfred North Whitehead (New York: Tudor Publishing Company, 1951), p. 14.

 

[11] Ernst CassirerAn Essay on Man (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1944, 1966). p.120.

 

[12] A N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, p. 87.

 

[13] Cf. Ibid., p. 86, for Whitehead’s keen observation on the romantic poet Shelley as “an emphatic witness to a prehensive unification as constituting the very being of nature.” In Chinese philosophical terminology ‘prehensive unification’ is called ‘hushe jiaoganpangtong tonghui’ (互攝交感,旁通統貫).

 

[14] John Goheen, “Whitehead’s Theory of Value” in Paul A Schilppop. cit., p. 438.

 

             [15] Thomé H Fang, Creativity in Man and Nature: A Collection if Philosophical Essays (Taipei: Linking Publishing Co., 1983). P. 85.

 

[16] Interested readers are therefore referred to my early paper “A Summit Meeting in Metaphysics, Religion and Philosophical Anthropology,” Proceedings of the First International Conference in Sinology, Academia Sinica, 1980, Section of Philosophy and Thought, Vol. II. pp. 117-182; an updated and expanded version (2005) is available on www.Thoméhfang.com

 

[17] A N. Whitehead. Process and Reality, p. 3.

 

[18] Cf. Fang, The Chinese View of Life, pp.

 

[19] For details consult Thomé H Fang, The Chinese View of Life, pp. 44-52; and Chinese Philosophy: Its Spirit and its Development, pp. 106-112.. It is interesting to note that concise as the later version is, Western readers (e.g., Dr. Lewis E. Hahn) still prefer the early version for a fuller account. Both versions are based on Fang’s short essay “Three Types of Philosophical Wisdom” (1937), of which am English translation is available for participants at this session. See Supplementary Reference Materials, “Why Thomé H Fang?” pp. 60-64.

 

[20]

 

[21]

 

[23]

 

[24] Fang, Lectures on The Hua Yan Philosophy, old edition, Vol. I, p. 412-3.

 

[25] Ibid., Vol. II, p. 283.